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L etterbox companies are an increasing phenomenon of major concern for the European trade union movement. Such artificial business constructions allow for their domiciliation in a tax friendly country, while performing commercial activities in other countries. The main 
objective is to minimize tax liability. Not only do letterbox companies represent a real danger to 
public finances, they constitute a direct threat to social Europe leading to social dumping and the 
exploitation of workers. Yet, EU law leaves room for such intolerable practices, and letterbox-type 
arrangements are expanding throughout the Union.
It is necessary for the European Union to introduce effective measures against artificial arrangements 
and letterbox companies, to live up to its obligations to protect and promote a social market economy 
aiming at full employment and social progress.
The European Trade Union Confederation has been at the core of the fight against letterbox 
companies for many years. 
From 2015 to 2017, the ETUC dedicated time and resources to conduct a project revealing the 
adverse impacts on labour rights and public revenue of letterbox companies practices on the basis 
of four major case studies.1 This project led to a series of key recommendations and put forward 
concrete proposals to the European institutions.2
Drawing on its expertise, the ETUC actively engaged in the 2018-2019 negotiations on the Company 
Mobility Law Package with the European institutions to push for the introduction of effective 
measures against letterbox companies to guarantee that company mobility cannot be used to evade 
or circumvent companies’ social and fiscal obligations. The 2019 European Parliament (EP) report very 
much reflected the input of the ETUC. The agreement reached in the trilogue negotiations between 
the European Commission, the European Parliament and the European Council constitutes a step 
forward compared to the unregulated status quo. However, it does not contain the most ambitious 
improvements put forward by the EP. The ETUC will be further active in pushing for an ambitious and 
effective transposition of the directives related to the Company Mobility Law Package. 
The ETUC Action Programme 2019-2023 includes the objective of combating letterbox companies 
and artificial arrangements. It paves the way for a renewed and determined ETUC strategy and 
actions in the next months and years.3 
In this framework, the study of Jan Cremers constitutes a major contribution to the expertise the ETUC 
has gained in the framework of the previous project. The report provides key evidence, by highlighting 
how European and national legal frameworks still fail to regulate and effectively tackle letterbox 
companies. It also contains recommendations which will be extremely useful for the work of the ETUC. 
The ETUC would like to thank Jan Cremers for his valuable contribution which provides for robust 
foundation and paves the way for ambitious ways forward to tackle letterbox companies’ practices 
of social dumping and tax evasion. 
Isabelle Schömann, ETUC Confederal Secretary 
1 K. McGauran, The impact of letterbox type practices on labour rights and public revenue, ETUC project on letterbox companies, June 2016.
 https://www.etuc.org/en/publication/impact-letterbox-type-practices-labour-rights-and-public-revenue
2 M. Houwerzijl, E. Henneaux, E. Traversa, A hunters game: how policy can change to spot and sink letterbox-type practices, ETUC project on letterbox companies, December 
2016. https://www.etuc.org/sites/default/files/publication/files/ces-brochure_compiled_thematic-uk-v2.pdf




1  The freedom of establishment was the subject of a series of court cases. The CJEU ruled that a restriction on the freedom of establishment can be justified on the ground of 
prevention of abusive practices. The specific objective of such a restriction must be to prevent conduct involving the creation of wholly artificial arrangements, which do not 
reflect economic reality, with a view to escaping the tax normally due on the profits generated by activities carried out on national territory. For an overview of relevant cases 
see: Guide to the Case Law of the European Court of Justice on Articles 49 et seq. TFEU, European Commission, 2017.
2    Interestingly, Directive 2002/14/EC establishing a general framework for informing and consulting employees in the European Community uses a definition of the undertaking 
that has been the main reference in court cases and juridical reasoning related to workers’ representation. This Directive defines the concept of undertaking as a public or 
private undertaking carrying out an economic activity, whether or not operating for gain, which is located within the territory of the Member States. 
T he creation of the Single Market in the late 1980s gave way to several economic freedoms with an impact on the socioeconomic situation of the citi-
zens and workers in the European Union.  These economic 
freedoms became enshrined in the Treaty on the Func-
tioning of the European Union (TFEU). The core principles 
governing the Single Market in relation to cross-border 
activities by mobile firms across the European Union are:
• the freedom to establish a corporate entity in another 
EU country (Article 49 TFEU),
• the freedom to provide or receive services in an EU 
country other than the one where a company or con-
sumer is established (Article 56 TFEU).
TFEU limits its scope in the context of the freedom of 
establishment to ‘companies or firms formed in accordance 
with the law of a Member State and having their registered 
office, central administration or principal place of busi-
ness within the Union’ (Article 54 TFEU). Consequently, the 
mobility of companies is promoted and guaranteed. The EU 
acquis says little about a possible abuse of these freedoms, 
although several disputes have led to court cases.1   
The application of the core principles evolved on the 
one hand through case law of the European Court of 
Justice, and on the other hand with the adoption of the 
Services Directive in 2006. The main aim of the Services 
Directive is promoting and simplifying the setting up of 
service providers in their home country and abroad and 
stimulating and simplifying the cross-border provision 
of services across the EU and its Member States. The 
central goal is to ensure and create an easier access to 
the market. 
There is neither a legal definition of undertakings in 
the TFEU, nor in the relevant competition or company 
law acts at EU or national level. In general, the concept 
‘undertaking’ is EU-wide described as any entity engaged 
in an economic activity, irrespective of its legal status and 
the way in which it is financed. To this end, the CJEU has 
sought to maximise the application of competition law by 
the use of a broad wording of undertakings. An economic 
activity is any activity consisting in offering goods and 
services on a given market. This broad approach has the 
consequence that an undertaking within EU Competition 
law is interpreted independently of national conceptions.2 
The prevailing definition is thus not necessarily identical 
to the notion of the corporate legal entity in national 
commercial, company or fiscal law. 
In principle, the creation of a legal corporate entity 
appears to be a national affair. The creation has to take 
place in accordance with the relevant provisions of national 
company law (with the exception of the SE and the SCE, 
which are regulated by EU rules). However, the performance 
of cross-border services by mobile firms is the result of an 
interplay of national and EU-rules:
a. Although founding a firm is still a national affaire, 
national company law is, over the years, trans-
formed across the EU into a field that is dominated 
by a deregulation policy entirely framed by the search 
for cross-border and transnational competitiveness 
and attractiveness (Cremers & Wolters 2011). Many 
Member States treat company law nowadays as one 
of the factors determining business location decisions 
that companies weight up (comparable to the presence 
of skilled labour, logistics and infrastructure, nearby 
customer/consumer markets).
b. The EU was modest in its ambitions in the area of com-
pany law until the late 1980s: an effective corporate 
governance framework had to create a level-playing 
field and a positive EU-wide business environment. The 
objective of harmonising company law was to promote 
the freedom of establishment. In the course of the 
1990s, this scope shifted and the purpose of EU rules 
changed to enable businesses to be set up and to carry 
out operations anywhere in the EU enjoying the eco-
nomic freedoms, to provide protection for shareholders 
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and other parties with an interest in companies, to 
make businesses more competitive, and to encourage 
businesses to cooperate across borders. Nowadays, 
European company law rules cover corporate issues 
such as the formation, capital and disclosure require-
ments, and cross-border operations (take-overs, 
mergers, and divisions).3 Moreover, the CJEU defined 
the concept of an establishment in case law. In the 
Gebhard Case (C-55/94) the Court defined the con-
cept of an establishment within the meaning of the 
Treaty as very broad, ‘allowing a Community national 
to participate, on a stable and continuous basis, in the 
economic life of a Member State other than his State 
of origin and to profit therefrom, so contributing to 
economic and social interpenetration within the Com-
munity in the sphere of activities as self-employed 
persons.’4 The single Directive (Directive 2017/1132 
relating to certain aspects of company law) codified a 
large part of the EU company law.5 
c. The Services Directive (Directive 2006/123/EC of 12 
December 2006 on services in the internal market) 
intended to enhance the implementation of the two 
economic freedoms that were seen as cornerstones 
of the completion of the internal market (freedom of 
establishment and the freedom to provide services). 
The Directive’s aim is to create an open single market of 
services within the EU. The Directive speaks (in Article 
5.1) about ‘the purpose of further simplification of pro-
cedures and formalities applicable to have “access to a 
service activity and to the exercise” of these activities.’
d. Besides these aspects of primary law, the activities of 
mobile companies with workers that provide cross-bor-
der services are ruled by several other Directives and 
Regulations, partly belonging to the social domain, 
partly arising from specific sectoral legal acts. In the 
area of the coordination of social security in the EU, in 
the field of the posting of workers and, for instance, in 
the 2009 Regulation with common rules for access to 
the international road haulage, efforts can be found that 
aim to ‘regulate’ the activity of firms. One might even 
refer to the temporary agency work Directive (2008/104/
EC) that seeks to establish a suitable framework for the 
use of temporary agency work across the EU. 
3  See the factsheet http://www.europarl.europa.eu/factsheets/en/sheet/35/company-law 
4  In the Cadbury Schweppes, the Court added that the question whether there is an actual establishment should be based on objective factors which are ascertainable by third 
parties with regard, in particular, to the extent to which the company physically exists in terms of premises, staff and equipment. 
5  A proposal (the Company Law Package of 25 April 2018) to revise and upgrade Directive 2017/1132, by introducing rules on digital tools and processes in company law and on 
cross-border conversions, mergers and divisions was negotiated in 2019 by the European Parliament and the Council. The co-legislators reached a compromise agreement on 4 
February 2019. The EP endorsed it on 18 April, the Council on 13 June 2019. It will apply 2 years from the date of its entry into force. 
6  The author wishes to thank several experts and practitioners that contributed. Special thanks to Katrin McGauran, Bettina Wagner, Thomas Hastings, Frederic De Wispelaere 
and Walter Gagawczuk for their detailed national reports.  
The aim of the research was to work with questions 
such as: 
• How can the genuine character of mobile legal corpo-
rate entities be determined and guaranteed? 
• What if a registered legal entity is no more than a let-
terbox company? 
• How to counteract non-genuine, fraudulent activities? 
• In addition, are there any instruments that serve to 
protect workers effectively against abuses of fake 
cross-border service provision by artificial arranged 
legal entities that function as recruiters or intermedi-
ates?
• And finally, are there any effective and dissuasive 
sanctions available?
The subject of this report spans a broad field of inter-
twined disciplines. The emphasis is on the phenomenon 
of (artificial) corporate entities operating in a cross-border 
context of free provision of services. The starting point is 
an analysis of the EU-parts of the regulatory frame for the 
internal market, followed by a general review of adjacent 
EU-social policies (chapter 2). Formulating legislation is one 
thing, making it work is another. Therefore, the analysis of 
the acquis is followed by a description of the implemen-
tation and functioning at national level, based on national 
input. Several national experts have delivered reports and 
legal information for the part that deals with the national 
implementation and practical functioning (Chapter 3).6  
The synthesis (Chapter 4) summarises the findings. The 
final section (Chapter 5) comes up with closing remarks 
and some policy recommendations. 
So far, research examining the functioning of corpo-
rate legal entities and the possible fraudulent use in a 
cross-border context from a social and workers’ rights 
perspective is scarce, certainly if compared with issues of 
fiscal engineering and money laundering. This research is 
for more than one reason work-in-progress, not in the least 
because the community of company law and corporate 
governance scholars is still more concerned about deregu-
lation and simplification than about societal consequences 
of their discipline. Serious investigation of the problem 
requires a multidisciplinary approach, including company 




T his report starts with an investigation of several aspects of the EU acquis that are relevant in the assessment of the ‘genuine’ character of 
corporate legal entities acting as cross-border service 
providers. Since there is a clear intersection between 
different policy areas (company law and related corpo-
rate law issues and the EU-rules on the free provision of 
services on the one hand, different areas of social policy 
on the other hand), the notion of genuine undertakings 
is also analysed in the social policy parts of the acquis.
• The first conclusion is that EU rules, which are for-
mulated in the area of company law, do not provide a 
definition of the genuine undertaking. The EU’s start-
ing point is simplifying and deregulating the entrance 
to the ‘business environment’. The basis is mutual 
trust and confidence between Member States and the 
assumption that the registration in any Member State 
is good enough for activities across Europe.
• Requirements that are described by the EU legislator 
with regard to registration are superficial and easy 
to handle by a ‘virtual’ office or by an ‘incubator’ 
that organises the establishment of the legal entity, 
arranges a company registered office address and 
takes care of registration duties.
• The core articles of the Services Directive do not 
specify strict requirements, which could rule the 
genuine character of corporate entities that act as 
service providers.
• The Regulations for the coordination of social security 
(883/2004 and 2009/987) provide certain criteria for 
the assessment of the genuine character of an under-
taking that posts workers. The assumption is that 
the posting undertaking/service provider is a genu-
ine company, registered and normally carrying out 
substantial activities in the country of registration. 
However, the CJEU so far has limited the possibilities 
to challenge shell companies with no real activities. 
• The Enforcement Directive 2014/67/EU does not 
change the situation that host countries have to rely 
entirely on information of the home country or the 
country of the registered office. Reference to the 
assessment of the genuine character is in line with 
the ‘substance rules’ formulated in the Regulations 
for the coordination of social security. These criteria 
apply first and foremost to the factual posting activity 
of the worker, and to a lesser extent to the activity of 
the service provider in the country of registration.
• The national reporting related to the assessment and 
monitoring of the genuine character of companies 
clearly indicates that it is current practice to regis-
ter companies without checking real activities and 
most Member States do not apply any requirements 
related to activities in the country of incorporation.
National company law, in the strict sense, seems 
hardly to be affected by the developments related to 
fraud and regulatory arbitrage. The terms ‘genuine’ or 
‘non-genuine’ undertaking do not figure in the EU acquis 
and are only sparsely used in the legislation of Member 
States. The information, necessary to determine 
whether a company is a genuine undertaking, of national 
registries is incomplete and superficial, and commercial 
databases are inconsistent, scarce and easy to manip-
ulate. As far as national instruments are used to tackle 
fraudulent practices with corporate legal entities in 
the context of cross-border services, these instruments 
neither stem from regulations enshrined in company law 
nor from the (implemented) safety-of-services related 
legislation. Limited efforts are made to tackle these 
practices based on secondary legislation in adjacent 
policy areas (i.e. labour inspectorate, social security 
offices). Compliance offices lack the competence to act 
effectively and thoroughly against non-genuine entities.
Research reveals that there is no definition of fraud-
ulent activities provided in the EU acquis related to 
company law and it is not an abuse of EU law to incorpo-
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rate a letterbox company in the Member State with the 
most attractive company law. Moreover, the EU-policy 
in general and the ECJ-rulings in particular provide 
low-cost corporate law leading to regulatory competition 
between EU Member States. Deregulation of corporate 
law affects the decision of firms of where to incorporate, 
without any direct link to real activities, and the wide-
spread use of an industry of special incorporation agents 
to facilitate legal mobility across countries has been the 
result.
• The policy area of national and EU company law lacks 
concrete reference to (the necessity to tackle) abuses 
and fraud.
• The Services Directive makes no reference to possi-
ble social fraud, for instance abusive cross-border 
recruitment practices by artificial arrangements that 
serve as service providers. The European Commission 
is mostly occupied with ‘unjustified’ restrictions and 
requirements that, according to the Treaty and the 
case law, are not permitted.
• The Services Directive includes two chapters that 
could serve to tackle fraudulent activities (Chapter V 
on protection of clients with mandatory information 
and Chapter VI on transnational cooperation of com-
petent authorities). However, the Directive gives no 
guidance how to make this operational; as a conse-
quence, effective implementation cannot be found.
• Very limited national assessment of the functioning of 
the liaison points can be found; most Member States 
refer back to the European Commission services in 
this area. In some countries, the liaison points and 
the points of single contact are being mixed up. In 
general, the points of single contact activities are 
restricted to free support of individuals and compa-
nies planning to establish an economic activity.
• The assessment of the IMI-instrument as a contri-
bution to tackle the fraudulent use of the freedom to 
provide services is still in infancy and alerts in this 
area are rather rare. Assessments of the function-
ing of the IMI-system are dominated by businesses’ 
expectations and worries about too much regula-
tion or data protection. Most attention is paid to the 
proportionality of national requirements under the 
Services Directive.
In practice, there is very limited ex ante verification 
activity in the Member States to explore whether a 
service provider is a genuine undertaking and carries 
out real activities. The national experts have not come 
across prominent case law on ‘non-substantial’ service 
provision based on ex ante verification. Various inspec-
tion activities may come into play if a company is failing 
to oblige different aspects of tax/labour law and ex post 
investigation in a firm is most likely in case of suspi-
cion of financial crimes. Until the point where there is 
evidence of this, assessing the genuine status of a firm’s 
activities by an authority is unlikely.
The EU acquis in the area of company policy aims 
to create a business-friendly legal environment, by 
reducing the ‘administrative burden’. In line with 
this philosophy EU company law directives give little 
detailed registration prescriptions. There is no 
support for a central European registration. Monitoring 
the registration is a responsibility of the Member State 
of registration. Nevertheless, the registration of a 
company shall, through the system of interconnection of 
registers, make available, without delay, the information 
on the opening and termination of any winding-up or 
insolvency proceedings of the company and on the strik-
ing-off of the company from the register, if this entails 
legal consequences in the Member State of the register 
of the company. 
• National company law in general makes it easy for 
companies to register and to decide where to reg-
ister its seat. It does not matter whether or not the 
company performs real activities from this registered 
address. The few requirements that are described 
by the EU legislator with regard to registration are 
superficial and easy to handle by a ‘virtual’ office or 
by an ‘incubator’ that organises the establishment of 
the legal entity, arranges a company registered office 
address and takes care of registration duties.
• Registration at the Chamber of Commerce, the usual 
practice in many countries, offers no guarantee. The 
Chambers have no monitoring tasks and play no 
substantial role in compliance and enforcement prac-
tices. At its best, there is verification of the accuracy 
of the information and a check for the sake of com-
pleteness.
• The registration of service providers remains a 
national affair in the country of registration. Member 
States are bound to introduce competent bodies, 
mechanisms and activities that are depending on this 
registered information.
• It is possible for a host country to impose require-
ments with regard to the provision of a service 
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activity, where they are justified for reasons of public 
policy. However, the findings at national level show 
that checks ensuring material economic presence or 
genuine service provision from a social perspective 
are in most cases missing.
• In the EU-coordination of social security, and in a sim-
ilar way in the posting acquis, substance has become 
the fundamental benchmark for the determination of 
the applicable legislation. Host countries have certain 
rights, but the main assessment lies in the hands of 
the country of registration. The so-called Gebhard 
test stays the main reference. The transmission of an 
A1-form is seen as the confirmation of legality.
The EU company law acquis provides neither control 
nor enforcement measures. The aim to facilitate the 
use of online registration tools and to dismantle obsta-
cles involving setting up companies, registering their 
branches or filing documents, especially in cross border 
operations, dominates EU policy.
• The control on prescribed requirements is handed 
over to the Member States without any guidance.
• The Services Directive has a dispute settlement pro-
cedure, meant to protect the client. It is prescribed 
that Member States shall, at the request of a com-
petent authority in another Member State, supply 
information (in practice with the IMI-system as the 
main instrument) on disciplinary or administrative 
actions or criminal sanctions and decisions concern-
ing insolvency or bankruptcy involving fraud taken by 
their competent authorities in respect of the provider 
which are directly relevant to the provider’s compe-
tence or professional reliability.
• The Administrative Commission for the Coordination 
of Social Security Systems installed by the Euro-
pean Commission has dealt with certain concerns 
on combating fraud, mainly on guaranteeing that 
contributions are paid to the right Member State and 
that benefits are not unduly granted or fraudulently 
obtained. The ultimate competence to check whether 
a service provider and the provision of services with 
posted workers are genuine lies in the hands of the 
national authorities in the country of registration.
• The Posting rules leave it up to the Member States 
to designate the competent authority that has to 
perform the appropriate provisions, measures and 
control mechanisms necessary for better and more 
uniform implementation, application and enforcement 
in practice of the PWD, including measures to pre-
vent and sanction any abuse and circumvention of the 
applicable rules.
• The Enforcement Directive prescribes the mutual 
assistance and cooperation, including the inves-
tigation of any non-compliance or abuse of 
applicable rules. The competence between the com-
petent authorities of the host country and the country 
of registration of the service provider are strictly 
divided and limited by national territorial borders.
• The revised PWD, Directive (EU) 2018/957, stresses 
the enhanced coordination between the Member 
States’ competent authorities and/or bodies and coop-
eration at EU level on combating fraud relating to the 
posting of workers. It should lead to reinforcement of 
the transnational dimension of inspections, inquiries 
and exchanges of information between the competent 
authorities or bodies of the Member States concerned.
Although registration is poor, the input of consulted 
experts reveals a growing attention for compliance 
control and enforcement based on secondary legisla-
tion, mainly stemming from adjacent social legislation 
(social security, mandatory working conditions, and fiscal 
policy). Straightforward instruments stemming from 
the core parts of the internal market are missing. The 
outlook is rather patchy and dispersed on a case-by-case 
basis, depending on the commitment of different actors 
and competent authorities. Moreover, a pro-active policy 
that intervenes in the freedom of establishment (like in 
Austria) easily comes under pressure of the Court or the 
Commission’s infringement policy.
The EU acquis does not provide for effective or 
dissuasive sanctions against the abuse of artifi-
cial corporate entities in a cross-border context. In this 
respect, the acquis refers to national sanctioning mech-
anisms. 
• There is no reference to sanctions in EU company law 
(except for the SE-Regulation, whereby it provides 
sanctions if an SE does not comply with the require-
ment that its registered office and its head office are 
located in the same Member State).
• The Services Directive provides no direct sanction 
mechanisms or guidelines in case the principles of 
the Directive are breached. National sanctions and 
other judicial actions referred to in the Directive 
shall only be communicated if a final decision has 
been taken (by a court). Information on disciplinary, 
9
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administrative or criminal sanctions can be used in 
cases where it is necessary to establish the good 
repute of a service provider. In practice, there is no 
evidence of a (frequent) use of this provision.
• The Services Directive refers mainly to sanctioning in 
relation to proportionality. The Directive formulates 
the elimination of disproportionate authorisation 
schemes, requirements, checks, inspections, fees and 
penalties as one of its key intentions.
• In the area of social security, there is little effec-
tive remedy in a host country against artificial 
legal entities that function as service providers in a 
cross-border context. Although the withdrawal of 
a provided A1-form could be a strong sanctioning 
instrument in a host country, this competence is in 
principle still a matter of the issuing country.
• Although the posting rules state that Member States 
have to install effective mechanisms for posted workers 
to uphold their rights, there is no direct remedy against 
abuses by service providers with no established eco-
nomic activity and little to no independent economic 
value in the country of registration, such as the with-
drawal from the national market of the host country. 
• The posting rules conform to CJEU rulings stating that 
a host state may not refuse recognition of the legal 
capacity of a company incorporated under the law of 
another Member State, even if it does not pursue any 
economic activity in the latter state.
In the examined parts of the acquis as transposed 
in national legislation, only few sanction mechanisms 
leading to deregistration, withdrawal or winding up 
could be found. Although deregistration is a regular 
phenomenon, it is seldom the consequence of social 
fraud or related breaches. Some countries have initiated 
efforts to tackle fraudulent activities that are arranged 
with the use of artificial legal entities through penal 
proceedings. Enforcing penalties in cross-border cases is 
very difficult.  
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2 
RELEVANT ASPECTS OF THE APPLICABLE 
NATIONAL AND EU ACQUIS
7 For an overview of (partly repealed or codified) legal instruments see: http://www.worker-participation.eu/Company-Law-and-CG/Company-Law/Overview-of-Directives 
8 Regulatory arbitrage is a practice where companies take advantage of legal loopholes or inconsistencies in order to avoid unprofitable regulations. For example, a company may 
relocate its headquarters to a country with favourable regulatory policies (in the field of taxation, social security, pay or other obligations) to save cost and increase profit. 
9 The trade union movement has often criticised that this SME-exemption policy serves larger corporations first and for all. 
10 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32017L1132&from=EN
2.1 THE CREATION AND FUNCTIONING OF 
FIRMS AND EU COMPANY LAW
In the introduction, it was already said that the main 
competence to create companies lies in the hands of 
the Member States. Notwithstanding this, a long list of 
European company law directives has been concluded, 
resulting in a vast package of company law acquis that 
includes rules on the formation and registration, on cross-
border take-overs, mergers and divisions of companies, 
and on financial and non-financial reporting and auditing.7  
From the very beginning, these European company 
law initiatives gave priority to the business environ-
ment perspective. The focus was on the identification 
of ‘unnecessary administrative burdens’, which should 
be removed, and on the simplification and deregula-
tion of the entrance to the market. But of course, this 
was not without risks. In an overall assessment (in 
2011) of the developments since the mid-1990s in the 
area of national and EU company law, the conclusion 
was that the deregulation policy appears to stimulate 
regime-shopping and regulatory arbitrage inside the 
European Union rather than contributing to a more 
sustainable legal setting resulting in well-governed 
companies that are accountable and transparent.8 Over 
the years, Members States introduced more and more 
exemptions for SMEs, and started a process of watering 
down registration conditions and lowering establishment 
thresholds, for instance capital requirements. As far as 
EU provisions triggered changes in national legislation, 
these changes did not contribute to more decent rules at 
national level, but fitted in a policy of more flexibility and 
a race to the bottom in the Member States (Cremers & 
Wolters 2011).  
 
The EU’s reasoning in this area, as expressed in 
several documents, is simple and it seems that many 
countries follow that reasoning: companies will benefit 
from reduced procedural requirements, as well as simpli-
fied and harmonised rules for accreditation, verification 
and registration. In addition, SMEs will benefit from 
reduced verification and reporting obligations and lower 
registration fees. Remarkably, this policy is hardly based 
on evidence or reliable forecasts of sought cross-border 
activities of SMEs. The resulting stimulus of an intra-EU 
beggar-thy-neighbour competition is not signalled in the 
relevant documents.9   
An analysis of these directives reveals that there 
is hardly any regulation or instrument that defines or 
prescribes requirements for genuine corporate activities. 
The analysis leads to the following brief overview.
2.1.1 The genuine undertaking in company law
The codified Directive relating to certain aspects of 
company law (EU) 2017/1132 of 14 June 2017 prescribes 
mainly global notions of statutory requirements.10 The 
statutes or the instrument of incorporation of a company 
shall always give at least the following information: (a) 
the type and name of the company; (b) the objects of 
the company; (c) where the company has no authorised 
capital, the amount of the subscribed capital; (d) where 
the company has an authorised capital, the amount 
thereof and also the amount of the capital subscribed 
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at the time the company is incorporated or is authorised 
to commence business, and at the time of any change 
in the authorised capital; (e) in so far as they are not 
legally determined, the rules governing the number of, 
and the procedure for, appointing members of the bodies 
responsible for representing the company vis-à-vis third 
parties, administration, management, supervision or 
control of the company and the allocation of powers 
among those bodies; and (f) the duration of the company, 
except where this is indefinite (Article 3). The following 
information at least shall appear in either the statutes or 
the instrument of incorporation or a separate document 
published in accordance with the procedure laid down in 
the laws of each Member State: (a) the registered office; 
(i) the identity of the natural or legal persons or compa-
nies or firms by which or in whose name the statutes or 
the instrument of incorporation, or where the company 
was not formed at the same time, the drafts of those 
documents, have been signed (Article 4). 
The rest of the EU framework in the area of corporate 
entities and company law provides neither a definition of 
the undertaking nor criteria for the genuine character of 
corporate activities. For instance, the so-called Twelfth 
Council Directive - Single-member private limited liability 
companies (89/667/EEC, codified in Directive 2009/102/
EC) created a legal instrument allowing the limitation 
of liability of the individual entrepreneur throughout 
the EU. The entity ‘private limited liability company’ is 
depending on national definitions, and there is no notion 
of the genuine corporate entity. Member States are free 
to lay down rules to cover the risks that single-member 
companies may present as a consequence of having 
single members (these risks are not further specified).
2.1.2 Fraudulent activities in company law
The codified Directive (EU) 2017/1132 speaks about 
objects of the company that are ‘unlawful or contrary to 
public policy’ (Article 11). The wording ‘public policy’ or 
‘public interest’ refers most often to strategies to protect 
areas of great importance to a national economy, i.e. the 
interests of creditors, minority shareholders, consumers 
or employees, against activities of foreign companies on 
their territory. The concept is recognised at both European 
and national level as a mechanism that allows countries 
to disregard the primacy of the law of the country of regis-
tration. The effect of the operation of such foreign law 
11 The ETUC is critical about the functioning of the SE-regime; this criticism has a strong focus on the creation of so-called empty and shelf SEs. According to the ETUC all EC 
assessments of the SE-statute fail to provide concrete answers to the question of why the creation of shelf SEs is promoted. The basic ETUC question was (and is) what the EU 
intends to do to combat this violation of the spirit of the SE legislation: in other words, offering an instrument for potential regime-shopping (Cremers et al. 2013). 
12  https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=OJ:L:2019:186:FULL&from=EN 
would hinder in concrete cases the application of funda-
mental principles of domestic law. However, this is neither 
specified, nor is there reference to fraudulent activities in 
the rest of the EU-series of corporate law.
The main purpose of the SE statute (EC 2157/2001), for 
instance, was to enable companies to operate their busi-
nesses on a cross-border basis in Europe under the same 
corporate regime. Assessments show that many SE’s are 
set up in jurisdictions merely to obtain the tax benefits of 
specific tax treaties, although the chosen structure has in 
reality little commercial substance. However, the Regula-
tion has not defined this as a fraudulent activity. 11
The Company law package adopted in the first half 
of 2019 led to a modification of Directive 2017/1132. 
Directive (EU) 2019/1151 sets out safeguards against 
fraud and abuse in online procedures, including control 
of the identity and legal capacity of persons setting up 
the company and the possibility of requiring physical 
presence before a competent authority. It maintains 
the involvement of notaries or lawyers in company law 
procedures as long as these procedures can be fully 
completed online. It foresees exchange of information 
between Member States (in article 13i) on disqualified 
directors in order to prevent fraudulent behaviour. The 
directive does not harmonise substantive requirements 
for setting up companies or doing business across the 
EU. Moreover, the information policy and the necessary 
cooperation between Member States in the exchange of 
information relevant for a disqualification of directors is 
formulate in rather ‘soft’ wordings (Member States ‘may 
require information’, and ‘may refuse the appointment of 
a person as a director of a company where that person is 
currently disqualified from acting as a director in another 
Member State’).12 
The question is whether these instruments will change 
the EU-policy that, according to scholars, so far did not 
address the abuse of the corporate form. Company law 
does not add much to tackling the problems with artifi-
cial legal corporate entities, such as letterbox companies 
(Sørensen, 2015).   
2.1.3 Company law - Registration criteria and 
other obligations
There is no centralised registration system foreseen at 
EU-level. The codified Directive (EU) 2017/1132 explicitly 
states that the establishment of any centralised register 
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database storing substantive information about compa-
nies is not the aim. However, another legal act, Directive 
2012/17/EU of 13 June 2012 as regards the interconnec-
tion of central, commercial and companies registers (that 
amends Directive 89/666/EEC and Directive 2005/56/EC) 
gives some prescriptions. The objective of the intercon-
nection Directive is to improve cross-border access to 
business information. In June 2017, the interconnection 
of Member States’ central, commercial and companies’ 
registers became operational. It was presented as a 
measure required for creating a more business-friendly 
legal and fiscal environment. The interconnection has 
to contribute to fostering the competitiveness of Euro-
pean business by reducing administrative burdens and 
increasing legal certainty. In accordance with point (8) of 
the Annex in the Commission Implementing Regulation 
(EU) 2015/884CCC, Member States will provide compa-
nies and their branches created in Member States with 
a European unique identifier (EUID). Through this unique 
identifier, firms can be unequivocally identified within 
the Union. The identifier is intended to be used for 
communication between registers through the system 
of interconnection of registers. It shall not lead to the 
establishment of any centralised registers database 
storing substantive information about companies.13  
The registration of a company, through the system 
of interconnection of registers, shall make available, 
without delay, the information on the opening and termi-
nation of any winding-up or insolvency proceedings 
of the company and on the striking-off of the company 
from the register, if this entails legal consequences in 
the Member State of the company register. Where a 
company has been dissolved or otherwise struck off the 
register, its branches are likewise struck off the register 
without undue delay. Member States shall ensure that 
the following particulars are available free of charge 
through the system of interconnection of registers:
a. the name and legal form of the company;
b. the registered office of the company and the Member 
State where it is registered; and
c. the registration number of the company.
Directive (EU) 2019/1151 aims to facilitate the use 
of online tools and to dismantle the obstacles involving 
13  At the global level, consultants such as Moody have established private lists with company data. The main aim is to provide investors with comprehensive company reports, 
financial strength indicators and ownership information that help to assess risks.   
14 Directive 2019/1151 was not subject of our assessment. However, it is relevant to look at the main aims in the area of registration. The new rules create possibilities for 
companies to register limited liability companies, set up new branches and file documents in the business register fully online; national model templates and information on 
national requirements have to be made available online in a language broadly understood by the majority of cross-border users; rules on fees for online formalities must be 
transparent and applied in a non-discriminatory manner; fees charged for the online registration of companies may not exceed the overall costs incurred by the Member State 
concerned; the ‘once-only’ principle applies, meaning that a company will only need to submit the same information to public authorities once; documents submitted by compa-
nies are stored and exchanged by national registers in machine-readable and searchable formats; more information about companies is made available to all interested parties 
free of charge in the business registers. 
setting up companies, registering their branches or filing 
documents, especially in cross-border operations. Once 
implemented it will provide improved online procedures, 
creating a digital way for businesses. The transposition 
of the Directive, published on 11 July 2019, enters into 
force on the twentieth day following that of the publi-
cation. It will apply 2 years from the date of its entry 
into force. A number of provisions will however apply 4 
years from the date of its entry into force. The modifi-
cation will not change the system of interconnection of 
business registers; disclosure of company information 
should be effected once that information is made avail-
able in the national registers that are interconnected 
and provide a comprehensive point of reference for 
users. The above-mentioned European unique identifier 
(EUID) should create a situation whereby companies 
can be unequivocally identified in communications 
between registers through the system of interconnec-
tion of registers established in accordance with Article 
22 (already figuring in Directive 2017/1132). The unique 
identifier shall comprise the necessary elements making 
it possible to identify the Member State of the register, 
the domestic register of origin, the company number in 
that register and, where appropriate, features to avoid 
identification errors.14  
The SE Regulation EC 2157/2001 that led to the 
creation of the EU corporate form of the European 
Company Statute, contains prescriptions that are more 
detailed. In general, the legal provisions of the country 
where the SE has its registered office apply like they 
would for any other (national) company established in 
that country. The SE is treated in every Member State 
in many respects as if it were a national public limit-
ed-liability company; in the large majority of cases and 
Member States, the status of the SE is similar to the 
status of a domestic public limited-liability company. 
However, there has to be a ‘real and continuous link’ 
with a Member State, and the registered office and 
the head office of an SE shall be located in the same 
Member State. There are harmonised conditions of 
capital (120,000 euro - this does not apply to subsid-
iary SE’s). The Regulation also specifies obligations on 
reporting and/or registration mechanisms in the case 
of transfer or merger. Companies forming a (holding) 
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SE must have a company in another Member State or 
a subsidiary or branch in another Member State for at 
least two years before the SE creation. An SE may not 
be registered unless an agreement on arrangements for 
employee involvement pursuant to Article 4 of Direc-
tive 2001/86/EC has been concluded, or a decision 
pursuant to Article 3(6) of the Directive has been taken 
(to not take up negotiations or to terminate negotiations 
already started), or the period for negotiations pursuant 
to Article 5 of the Directive has expired without an 
agreement having been concluded. 
A majority of Member States provide the SE with 
stronger protection for minority shareholders and many 
of them provide better protection for creditors.
The transfer of an SE is regulated (article 8 of the 
Regulation), for instance any implication the transfer 
may have on employees’ involvement has to be reported 
in a published transfer proposal. National requirements 
that public limited-liability company should have more 
than one shareholder do not apply in the case of a 
subsidiary SE.
2.1.4 Compliance control and enforcement of 
obligations in company law
Directive 2012/17/EU settles the interconnection 
of registers but neither includes control nor enforce-
ment measures. The recent modifications of Directive 
2017/1132 have hardly led to a legal framework with 
more enhanced control and enforcement instruments. 
Tackling suspected fraudulent use of the digital solu-
tions for completion of company law online procedures 
focuses on the question whether company founders 
can be asked to be present in person. In the European 
Commission’s assessment report, it is said that a policy 
seems justified to allow MS to exceptionally ask for 
the company founder or representative to be present in 
person – but only in rare and well-justified cases.15 
There is also no prescribed control measure on most 
of the obligations of the SE Regulation. ETUC has 
constantly questioned the creation of empty and shelf 
SEs, without any cross-border dimension, and the fact 
that the legislator is not acting against this unintended 
effect. The legal form of an SE was not invented for 
companies without economic activity and employees. 
The question should not be what the main advantages 
for a company are to buy a ready-made shelf SE, but 
rather what the legislator wants to do against this viola-
tion of the spirit of the SE legislation.
15  https://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-8560-2018-ADD-2/en/pdf 
2.1.5 Company law and sanctioning
The codified Directive (EU) 2017/1132 contains the 
notion of nullity. However, this refers to the special 
case of the nullity of a merger or a division. According 
to the Directive, the laws of the Member States may 
not provide for the nullity of companies other than in 
accordance with the following provisions: (a) nullity 
must be ordered by decision of a court of law; (b) nullity 
may be ordered only on the grounds: (i) that no instru-
ment of constitution was executed or that the rules of 
preventive control or the requisite legal formalities were 
not complied with; (ii) that the objects of the company 
are unlawful or contrary to public policy;(iii) that the 
instrument of constitution or the statutes do not state 
the name of the company, the amount of the individual 
subscriptions of capital, the total amount of the capital 
subscribed or the objects of the company; (iv) of failure 
to comply with provisions of national law concerning the 
minimum amount of capital to be paid up; (v) of the inca-
pacity of all the founder members; (vi) that, contrary to 
the national law governing the company, the number of 
founding members is less than two. By way of deroga-
tion from the provisions mentioned in point (a), the laws 
of a Member State may also provide for the nullity of a 
merger or a division to be ordered by an administrative 
authority if an appeal against such a decision lies to a 
court. Apart from these grounds of nullity, a company 
shall not be subject to any cause of non-existence, 
absolute nullity, relative nullity or declaration of nullity 
(article 11). Based on article 12.2 nullity can entail the 
winding-up of the company or dissolution. However, it 
is neither clear whether there has to be any compliance 
control nor which body executes such control. 
The Twelfth Council Directive - Single-member private 
limited liability companies (89/667/EEC, codified in 
Directive 2009/102/EC) prescribes coordination meas-
ures that apply to Member States’ provisions concerning 
private limited companies. The Directive refers to a 
national sanctioning dimension. Member States may lay 
down special provisions or penalties for cases where: (a) 
a natural person is the sole member of several compa-
nies; or (b) a single-member company or any other legal 
person is the sole member of a company. The Directive 
neither gives guidance when sanctions are at stake, nor 
how compliance and enforcement should be organised.  
The SE Regulation mentions one severe sanction: if 
the SE does not comply with the requirement that the 
registered office and the head office of an SE shall be 
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located in the same Member State. A Member State 
in which the SE’s registered office is situated shall put 
in place the measures necessary to ensure that an SE, 
which fails to regularise its position in accordance with 
this principle, is liquidated. The possibility for an SE to 
transfer its registered office from one Member State 
to another is subject to anti-abuse provisions and anti-
treaty shopping rules. Each Member State has its own 
anti-treaty shopping rules and the transfer of the regis-
tered office of an SE is in principle subjected to these 
national rules. In practice, many SEs have been trans-
ferred, for instance for tax reasons. However, there is no 
evidence of a pro-active national policy of compliance 
control in this area.16  
2.1.6 The EU company law acquis in summary
Whilst the creation and registration of new corporate 
legal entities is a matter of national company law, the 
EU has created, built on the principles of the economic 
freedoms, a European market for these entities without 
an appropriate transnational safety net that ensures the 
genuine character of any cross-border activity. The EU 
merely established a package of company law initiatives, 
with the starting point of simplifying and deregulating 
the entrance to the ‘business environment’. The basis is 
mutual trust and confidence between Member States 
and the assumption that the registration in any Member 
State is good enough for activities across Europe. The few 
requirements that are described by the EU legislator with 
regard to registration are superficial and easy to handle 
by a ‘virtual’ office or by an ‘incubator’ that organises the 
establishment of the legal entity, arranges a company 
registered office address and takes care of registration 
duties and the drawing of proceedings of the board.17   
Even the final outcomes of the implementation of SE 
rules, which were celebrated for the degree of harmo-
nisation they represented, led with a great range of 
choices and supplementary national legislation only to a 
national and European hybrid, with European elements 
being added to existing national structures to create an 
entity that can operate across Europe. Behind its unified 
image, the SE is treated in every Member State in many 
aspects as if it were a national public limited-liability 
company (Cremers et al. 2013). 
16  See for instance: J. Cremers, The EU assessment of the SE corporate form (Cremers et al. 2013, Chapter 12). https://www.etui.org/Publications2/Books/A-decade-of-expe-
rience-with-the-European-Company 
17  An online search of ‘ready-made companies’ leads at present to 675,000,000 hits, with services that manage everything from business registration, a virtual office space to 
corporate prepaid cards. Prices start at around 35 euro, with additional costs for all the services needed, such as fake proceedings or the creation of ‘substance’. One of the 
main selling tricks is that ready-made companies may have been registered for a number of years; this shows longevity, making the business appear more established that it 
might be. ‘This is great for increasing trust with new or prospective clients as it gives the impression that you have been trading for longer than you have.’ 
In general, the EU legislator completely relies on the 
registration standards in the Member States. However, 
in most Member States, the national company level 
framework of creation and registration requirements 
rushes through a similar process of simplification and 
deregulation. Moreover, the EU-policy in general and the 
ECJ-rulings in particular providing low-cost corporate 
law are leading to regulatory competition between EU 
Member States. Deregulation of corporate law affects 
the decision of firms of where to incorporate, without 
any direct link to real activities, and the widespread use 
of an industry of special incorporation agents to facili-
tate legal mobility across countries has been the result 
(Becht et al. 2008).
Without a clear definition of the genuine undertaking, 
it is of course difficult to determine unlawful or non-gen-
uine businesses practices. This is what characterises 
the EU policy. Notably in the policy area of company 
law, concrete reference to (the necessity to tackle) 
abuses is absent. Equally, it can be concluded that the 
EU acquis does not provide effective or dissuasive sanc-
tions against the abuse of artificial corporate entities 
in a cross-border context. Only in recent years, experi-
ences with cross-border activities of artificial corporate 
arrangements in other domains (taxation, social secu-
rity, labour standards) have led to debates and the first 
cautious steps to work towards more adequate legis-
lative approaches. A core concept in this debate is the 
‘substance’ of performed activities (see below).  
 
2.2 THE SERVICE DIRECTIVE AND GENUINE 
PROVISION OF SERVICES
The Services Directive (Directive 2006/123/EC of 
12 December 2006 on services in the internal market) 
intended to enhance the implementation of two 
economic freedoms that were seen as cornerstones 
of the completion of the internal market (freedom of 
establishment and the freedom to provide services). The 
Directive referred to Article 43 of the Treaty (currently 
Article 49 TFEU) that ensures the freedom of estab-
lishment and Article 49 of the Treaty (currently Article 
56 TFEU) that establishes the right to provide services 
within the EU. 
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Although the Directive’s main aim is to simplify and 
facilitate the cross-border provision of services, the rules 
include some chapters that deal with possible fraud 
(see below). The sections (in Chapter 3) that deal with 
national transpositions are dedicated to whether, and 
to what extent, concrete instruments have been imple-
mented to tackle fraudulent activities.18   
2.2.1 The genuine service provider
The Directive talks about achieving a genuine internal 
market for services. Moreover, ‘the need to comply with 
labour law’ has to be considered (according to recital 7). 
It is important to note that the Services Directive does 
not interfere with the rules of private international 
law, in particular rules governing the law applicable to 
contractual and non-contractual obligations (including 
labour contract law). Moreover, recital 13 of the Direc-
tive refers to fully respect ‘Community initiatives based 
on Article 137 of the Treaty (now Article 154) with a 
view to achieving the objectives of Article 136 (now 
Article 152-153 TFEU) thereof concerning the promotion 
of employment and improved living and working condi-
tions.’ 19 
Recital 36 further specifies that the concept of a 
provider should not cover the case of branches in a 
Member State of companies from third countries. The 
freedom of establishment and free provision of services 
may benefit (only) companies constituted in accord-
ance with the laws of a Member State and having their 
registered office, central administration or principal 
place of business within the EU. The concept of service 
‘provider’ should cover any natural person of a Member 
State or any legal person engaged in a service activity 
in a Member State. The concept of provider covers both 
cross-border service provision within the framework of 
the free movement of services and also cases in which 
an operating entity establishes itself in a Member State 
in order to develop its service activities there.
According to Article 4.4, an ‘establishment’ means the 
actual pursuit of an economic activity, as referred to in 
Article 43 of the Treaty, by the provider for an indefinite 
18  For an overview of national transpositions of Directive 2006/123/EC on services in the internal market, see: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/NIM/?uri=CE-
LEX:32006L0123 
19  Recital 15 adds the respect for the exercise of fundamental rights applicable in the Member States and as recognised in the
Charter of fundamental Rights of the European Union and the accompanying explanations, reconciling them with the fundamental freedoms laid down in Articles 43 and 49 of the 
Treaty. 
20  In a 2016 assessment by the European Commission services, it was concluded that 40% of structured dialogues, which the Commission launched vis-à-vis Member States in 
2015 to ensure compliance with the Services Directive, concerned newly introduced national measures. The Commission therefore planned, in accordance with the case-law 
of the Court of Justice of the European Union, to establish a more effective and efficient notification procedure preventing the adoption by Member States of authorisation 
schemes or certain requirements. Member States should clarify the public interest objective pursued, set out how the notified authorisation scheme or requirement is necessary 
and justified to meet this objective and explain how it is proportionate in doing so; it should include explanations on why it is suitable, why it does not go beyond what is ne-
cessary and why no alternative and less restrictive means would be available. The reasons which may be invoked by way of justification should be accompanied by appropriate 
evidence and by an analysis of the proportionality of the notified measure. The European Commission formulated a draft Interinstitutional File: 2016/0398(COD) for such a new 
procedure that is still pending in the European Council of Ministers. 
period and through a stable infrastructure from where 
the business of providing services is actually carried out. 
The core articles of the Directive do not specify addi-
tional requirements. The main emphasis is on further 
simplification of procedures and formalities applicable 
for ‘access to a service activity and to the exercise’ 
of cross-border services activities (Article 5.1). The 
Commission is mainly preoccupied with new or changed 
authorisation schemes or new or changed requirements 
formulated by Member States. Noteworthy is the fact 
that the creation of companies as such is based on 
(mutual) trust; this trust is apparently absent when it 
comes to the formulation of national authorisation or 
other requirements.20 
2.2.2 Fraudulent provision of services
Overall, there is neither reference to possible social 
fraud, for instance abusive cross-border recruitment 
practices by service providers, nor to control mecha-
nisms that go beyond the national territory and can deal 
at transnational level with fraudulent activities (with the 
exception of the cooperation through the IMI-instrument 
that is treated later on in this section). Recital 40 refers 
to certain provisions of the Services Directive that have 
been developed by the Court of Justice in its case law in 
relation to Articles 43 and 49 of the (old) Treaty and may 
continue to evolve. The key notion of ‘overriding reasons 
relating to the public interest’ as recognised in the case 
law of the Court of Justice covers, according to Article 
4.8, at least the following national grounds: public 
policy, public security; public safety; public health; the 
maintenance of order in society; social policy objectives; 
the protection of the recipients of services; consumer 
protection; the protection of workers, including social 
protection; animal welfare; the preservation of the finan-
cial balance of the social security system; combating 
fraud; the prevention of unfair competition; the protec-
tion of the environment and the urban environment, 
including town and country planning; the protection 
of creditors; safeguarding the sound administration of 
justice; road safety; the protection of intellectual prop-
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erty; cultural policy objectives, including safeguarding 
the freedom of expression of various elements, in 
particular social, cultural, religious and philosophical 
values of society; the need to ensure a high level of 
education, the maintenance of press diversity and other 
national cultural or historic objectives. 
In recital 105, it is said that administrative coopera-
tion is essential to make the internal market in services 
function properly. Lack of cooperation between Member 
States results in proliferation of rules applicable to 
providers or duplication of controls for cross-border 
activities, and can also be used by rogue traders to avoid 
supervision or to circumvent applicable national rules on 
services. It is, therefore, essential to provide for clear 
and legally binding obligations for Member States to 
cooperate effectively. Recitals 106-109 add that for the 
purposes of the Chapter on administrative cooperation, 
‘supervision’ should cover activities such as monitoring 
and fact finding, problem solving, enforcement and impo-
sition of sanctions and subsequent follow-up activities, 
including those relating to cases where a provider is 
established in another Member State. Other obligations 
of mutual assistance should apply only in cross-border 
cases where the freedom to provide services applies.
2.2.3 Registration criteria and other obligations 
for service providers
The starting point is the simplification of procedures 
(Article 5.1). Where procedures and formalities are not 
sufficiently simple, Member States shall simplify them. 
Restricted authorisation at national level is permitted. 
However, where Member States require a provider or 
recipient to supply a certificate, attestation or any other 
document proving that a requirement has been satisfied, 
they shall accept any document from another Member 
State which serves an equivalent purpose or from which 
it is clear that the requirement in question has been 
satisfied (Article 5.3). Conditions for granting author-
isation for a new establishment shall not duplicate 
requirements and controls that are equivalent or essen-
tially comparable as regards their purpose to which the 
provider is already subject in another Member State or 
in the same Member State (Article 10.3). 
Article 16.3 refers to acceptable requirements. ‘The 
Member State to which the provider moves shall not be 
prevented from imposing requirements with regard to 
the provision of a service activity, where they are justi-
fied for reasons of public policy, public security, public 
health or the protection of the environment (…). Nor 
shall that Member State be prevented from applying, in 
21  For a list of the national Points of Single Contacts see: https://ec.europa.eu/growth/single-market/services/services-directive/in-practice/contact_en 
accordance with Community law, its rules on employ-
ment conditions, including those laid down in collective 
agreements.’
However, Chapter VI binds the Member States to intro-
duce competent bodies, mechanisms and activities that 
are depending on registered information. In the preceding 
Chapter V, several binding measures are already formu-
lated to watch over the quality of the services and to 
protect the recipient of the services (necessary infor-
mation, authorisation if required, relevant competent 
authority or single point of contact, existing after-sales 
guarantees and/or professional liability insurances, appli-
cable codes of conduct and several other information 
documents). According to Article 22.4 Member States 
shall ensure that the information that a provider must 
supply in accordance with Chapter V is made available or 
communicated in a clear and unambiguous manner, and 
in good time before conclusion of the contract or, where 
there is no written contract, before the service is provided. 
Providers shall also supply contact details, in particular 
a postal address, fax number or e-mail address and tele-
phone number to which all recipients, including those 
residents in another Member State, can send a complaint 
or a request for information. Additionally, they have to 
supply their legal address if this is not the usual address 
for correspondence. Although these obligations aim to 
protect the recipient with no explicit reference to social 
fraud, this information could be relevant for an assess-
ment of the ‘genuine’ character of the legal entity that 
provides the service activity.
2.2.4 Compliance control and enforcement of 
obligations in the provision of services
Chapter VI speaks about the necessity to have ‘liaison 
points’ in the Member States. Their cooperation is bound 
by obligations, and in case they do not fulfil their obliga-
tion of mutual assistance, this has to be communicated to 
the Commission. But it should not be possible for Member 
States to bypass the rules laid down in the Services Direc-
tive by conducting checks, inspections or investigations 
which are discriminatory or disproportionate.     
The ‘liaison points’ (and/or Points of Single Contact) 
in the Member States can deliver mutual assistance and 
put in place measures for effective cooperation.21 Articles 
28-36 give detailed information on the obligatory mutual 
assistance and the competences (and the related limi-
tations) to inspect, the supervisory tasks in the Member 
State of establishment and in the Member State where 
the service is provided. It talks about alert mechanisms 
and good repute. The exchange of information regarding 
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the good repute of providers should not pre-empt initi-
atives in the area of police and judicial cooperation in 
criminal matters, in particular on the exchange of infor-
mation between law enforcement authorities of the 
Member States and on criminal records. For this purpose, 
a well-functioning electronic information system has to 
be established that allows competent authorities easily 
to identify their relevant interlocutors in other Member 
States and to communicate in an efficient way (later on 
institutionalised with the introduction of the IMI-system). 
In the assessment of the Services Directive a lot of atten-
tion has been given to the functioning of this IMI-system, 
whilst little is known about the operational and practical 
functioning of the liaison points (and/or the Points of 
Single Contact) and other ‘competent authorities’ that 
have to fulfil the prescribed obligations.22 
2.2.5 Service provision and sanctioning
Article 27 of the Directive speaks about the settle-
ment of disputes (between the service provider and the 
recipient/client). This reference is exclusively related to 
the provider-client relationship. It is however, unclear 
which (national) competent authority has to deal with 
and solve such disputes. Article 29.3 specifies that, upon 
gaining actual knowledge of any conduct or specific acts 
by a provider established in its territory, which provides 
services in other Member States, which, to its knowl-
edge, could cause serious damage to the health or safety 
of persons or to the environment, the Member State of 
establishment shall inform all other Member States and 
the Commission within the shortest possible period of 
time. The Member State where the service is provided 
is responsible for the supervision of the activity of the 
provider in its territory and for the checks, inspections 
and investigations necessary to supervise the provided 
service. Those checks, inspections or investigations have 
to be proportionate and may be neither discriminatory, nor 
motivated by the fact that the provider is established in 
another Member State.
Article 32 lays the founding principles for a joint alert 
mechanism, operating through a European Network of 
Member States’ authorities. The Member States shall, at 
22  A first information note to the Competitiveness and Growth Council (State of Implementation of the Services Directive, dated 26 February 2010) focuses mainly on the 
simplification and the lifting of regulatory barriers. It speaks about the Points of Single Contact or the system of administrative cooperation as ‘long-term projects that should 
be further developed and expanded beyond the implementation deadline’, and indicates that the necessity to provide business with extensive information should have priority. 
There is no reference to any compliance role. The mutual cooperation is channelled towards the IMI-system. In May 2010, the same information was discussed in the Competi-
tiveness Council. In its Report on the implementation of the Services Directive 2006/123/EC (2010/2053(INI)), the European Parliament agreed with the Commission’s approach 
that stressed the need to avoid administrative burden for service providers. However, the EP also considered it useful to establish cooperation within a European network 
formed by the Member States’ public authorities and to set up an interchange of information on the reliability of service providers.  
23  The CJEU ruled in joint cases (‘Maksimovic and Others’) that fines imposed under Austrian legislation exceeding 13 million euro for failure to comply with the obligations for 
posted workers were disproportionate. According to the court, Austria’s national legislation is in conflict with the freedom to provide services outlined in article 56 of the Treaty 
on Functioning of the European Union (TFEU). 
24 The 2012 Regulation has been amended later on. In this report, we refer to a 2018 codified version that can be found on: http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/imi-net/_docs/
library/regulation_2018_consolidated_EN.pdf 
the request of a competent authority in another Member 
State, supply information, in conformity with their national 
law, on disciplinary or administrative actions or criminal 
sanctions and decisions concerning insolvency or bank-
ruptcy involving fraud taken by their competent authorities 
in respect of the provider which are directly relevant to the 
provider’s competence or professional reliability. However, 
sanctions and other judicial actions referred to shall only 
be communicated if a final decision has been taken by a 
court. If an appeal in this respect has been lodged, the 
Member State in question should provide an indication 
of the date when the decision of the appeal is expected. 
Moreover, that Member State shall specify the provisions 
of national law pursuant that the provider was found 
guilty or penalised (article 33.2). Besides this information 
mechanism, there is no explicit reference to penalties 
that have EU-wide consequences. Further proceedings of 
mutual assistance are defined in Article 35. This article 
also prescribes the way intentions to take measures have 
to be motivated.
The Services Directive prescribes nothing about sanc-
tions in situations where the principles of the Directive 
are breached. The only reference to sanctioning is made 
in relation to proportionality. The Directive formulates the 
elimination of disproportionate authorisation schemes, 
requirements, checks, inspections, fees and penalties as 
one of its key intentions. Indeed, in the meantime, the 
CJEU has ruled in cases of the sanctioning of irregular 
service provision. In a recent Austrian case, the CJEU 
qualified the applied sanctions as disproportionate (this is 
treated in the part with national experiences).23  
2.2.6 The IMI-system
The main instrument that has been developed for the 
administrative transnational cooperation is the Internal 
Market Information System (IMI). The IMI-system was 
originally based on a decision by the European Commis-
sion. It has been modified in the course of time and is 
currently governed by Regulation (EU) No 1024/2012 of 
the European Parliament and the Council (of 25 October 
2012) that repealed Commission Decision 2008/49/EC.24  
The main idea behind IMI is the creation of a central-
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ised communication mechanism to facilitate cross-border 
exchange of information and mutual assistance, thus 
‘contributing to better governance of the single market’ 
(recital 5 of the Regulation). The labour inspector-
ates and other compliance offices use this system to 
exchange with colleagues in their administrative coop-
eration. They may invoke as evidence any information, 
document, finding, statement or certified true copy 
that is received electronically by means of IMI, on the 
same basis as similar information obtained in their own 
country, for purposes compatible with the reasons for 
which the data were originally collected. The Regulation 
makes no reference to fraudulent activities. However, it 
is possible to exchange information and processing data 
connected to offences, criminal convictions or security 
measures, including administrative sanctions or judge-
ments in civil case (limited by relatively strict specific 
safeguards). This information on disciplinary, adminis-
trative or criminal sanctions can be used in cases where 
it is necessary to establish the good repute of an indi-
vidual or a legal person. Related to service providers, it 
is possible through the IMI-system to verify information 
about a foreign company or person wanting to provide 
a service in another country and to flag the activity of a 
service provider that could have health, safety or envi-
ronmental implications. The last function is seen as an 
alert mechanism.25   
Although it is not our intention to evaluate and assess 
the IMI-system, it is interesting to examine what coop-
eration through IMI can generate in the tackling of 
fraudulent service providers.26 The number of areas in 
which IMI is used has expanded to eight: professional 
qualifications; services; posted workers; cross-border 
road transport of euro cash; Solvit; patients’ rights in 
cross-border healthcare; e-commerce (pilot project); 
train driving licences (pilot project). 31 countries, the EU 
Member States and Norway, Liechtenstein and Iceland, 
are connected and can use the instrument. 
According to a special 2016 report of the European 
Court of Auditors, there is little administrative cooper-
ation in matters relating to the Services Directive. The 
usage of the IMI for the Directive is moderate to low: 
25  More information can be found in the IMI-library: http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/imi-net/library/index_en.htm 
26  In its assessment of the implementation of the Enforcement Directive, the European Commission is positive about the functioning of the IMI-system: by introducing adminis-
trative requirements and control measures through the Internal Market Information System, Member States are in a better position to monitor compliance with the rules and 
ensure that the rights of posted workers are guaranteed. https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:52019DC0426&from=EN 
27   https://www.eca.europa.eu/Lists/ECADocuments/SR16_05/SR_SERVICES_EN.pdf 
28  https://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/imi-net/_docs/statistics/2017/12/imi-requests.pdf
29  After the transposition of the Services Directive into national law in 2008, the institutions in all federal German states received handbooks and guidelines for the service 
directive and the IMI system, partly translation of European documents, partly federal documents prepared by the respective ministries of economy (in most Länder). The main 
focus was the differentiation between freedom of services of companies with no regular representation in Germany and hence provision of temporary services on the one hand 
and long-term provision of services on the other hand with companies establishing some sort of German subsidiary. The transnational administrative cooperation and the use of 
IMI as a mean of cooperation for transnational administrative institutions were seen as crucial. Nevertheless, the European Commission identified a divergent implementation 
of the administrative requirements, due to the federal system in Germany. The lack of uniform procedures for the establishment requirements in all sectors and federal states 
was said to have led to double requirements. 
information requests occur, as do notifications, but 
alerts and case-by-case derogations are rare. Also, the 
Commission recognises that IMI is insufficiently used in 
relation to the Services Directive or the Posting Direc-
tive, certainly if this is compared to the professional 
qualifications Directive.27 
The latest figures confirm that the use of the IMI-in-
strument remains rather modest and very uneven; the 
majority of requests that circulate through the system 
are indeed related to issues on the recognition of profes-
sional qualifications (72.6%), with a remarkable high 
share of requests sent by Norway.28  
Directly related to the subject of service provision and 
posting, the figures are modest:
• In 2017, the share of requests on the subject of ser-
vice provision with posted workers consisted in 
21.5% of all requests. One third of the posting related 
requests (1154 out of 3174) were sent by one country, 
Austria. 
• Three countries, Austria, Belgium and France sent 
out 75% of all IMI-requests on posting issues. Twen-
ty-five countries (including for instance large receiving 
countries like German or the UK) make hardly ever 
use of IMI.29   
• The countries receiving posting requests are more 
evenly spread with Slovenia, Poland, Portugal and 
Romania on top (together having 50% of all requests). 
• Requests concerning information on the sending 
service provider cover 10% of all posting related 
requests. Interestingly, the bulk of the requests con-
cerning information on the service provider with 
posted workers is sent to Slovenia. 
• Member States can come up with an urgent request 
concerning an establishment that posts workers. In 
fact, 1.4% of all posting requests fall in this category 
and only three countries have used IMI for this type 
of requests. 
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• Finally, 1.8% of all requests related to posting are 
requests to recover a penalty or fine.  
The IMI-system can also be used as the communi-
cation tool for the Services Directive. IMI can function 
as an alert mechanism, for instance, where authorities 
in other Member States should be warned against a 
specific service provider. However, the use in this area 
is even lower, only 3% of all IMI-requests (466 out of 
the total of 14764) concern information inquiries and 
exchanges on the Services Directive. Again, it is Austria 
that sends out the bulk of the requests (271 out of 466). 
A quarter of these requests are addressed to Romania. 
The information on the type of requests, directly related 
to the Services Directive, is not available. But in all 
evaluations of the European Commission, there is no 
reference to requests about ‘good repute’ or other 
Service Directive related issues that deal with fraudulent 
provision of services. In this respect, using the means 
to perform necessary checks on suppliers from another 
Member States and to enhance the administrative coop-
eration and mutual assistance, electronically facilitated 
through the IMI system, stays at a moderate level.   
2.2.7 The EU acquis on the genuine service 
provider summarised 
The Services Directive includes some notions that 
could be used as building blocks for instruments that 
monitor the genuine character of service providers. 
The national research (Chapter 3) examines the extent 
these notions have been implemented and have led 
to operational activities. In the work of the European 
Commission, there is no trace of infringement initi-
atives related to poor implementation in this regard. 
The Commission focuses mainly on too much regula-
tion, not on effective regulation that fits in a strategy 
to tackle fraudulent service providers. Infringement 
activities related to the Services Directive are domi-
nated by requests to Member States to remove what the 
Commission calls ‘excessive and unjustified obstacles 
to cross-border activities.’ In recent years, the Commis-
sion has acted against what it considers requirements 
imposed on certain service providers in Member States 
that run counter to the Services Directive.30 
In other directly related areas, the European legis-




31  https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/NIM/?uri=celex:32014L0067 
32  https://publications.europa.eu/en/publication-detail/-/publication/a379e7ca-6d2f-46df-acff-2ed857804bfa 
33  https://publications.europa.eu/en/publication-detail/-/publication/f83276f5-5a6a-11e8-ab41-01aa75ed71a1/language-en/format-PDF/source-87630724 
between the interests of social protection of workers, 
fair competition and the freedom to provide cross-border 
services. For instance, in order to avoid social dumping 
in the provision of services, the Enforcement Directive 
on Posting of Workers provides national authorities 
with tools to fight abuse and fraud and to improve their 
administrative cooperation and the exchange of informa-
tion (see below).31 The question is whether a provision 
that is seen as a matter of secondary law (in the social 
domain) is dissuasive and effective in tackling fraudulent 
service providers. It would probably be better to have 
a provision with EU-wide percussions in the hard core 
of the EU-frame that applies to the freedom to provide 
services.
As the IMI-system was installed, the main refer-
ences for the scope of the instrument were the Services 
Directive and the Directive on the recognition of profes-
sional qualifications.32 This scope has been extended to 
several adjacent policy areas. However, the evaluation 
of the instrument as a contribution to tackle the fraud-
ulent use of the freedom to provide services is still in its 
infancy. Most attention has been paid to the protection 
of personal data and to the proportionality assessment 
of national regulations required under the Services 
Directive. Currently, a pilot project is running that has 
to shed light on the contribution the system can deliver 
to administrative cooperation between competent 
authorities of the Member States, taken into account 
the principles of Regulation (EU) 2016/679 that settles 
the protection of natural persons with regard to the 
processing of personal data and on the free movement 
of such data.33 A second priority in this IMI-evaluation is 
the handling of notifications from Member States. Offi-
cially, the Commission can assess new measures and 
requirements. However, there is no obligation under the 
Services Directive to notify about draft measures and in 
the majority of cases the notified measures are already 
adopted. In that context, the only effective tool for the 
Commission to tackle those measures is an infringe-
ment procedure. Under the single market strategy, the 
Commission announced a legislative initiative to address 
these issues.  
A 2016 report by the European Court of Auditors 
revealed, in an assessment of the tools and support 
provided by the Commission for the implementation 
of the Services Directive, that these tools have been 
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underused and thus are only partially effective. IMI is 
little used in relation to the Services Directive compared 
to the professional qualifications Directive. The level of 
effectiveness of the IMI-instrument for the directive has 
not been as high as intended. Moreover, the auditors 
found that the Member States rarely use the alert mech-
anism, giving the impression that the corresponding 
function in IMI is superfluous. The auditors conclude that 
overall IMI-usage for the Services Directive is moderate 
to low: information requests occur, as do notifications, 
but alerts are rare (European Court of Auditors, 2016).
 
2.3 THE GENUINE UNDERTAKING 
IN THE SOCIAL SECURITY ACQUIS
Regulation (EC) No 883/2004 of the European 
Parliament and of the Council of 29 April 2004 on the 
coordination of social security systems and its imple-
menting Regulation 987/2009 aim in particular to 
facilitate the freedom of workers to move to other 
Member States as well as the freedom to provide 
services for the benefit of employers, which post 
workers to Member States other than that in which 
they are established. Its provisions aim at overcoming 
the obstacles likely to impede freedom of movement of 
workers and at encouraging economic mobility whilst 
avoiding administrative complications, especially for 
workers and undertakings. The Regulation provides firms 
with the opportunity to post workers during periods of 
a temporary nature to another Member State than the 
State in which the undertaking has its registered office 
or a place of business or the State in which the self-em-
ployed person normally pursues his activity. In such 
a situation, it is possible to derogate from the general 
lex loci laboris principle that a person who is pursuing 
an activity as an employed or self-employed person in 
a Member State shall be subject to the legislation of 
that Member State. Workers posted by an employer to 
another Member State to perform work on that employ-
er’s behalf shall continue to be subject to the legislation 
of the first Member State. 
The Regulation formulates some conditions for the 
application of this derogation that are relevant for the 
subject of our research. Some of the decisive conditions 
serve to protect the worker’s legal security. For instance, 
the duration of the work shall not exceed 24 months, and 
workers cannot be sent to replace another colleague. 
34  Decision No A2 of 12 June 2009 concerning the interpretation of Article 12 of Regulation (EC) No 883/2004 of the European Parliament and of the Council on the legislation 
applicable to posted workers and self-employed workers temporarily working outside the competent State. https://op.europa.eu/en/publication-detail/-/publication/55844f8f-
1300-4ac9-93fb-054ac87307ad/language-en 
Moreover, the legal security to which he or she and 
the institution with which he/she is insured require the 
existence of a direct relationship between the posting 
undertaking and the posted worker that is maintained 
throughout the period of posting. The work must be 
performed on behalf and under the subordination of the 
employer of the sending State. 
2.3.1 The genuine undertaking and social security
One of the key questions in this area is whether the 
sending firm is a genuine undertaking. The Regulations 
for the coordination of the social security (883/2004 and 
2009/987) provide certain criteria for the assessment 
of the genuine character of an undertaking that posts 
workers. The Administrative Commission for the Coor-
dination of Social Security Systems (ADMIN hereafter) 
has discussed these issues in 2009, this was almost in 
parallel with the conclusion of the implementing Regula-
tion 987/2009. In its Decision No A2, ADMIN prescribes 
that a number of elements have to be taken into account 
in order to establish whether a direct relationship 
exists and continues to exist, including responsibility 
for recruitment, employment contract, remuneration 
(without prejudice to possible agreements between the 
employer in the sending State and the undertaking in the 
State of employment on the payment to the workers), 
dismissal, and the authority to determine the nature of 
the work.34 
More directly related to the posting undertaking 
is the condition of an existence of ties between the 
undertaking that acts as the service provider and the 
Member State in which it is established. The possibility 
of posting should be confined solely to undertakings 
normally carrying out their business in the territory of 
the Member State whose legislation remains appli-
cable to the posted worker; assuming therefore that 
the above provisions apply only to undertakings which 
ordinarily perform substantial activities in the territory 
of the Member State in which they are established. 
Thus, the posting undertaking/service provider is a 
genuine company, registered and normally carrying out 
substantial activities in the country of registration. The 
temporary activities are carried out under a commercial 
contract for the temporary provision of services in the 
host country, based on a public or private commercial 
contract between the user undertaking and the service 
provider.
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2.3.2 Fraudulent activities related to cross-
border service provision
The starting points in the Regulations for social secu-
rity have led to several disputes and deliberations (and 
CJEU-rulings) that deal with legitimacy:
• What is meant by ties between the undertaking and 
the Member State?
• How to define substantial activities?
• What means to be established in the territory of a 
Member State?
• And ultimately, how to define the genuine character 
of the company?
In the above-mentioned Decision A2, it is said that, in 
cases of doubt, the competent authority of the Member 
State in which the undertaking/service provider is 
established is required to examine all the criteria char-
acterising the activities carried out by that undertaking, 
in order to determine whether the undertaking ordinarily 
performs substantial activities in the territory of the 
Member State of establishment. 
The criteria are: the place where the undertaking has 
its registered office and administration; the number of 
administrative staff working in the Member State in 
which it is established and in the other Member State; 
the place where posted workers are recruited and the 
place where the majority of contracts with clients are 
concluded; the law applicable to the contracts concluded 
by the undertaking with its workers, on the one hand, 
and with its clients, on the other hand; the turnover 
during an appropriately typical period in each Member 
State concerned; and the number of contracts performed 
in the sending State. 
These criteria should be adapted to each specific case 
and consider the nature of the activities carried out by 
the undertaking in the State in which it is established. For 
self-employed a similar list of conditions is formulated.
In line with this reasoning Regulation 987/2009 
(Article 14.2) says:  
For the purposes of the application of Article 
12(1) of the basic Regulation, the words ‘which 
normally carries out its activities there’ shall refer 
to an employer that ordinarily performs substantial 
activities, other than purely internal management 
activities, in the territory of the Member State in 
which it is established, taking account of all criteria 
characterising the activities carried out by the under-
taking in question. The relevant criteria must be 
suited to the specific characteristics of each employer 
and the real nature of the activities carried out
Regulation 883/2004 introduced the term ‘substantial 
part of his/her activity’ in article 13.1 as the fundamental 
benchmark for the application of the legislation of the 
Member State of residence or the legislation of the 
Member State in which the registered office or place 
of business of the service provider is situated. This 
distinction is decisive for determining the social security 
legislation that applies to the posted worker. Related to 
the substance, the implementing Regulation 987/2009 
(Article 14.8) formulates criteria for substantial activities 
applicable to the worker, not to the service provider:
For the purposes of the application of Article 13(1) 
and (2) of the basic Regulation, a ‘substantial part 
of employed or self-employed activity’ pursued in a 
Member State shall mean a quantitatively substantial 
part of all the activities of the employed or self-em-
ployed person pursued there, without this necessarily 
being the major part of those activities. To deter-
mine whether a substantial part of the activities is 
pursued in a Member State, the following indicative 
criteria shall be taken into account: (a) in the case 
of an employed activity, the working time and/or 
the remuneration; and (b) in the case of a self-em-
ployed activity, the turnover, working time, number of 
services rendered and/or income. In the framework of 
an overall assessment, a share of less than 25 % in 
respect of the criteria mentioned above shall be an 
indicator that a substantial part of the activities is not 
being pursued in the relevant Member State
2.3.3 Registration criteria and other obligations. 
Workers who are posted have to be in the possession 
of a posting certificate, which is the A1-form (until the 
revision of the coordination rules, the E101-form). It is 
in fact a standardised EU-form that confirms their status 
as a posted worker (or posted self-employed) in the 
area of social security and functions as a declaration, 
handed out by the competent authorities of the sending 
state, that the social security contributions are paid. The 
worker or its employer can require the A1 document, 
which can be obtained from the competent authority in 
the sending state. The document liberates the posting 
firm from the payment of social security contributions 
in the country where the work is carried out. If contacts 
with competent authorities in the state that have issued 
the A1-form are necessary, this mainly happens through 
the IMI-system or, incidentally, by more direct contacts.
Over the years, the Court of Justice of the EU (CJEU) 
has opined and ruled on the validity, the examination 
and possible withdrawal of A1-forms. Until recently, 
the position of the CJEU was very rigid in this regard. 
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The guiding principle was and is that, in case of posting 
with the application of the coordination Regulations, an 
A1-form issued by the home Member State has a binding 
effect as long as it has not been retracted or declared 
invalid by the issuing State. Once provided, the A1-form 
has to be respected and accepted in a host state, even 
if there are clear indications of fraudulent practices. 
Withdrawal is only possible by the issuing country. The 
CJEU confirmed the binding nature of an A1-form time 
and again – even when issued retroactively – for both 
the competent authorities and the courts of the host 
Member State to which an employee is posted. The fact 
that an A1-form is issued retroactively has no impact 
whatsoever on its binding nature, even if the A1-form 
was only issued after the host Member State declared 
the posted employee to be subject to its social security 
scheme, based on its national legislation. In such event, 
the A1-form’s binding nature will take precedence over 
the host Member States decision. In recent rulings 
(refer to the Sanctioning section), the CJEU added some 
nuance to this strict interpretation.  
2.3.4 Compliance control and enforcement of 
obligations in social security issues 
Until some years ago, competent authorities for social 
security at national level had no compliance ‘tradi-
tion’. They acted mainly as administrative centres that 
registered and handed out A1-forms, together with 
the regular work that these offices performed for the 
national social security. Identified irregularities with 
cross-border service provision in the form of posted 
workers were (and are) investigated on a case-by-case 
basis. 
The EU-Regulations provide a mediation mechanism 
and dispute solving, in case the competent authori-
ties of Member States have divergent opinions on the 
correct interpretation of the social security coordination 
rules or other contradictions need to be clarified and (re)
interpreted. Articles 71 and 72 of Regulation 883/2004 
redefine the role of the Administrative Commission 
for the Coordination of Social Security Systems that is 
attached to the European Commission. In summary, 
the tasks are to deal with all administrative questions 
and questions of interpretation arising from the provi-
sions of the coordination of the Regulations, facilitate 
the uniform application of Community law, especially 
by promoting exchange of experience and best admin-
35 Over the years, the Administrative Commission (in the old and renewed form) formulated more than 200 decisions. In recent years, the European Commission has divided the 
decisions in 7 categories: applicable legislation (A series), electronic data exchange (E series), family benefits (F series), horizontal issues (H series), pensions (P series), recove-
ry (R series), sickness (S series), and unemployment (U series). See: Decisions and Recommendations in force (2017), Administrative Commission for the Coordination of Social 
Security Systems, DG Employment, Social Affairs & Inclusion, European Commission.
36 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=uriserv:OJ.C_.2010.149.01.0005.01.ENG
istrative practices, facilitate realisation of actions of 
cross-border cooperation activities in the area of the 
coordination of social security systems and encourage 
the use of new technologies in order to facilitate the 
free movement of persons.35  
This is not the place to assess the functioning of 
this Administrative Commission, but it can be observed 
that a lot of its work has been dedicated to the instal-
lation of systems for the electronic exchange of social 
security information. Additionally, a series of decisions 
deals with frictions that origin from the interpretation 
of the Regulations (such as the validity of A1-forms, the 
establishment of dialogue and conciliation mechanism, 
interpretation of the posting rules and the determina-
tion of the applicable legislation). One decision of the 
Administrative Commission deals with fraudulent activ-
ities. Decision H5, concluded in March 2010, concerns 
the cooperation on combating fraud and error within the 
framework of the coordination of social security systems. 
This decision focuses on guaranteeing that contributions 
are paid to the right Member State and that benefits are 
not unduly granted or fraudulently obtained.36 The main 
concern is identifying the right person and combating the 
non-reporting of death. Nevertheless, Decision H5 also 
foresees that ‘Member States shall nominate a point of 
contact for fraud and error to whom either risks of fraud 
and abuse, or systematic difficulties which cause delays 
and error, can be reported by competent authorities or 
institutions’ (Article 3). In the documentation of the 
Administrative Commission, there is no further reference 
to the functioning of this point of contact in the area of 
fraudulent service providers. 
2.3.5 Social security and sanctioning 
Effective sanctioning is in most cases depending on 
the competences with regard to the validity of the issued 
A1-form. The CJEU reiterated that, if Member States 
bring a dispute regarding the validity of an A1-form 
before the Administrative Commission, the conclusion 
of this Commission will not have any normative power. 
As such, an A1-form will continue to be binding for 
the authorities and courts of the host Member State 
as long as it has not been retracted or declared invalid 
by the home Member State, even if the Administrative 
Commission would have concluded that the certificate 
was incorrectly issued and should be redrawn. This 
induced opportunities for artificial service providers to 
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manipulate with A1-forms that covered up the irregular 
recruitment of workers. Competent authorities in several 
Member States have dealt with such cases. 
The latest CJEU-verdicts lead to a certain softening of 
this rigid policy. In its ‘Altun’ judgement, the CJEU ruled 
that, in case of posting, the courts of a host Member 
State can disregard an A1-form issued by the compe-
tent authorities of the issuing Member State provided 
fraud is evidenced. The CJEU formulates certain condi-
tions that have to be met. First, there must be evidence 
that the conditions for a valid posting are not complied 
with. Secondly, there has to be evidence that the parties 
concerned had the intention to circumvent the condi-
tions for a valid posting, with a view to obtaining the 
advantage attached to it, i.e. remaining subject to the 
home country’s social security scheme. If the compe-
tent authorities of the host Member State to which 
workers are posted can provide to the issuing authorities 
concrete evidence of such fraud, collected in the course 
of a judicial investigation, it is the duty of the latter 
authorities to examine the grounds on which the A1-form 
was issued and withdraw it. If the issuing authorities fail 
to do so within a reasonable deadline, the CJEU argues 
that a national court in the host Member State can disre-
gard the A1-forms after legal proceedings.37   
The host country thus can disregard the application 
of an A1-form in case of demonstrated fraud, in limited 
cases determined after legal proceedings. The CJEU 
does not support a unilateral competence of national 
authorities disregarding an A1-form. The observed 
restrictions for competent authorities in the host state 
remain, in case fraudulent practices are uncovered. Even 
more important is that the policy towards abuses stay a 
matter of individualised proceedings with no EU-wide 
sanctioning, even when abuses are identified. 
In the agreement on the revision of the current 
EU-framework for the social security coordination that 
was reached in March 2019 between delegations of the 
European Council and the European Parliament more 
attention is paid to fraud. The provisional agreement 
speaks, for instance, about the withdrawal of a document 
with a retroactive effect, in case of fraud. Moreover, 
37 The CJEU concluded: when an institution of a Member State to which workers have been posted makes an application to the institution that issued E 101 certificates (currently 
A1) for the review and withdrawal of those certificates in the light of evidence, collected in the course of a judicial investigation, that supports the conclusion that those certifi-
cates were fraudulently obtained or relied on, and the issuing institution fails to take that evidence into consideration for the purpose of reviewing the grounds for the issue of 
those certificates, a national court may, in the context of proceedings brought against persons suspected of having used posted workers ostensibly covered by such certificates, 
disregard those certificates if, on the basis of that evidence and with due regard to the safeguards inherent in the right to a fair trial which must be granted to those persons, 
it finds the existence of such fraud. http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?text=&docid=199097&pageIndex=0&doclang=EN&mode=lst&dir=&occ=first&part=1&-
cid=2223564
38 On 13 December 2016, the European Commission submitted a draft regulation COM (2016)815 amending Regulations 883/2004 and 987/2009. Its goal is a ‘continuation of 
the process of modernisation of the EU law on social security coordination set out in Regulations 883/2004 and 987/2009, by further facilitating the exercise of citizens’ rights 
while ensuring legal clarity, a fair and equitable distribution of the financial burden among the Member States and administrative simplicity and enforceability of the rules. In 
April 2019, the European legislator (Council and European Parliament) reached an agreement in principle. The agreement was rejected in the Council of Ministers and is, at the 
moment of writing, renegotiated.
39 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:31997Y0719(03):EN:HTML
national authorities may have recourse to the European 
Labour Authority in cases of non-compliance with dead-
lines or insufficient replies, in view of a timely resolution 
of the dispute. And, in order to avoid abuse, a series of 
factors will determine the place of establishment of the 
employer. This has to reduce the risk of letterbox compa-
nies being utilised to circumvent the rules.38 
2.3.6 Social security coordination and service 
provision 
In summary, the EU regulations that serve to coordi-
nate the social security principles, which apply in the 
area of labour mobility and the free provision of services 
with posted workers, provide some criteria that might 
contribute to the uncovering of irregular service provi-
sion by artificial legal entities. However, these criteria are 
ambiguous and not very consistent in clarifying what is 
meant by a genuine service provider. As far as substance 
criteria are made operational, these criteria apply first and 
for all to the factual activity of the worker, not the activity 
of the service provider in the country of registration. 
In this area, the so-called Gebhard test stays the main 
reference.39 National measures restricting EU freedoms 
must fulfil four conditions: they must be applied in a 
non-discriminatory manner; they must be justified by 
imperative requirements in the general interest; they 
must be suitable for securing the attainment of the objec-
tive which they pursue; and they must not go beyond 
what is necessary in order to attain it. Moreover, the 
competence to check whether a service provider and the 
provision of services with posted workers are genuine lies 
in the hands of the national authorities in the country of 
registration. Thus, in line with the case law of the CJEU, 
there is limited remedy against service providers with no 
established economic activity and little to no independent 
economic value in the country of registration. The CJEU 
has ruled that a host state may not refuse recognition of 
the legal capacity of a company incorporated under the 
law of another Member State, even if that company does 
not pursue any economic activity in the latter state. 
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2.4 THE GENUINE UNDERTAKING 
IN THE POSTING ACQUIS
Based on the articles of the Treaty that underpin the 
freedom to provide services, Directive 96/71/EC of 16 
December 1996 concerning the posting of workers in 
the framework of the provision of services (hereafter 
PWD) introduced ‘posting’, that is the situation whereby 
an undertaking sends an employee to carry out work 
on its behalf in another country for a limited period of 
time, within the juridical sphere of labour law. The PWD 
provides a frame for wages and working conditions for 
workers posted by their employer to provide services 
in another Member State. Key aspects of posting 
(according to the Directive) are:
a. The existence of a direct labour contract between the 
service provider and the posted worker in the coun-
try of origin and the maintenance of this employment 
relation during the posting period.
b. The posting company should be a genuine under-
taking that normally carries out activities in the 
country of registration and temporarily performs ser-
vices abroad based on a commercial contract. 
c. The posting is temporary and the posted worker stays 
subordinate to the posting company while performing 
work related to the commercial contract between the 
posting company and the user undertaking. 
In recent years, intense and protracted political 
debates have taken place in relation to the ‘genuine’ 
character of posting, its effects on the labour market 
and a possible distortion of competition caused by 
non-genuine actors. This has led to efforts to enhance 
enforcement (Enforcement Directive 2014/67/EU) 
and to a revision of the 1996 Directive (Directive EU/ 
2018/957).40 Our analysis of the posting acquis will only 
consist of an assessment of the genuine notion of the 
service provider legal entity.
2.4.1 The genuine posting undertaking
The Directive provides in fact no operational instru-
ment related to the genuine character of the service 
provider. One of the first assessments dedicated to the 
40 Directive 2014/67/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 May 2014 on the enforcement of Directive 96/71/EC concerning the posting of workers in the 
framework of the provision of services and amending Regulation (EU) No 1024/2012 on administrative cooperation through the Internal Market Information System (‘the IMI 
Regulation’) and Directive 2018/957/EU amending Directive 96/71/EC concerning the posting of workers in the framework of the provision of services. See: https://ec.europa.
eu/social/main.jsp?catId=471#navItem-10 
41 See: http://www.eurodetachement-travail.eu/datas/files/EUR/synthesegenerale_2013EN.pdf and http://www.eurodetachement-travail.eu/datas/files/EUR/EURODETACHE-
MENT_project__2014_EN_.pdf 
implementation of the Posting Directive in 2003 exam-
ined both the legal context and the practical functioning 
of the PWD in the framework of the free provision of 
services. The findings showed that checking whether the 
undertaking in the home country was a genuine under-
taking, pursuing economic operations on a stable basis 
turned out to be very difficult. Host countries had to 
rely entirely on information of the home country or the 
country of the registered office, and the crucial cooper-
ation and mutual exchange in this area were absent. As 
a result, the compliance offices had serious problems in 
controlling whether the posting was just a workforce 
supply or in fact a provision of services based on a 
commercial contract (Cremers & Donders 2004).  
A reinvestigation in 2010, across 12 country cases 
(Cremers 2011), and a series of pilot projects with 
labour inspectorates of several European countries 
that started to discuss and exchange experiences with 
posting confirmed the practical problems identified in 
earlier research. Irregular use of posting is often shaped 
as a circumvention of the national regulatory frame-
work of pay, social security and labour standards in the 
host state with artificial corporate entities as the main 
‘vehicle’ for fraudulent service providers. Compliance 
authorities are in such cases confronted with manipula-
tion of the freedom of establishment (foreign agencies 
and recruitment establishments that in reality are ficti-
tious companies and arrangements), whilst de facto the 
only core business is labour recruitment.41 
Verification in the country where the services are 
provided requires the establishment of a working rela-
tion between competent authorities of several Member 
States, which is time-consuming. Such regime gets 
completely out of sight in situations with a chain of 
corporate entities in a triangle cross-border context 
(with a country of origin, a host country and another 
country for the financial transfers). The incubators of 
this method know very well that control is impeded, 
that the reference to free service provision leads to 
time-consuming research (verification of registration, 
contracts and pay slips, checking of the genuine char-
acter and of the legality of firms and agencies), also 
because consultation of colleagues abroad is needed, 
and that competences to effectively tackle breaches 
are missing. 
25
EU COMPANY LAW, ARTIFICIAL CORPORATE ENTITIES AND SOCIAL POLICY
The Enforcement Directive (2014/67/EU) that aims to 
overcome the problematic enforcement practice fits in 
the general search for a balance between the promotion 
of cross-border services and mobility of undertakings 
on the one hand and the tackling of possible abuses 
and circumvention of social rights and obligations on 
the other. In its 5th recital, it is said that the aim is to 
ensure compliance with Directive 96/71/EC (the PWD), 
whilst not putting an unnecessary administrative burden 
on the service providers. In recital 7, it is clearly stated 
that the constituent factual elements characterising the 
temporary nature inherent to the notion of posting, and 
the condition that the employer is genuinely established 
in the Member State from which the posting takes place, 
need to be examined by the competent authority of the 
host Member State and, where necessary, in close coop-
eration with the Member State of establishment. 
Directive (EU) 2018/957 of 28 June 2018 amends 
Directive 96/71/EC concerning the posting of workers 
in the framework of the provision of services. The revi-
sion confirms that the freedom to provide services 
includes the right of undertakings to provide services in 
the territory of another Member State, and to post their 
own workers temporarily to the territory of that Member 
State for that purpose. The aim of the revision is to 
strike the right balance between the need to promote 
the freedom to provide services and ensure a level 
playing field on the one hand and the need to protect the 
rights of posted workers on the other. Key aspects of the 
revision (according to the Directive) are the promotion of 
the equal pay principle, the possibility to verify working 
conditions, conditions for accommodation and travel 
provisions and other allowances specific to posting that 
ensure greater protection for posted workers. More-
over, where the effective duration of a posting exceeds 
12 months, Member States shall ensure that all the 
applicable terms and conditions of employment which 
are laid down in the Member State where the work is 
carried out are guaranteed to workers who are posted 
to their territory (inserted Article 3.1a). Related to the 
genuine character of posting situations and the tack-
ling of abuses in subcontracting situations, the revision 
refers to articles 4 and 12 of the Enforcement Directive.
2.4.2 Fraudulent activities with posting
The Enforcement Directive (2014/67/EU) leaves it 
up to the Member States to designate the competent 
authority that has to perform the appropriate provisions, 
42 ETUC-research questions whether this provision in the Enforcement Directive is formulated strong enough to make companies comply with preconditions for genuine service 
provision. https://www.etuc.org/sites/default/files/publication/files/ces-brochure_compiled_thematic-uk-v2.pdf
measures and control mechanisms necessary for better 
and more uniform implementation, application and 
enforcement in practice of the PWD, including measures 
to prevent and sanction any abuse and circumvention of 
the applicable rules. Although fraudulent activities are 
not precisely defined, the Directive speaks about abuse 
and circumvention of the applicable rules by undertak-
ings taking improper or fraudulent advantage of the 
freedom to provide services enshrined in the TFEU and/
or of the application of Directive 96/71/EC (recital 7). The 
identification of a genuine posting and preventing abuse 
and circumvention in the Directive are considered to be 
indicative and non-exhaustive. Competent authorities 
shall make an overall assessment of all factual elements 
that are deemed to be necessary. These elements are 
intended to assist competent authorities when carrying 
out checks and controls and where they have reason to 
believe that a worker may not qualify as a posted worker 
under Directive 96/71/EC. Those elements are indicative 
factors in the overall assessment to be made and there-
fore shall not be considered in isolation. In particular, 
there should be no requirement that each element is to 
be satisfied in every posting case. 
The revision of the PWD, Directive (EU) 2018/957, 
speaks about abuse of the rights guaranteed by the 
Treaties and circumvention of the rules. The Directive 
mentions explicitly abuses in subcontracting situations 
and in the transnational hiring-out of workers, such 
as transnational cases of undeclared work and bogus 
self-employment linked to the posting of workers. 
2.4.3 Registration criteria and other obligations 
for posting firms
The Enforcement Directive gives some guidelines 
in Article 4.2 that aim to facilitate the identification of 
genuine posting.42 It provides Member States’ authorities 
with ‘substance rules’, consisting of a non-exhaustive 
list of indicative factual elements that should be used 
in an overall assessment in order to determine whether 
an undertaking genuinely performs substantial activities, 
other than purely internal management and/or adminis-
trative activities: 
In order to determine whether an undertaking genu-
inely performs substantial activities, other than 
purely internal management and/or administrative 
activities, the competent authorities shall make an 
overall assessment of all factual elements charac-
terising those activities. Such elements may include 
in particular:
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(a) the place where the undertaking has its regis-
tered office and administration, uses office space, 
pays taxes and social security contributions and, 
where applicable, in accordance with national law 
has a professional licence or is registered with the 
chambers of commerce or professional bodies;
(b) the place where posted workers are recruited 
and from which they are posted;
(c) the law applicable to the contracts concluded by 
the undertaking with its workers, on the one hand, 
and with its clients, on the other;
(d) the place where the undertaking performs its 
substantial business activity and where it employs 
administrative staff;
(e) the number of contracts performed and/or the 
size of the turnover realised in the Member State of 
establishment, considering the specific situation of, 
inter alia, newly established undertakings and SMEs.
According to an assessment of the national implementa-
tion of the Enforcement Directive, most Member States 
have transposed a list of elements identical to those in the 
Directive.43 Some Member States kept existing or added 
new elements. For instance, Spain added an explicit iden-
tification of the undertaking posting the workers.
 
The revision of the PWD, Directive (EU) 2018/957, 
settles the application of certain provisions of the 
temporary agency Directive 2008/104/EC. The basic 
working and employment conditions applicable to 
temporary agency workers posted to the territory of 
another Member State should be at least those which 
would apply to such workers if they were recruited by 
the user undertaking to occupy the same job (a modifi-
cation of Article 1.3.c of the PWD). The user undertaking 
informs the temporary employment undertaking, or 
placement agency, about the posted workers who are 
temporarily working in the territory of a Member State, 
other than the Member State in which they normally 
work for the temporary employment undertaking or 
placement agency or for the user undertaking, in order 
to allow the employer to apply, as appropriate, the terms 
and conditions of employment that are more favourable 
to the posted worker.
2.4.4 Compliance control and enforcement of 
posting obligations 
Article 6 of the Enforcement Directive prescribes the 
mutual assistance and cooperation (providing informa-
tion, carrying out checks, inspections and investigations 
43 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:52019DC0426&from=EN 
with respect to situations of posting, including the 
investigation of any non-compliance or abuse of appli-
cable rules). Moreover, the Member State are obliged 
to designate one or more competent authorities, which 
may include the liaison offices mentioned in the PWD. 
Through the IMI-system the European Commission 
is informed about the designation of the competent 
authority or authorities. Member States shall ensure 
that service providers established in their territory 
supply the competent authorities in another Member 
State with all the information necessary for supervising 
their activities in compliance with their national laws. 
The transfer of information and answers to requests is 
channelled through the IMI-system. Registers in which 
service providers have been entered, and which may be 
consulted by the competent authorities in their territory, 
may also be consulted, in accordance with the same 
conditions, by the equivalent competent authorities of 
other Member States. 
Article 7 adds that competent authorities of a host 
Member State may also ask the competent authorities of 
the Member State of establishment, in respect of each 
instance where services are provided or each service 
provider, to provide information as to the legality of the 
service provider’s establishment, the service provider’s 
good conduct, and the absence of any infringement 
of the applicable rules. But, according to Article 7.1, 
there is no duty to carry out checks and controls on 
each other’s territory. Or like Article 10 says ‘authorities 
designated under national law carry out effective and 
adequate inspections on their territory in order to control 
and monitor compliance with the provisions and rules’. 
The Enforcement Directive prescribes that it is 
possible for the host country to impose administrative 
requirements and control measures if these are justi-
fied, proportionate and not discriminatory. A host country 
may impose requirements such as a declaration at the 
commencement of the service provision, the identity of 
the provider and the number of posted workers. There 
is no reference to requirements that may be imposed 
by the country of registration of the service provider, 
although in practice, it is the competent authority of the 
country of registration that has (according also to the 
Service Directive) jurisdiction to check the genuine char-
acter of a company. 
Directive (EU) 2018/957 of 28 June 2018 that amends 
and revises the PWD, stresses the enhanced coordination 
between the Member States’ competent authorities and/
or bodies and cooperation at Union level on combating 
fraud relating to the posting of workers. This should 
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be effectuated by a reinforcement of the transnational 
dimension of inspections, inquiries and exchanges of 
information between the competent authorities or bodies 
of the Member States concerned. Competent authorities 
or bodies should have the necessary means for alerting 
on such situations and exchanging information aiming 
to prevent and combat fraud and abuses. The Directive 
also refers to the necessity to collect and monitor suffi-
cient and accurate data on the number of posted workers 
(sectoral and per state).
The cooperation can be characterised, according to 
Article 4.2 of the revision, in particular by:
• Replying to reasoned requests from these competent 
authorities or bodies for information on the transna-
tional hiring-out of workers.
• Where the competent authority or body in the 
Member State from which the worker is posted does 
not possess the information requested by the compe-
tent authority or body of the Member State to whose 
territory the worker is posted, it shall seek to obtain 
that information from other authorities or bodies in 
that Member State.
In the event of persistent delays in the provision of 
such information to the Member State to whose territory 
the worker is posted, the Commission shall be informed 
and shall take appropriate measures.
The monitoring, control and enforcement is formulated 
in a modification of Article 5 of the PWD. The host country 
is responsible for the monitoring, control and enforcement 
of the obligations laid down in the revised PWD and in 
Directive 2014/67/EU and shall take appropriate measures 
in the event of failure to comply with these Directives.
2.4.5 Sanctioning and posting
Regarding complaints and the defence of rights, 
Member States shall, according to the posting acquis, 
ensure that there are effective mechanisms for posted 
workers to lodge complaints against their employers 
directly; as well as the right to institute judicial or 
administrative proceedings, in the Member State in 
whose territory the workers are or were posted, where 
such workers consider they have sustained loss or 
damage as a result of a failure to apply the applicable 
rules, and even after the relationship in which the 
failure is alleged to have occurred has ended. Trade 
unions and other third parties may engage, on behalf 
or in support of the posted workers or their employer, 
and with their approval, in any judicial or administra-
tive proceedings. Member States may take additional 
measures, I relation to the abuse with artificial corpo-
rate entities, on a non-discriminatory and proportionate 
basis in order to ensure that in subcontracting chains 
the contractor of which the employer (service provider) 
is a direct subcontractor can, in addition to or in place 
of the employer, be held liable by the posted worker. The 
liability is limited to worker’s rights acquired under the 
contractual relationship between the contractor and his 
or her subcontractor. Member States may take alterna-
tive enforcement measures, which enable, in a direct 
subcontracting relationship, effective and proportionate 
sanctions against the contractor, to tackle fraud and 
abuse in situations when workers have difficulties in 
obtaining their rights.
Article 5 of the revised PWD prescribes that Member 
States shall lay down the rules related to penalties appli-
cable to infringements of national provisions adopted 
pursuant to the Directive and shall take all measures 
necessary to ensure that they are implemented. The 
penalties provided for shall be effective, proportionate 
and dissuasive. Moreover, the revision explicitly says 
that, if it is established that an undertaking is improperly 
or fraudulently creating the impression that the situation 
of a worker falls within the scope of the PWD, following 
an overall assessment made pursuant to Article 4 of 
Directive 2014/67/EU by a Member State, this Member 
State shall ensure that the worker benefits from relevant 
law and practice.
2.4.6 The genuine provision of services through 
posting summarised
As the revision of the PWD is still in the stage of 
national transposition and implementation (and the 
national transposition of the Enforcement Directive 
was not finalised in most countries before mid-2017) 
it is, of course, too early to assess the functioning of 
the revised posting acquis. However, in summary, the 
EU Directives that regulate the freedom to provide 
services, by undertakings that post their workers to 
another Member State, do provide some criteria that 
clarify what is meant with a genuine service provider. 
The Enforcement Directive formulates substance 
criteria in line with the criteria that are enshrined in 
the Regulations for the coordination of social secu-
rity. These criteria apply to the factual posting activity 
of the worker and, to a lesser extent, to the activity 
of the service provider in the country of registration. 
The competence to check whether a service provider 
and the provision of services with posted workers are 
genuine, lays in principle in the hands of the national 
authorities in the country of registration. The Enforce-
ment Directive provides some indicators for such an 
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assessment: the place of the registered office and 
administration, the office space, the payment of taxes 
and social security contributions and, where appli-
cable, professional licences or registration with the 
chambers of commerce, the place where substantial 
business activities are performed and administrative 
staff is employed, and the turnover realised in the 
Member State of establishment. The host country 
may, according to the revision of the PWD, carry out 
an overall assessment whether an undertaking is 
improperly or fraudulently creating the impression that 
the situation of a worker falls within the scope of the 
PWD. However, like in the case of the social secu-
rity acquis and in line with the case law of the CJEU, 
there is no effective remedy, such as the withdrawal 
from the national market of the host country, against 
service providers with no established economic activity 
and little to no independent economic value in the 
country of registration. The CJEU has ruled that a host 
state may not refuse recognition of the legal capacity 
of a company incorporated under the law of another 
Member State, even if that company does not pursue 
any economic activity in the latter state. 
 
2.5 TOPICAL DEVELOPMENTS BEYOND 
THE ANALYSED PARTS OF THE EU ACQUIS
The financial services is the one policy area in which the 
tackling of service provisions with artificial legal corporate 
entities has become a prominent matter. The EU-legislator 
is seeking to ensure oversight of asset managers, and has 
warned that letterbox entities, nominally based in the EU 
but managed from abroad, will no longer be tolerated. 
In a 2019-report the European Banking Authority (here-
after EBA) is critical about outsourcing that can lead to a 
situation where an institution becomes an ‘empty shell’ 
that lacks the substance to remain authorised. EBA has 
formulated guidelines that aim to clarify the supervisory 
expectations regarding outsourcing to service providers, 
including situations where institutions use back-to-back 
transactions or intragroup transactions to transfer part of 
the market risk and credit risk to a non-EU/EEA service 
provider. EBA wants to ensure that outsourcing of finan-
cial institutions is performed in an orderly manner and 
not performed to an extent that would lead to the setting 
up of empty shells that no longer have the substance 
to remain authorised. This additional assurance should 
protect the level playing field within the EU/EEA. It is up 
to competent national authorities to ensure that EU/EEA 
financial institutions are not operating as an empty shell. 
44 https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2019-04-08/irish-central-bank-warns-u-k-asset-managers-on-brexit-access 
Institutions and payment institutions should maintain at 
all times sufficient substance and meet all the conditions 
of their authorisation at all times (EBA 2019). 
This is a very topical issue in view of Brexit, for 
instance in Ireland. In an earlier opinion on the possible 
consequences of Brexit, EBA already wrote that compe-
tent authorities should assess carefully the adequacy 
of the relocating firms’ structure and governance and 
whether or not the envisaged structure is commensurate 
to the size, nature and complexity of the activities. Appli-
cations should contain sufficient information on their 
business structure and programme and a clear expla-
nation of the choices taken in terms of substance of 
the incoming entity. EU27 entities set up after Brexit 
by UK companies must not operate as a ‘letterbox’ or 
‘empty shell’, but have appropriate governance and risk 
management arrangements in place to be able to take 
on identification and management of the risks that it 
has generated, and that in the event of a crisis, it could 
rapidly deploy scaled up risk management arrangements 
(EBA 2017). In April 2019, Ireland’s central bank consist-
ently put pressure on UK investment funds selling into 
Ireland not to market products there or in the rest of 
the EU after the UK becomes a so-called third country 
outside the European Union, warning they could be 
breaking the law by doing so. The regulator, based in 
Dublin, forewarned UK funds that it is a criminal offense 
for an unauthorized credit firm to provide financial 
services in Ireland, and consistently said so-called brass-
plate operations aren’t welcome. Firms authorised in 
Ireland must be run from there, the regulator insisted.44 
Another related development comes from the obli-
gation to register under the UBO-system (the Ultimate 
Beneficial Owner). The UBO-registration aims to prevent 
people from hiding themselves behind legal entities. 
The obligation goes back to the implementation of the 
4th Anti-Money Laundering Directive that intended to 
prevent money laundering and terrorist financing and 
had to be implemented on 26 June 2017. Any institution 
that falls within the scope of the Anti-Money Laun-
dering and Anti-Terrorist Financing Act must retrieve 
the identity of the UBO of their business relations on 
a mandatory basis. A 5th Directive was adopted in 
2018 with a view to strengthen the Union’s regime set 
in place, and seeing the commitments undertaken by 
Member States to quickly proceed with the transposition 
of Directive (EU) 2015/849. It included in Article 30 the 
obligation for Member States to ensure that breaches of 
the UBO-provision are subject to effective, proportionate 
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and dissuasive measures or sanctions. The amendments 
to Directive (EU) 2015/849 should be transposed by 
10 January 2020.45 Member States should set up bene-
ficial ownership registers for corporate and other legal 
entities by 10 January 2020 and for trusts and similar 
legal arrangements by 10 March 2020. Central registers 
should be interconnected via the European Central Plat-
form by 10 March 2021. Several Member States have 
established procedures for this registration. However, 
the implementation and the registration were several 
times postponed in the Member States and the enforce-
ment of the obligation is not functioning well.46  
Only five countries met the 26 June 2017 deadline for 
having an ultimate beneficial ownership (UBO) register 
under national law – the UK, Denmark, France, Germany 
and Sweden. In the UK, companies were already 
required (from 30 June 2016) to declare who owns or 
controls the firm to Companies House via the People 
with Significant Control register. Representatives of firms 
were required to identify the people with significant 
control over the company and confirm their information, 
record the details on the company’s own register within 
14 days, provide this information to Companies House 
within a further 14 days, update the information on the 
45 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=CELEX:32018L0843&from=NL 
46 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=celex%3A32015L0849 
company’s own register when it changes within 14 days, 
and update the information at Companies House within 
a further 14 days and confirm to Companies House that 
information on the public register is accurate, where it 
has not been updated in the previous 12 months. The 
4th Anti-Money Laundering Directive led to amend-
ments of this system (into force since 26 June 2017). 
The Amendment Regulations widen the scope of compa-
nies required to comply with the People with Significant 
Control Regime.
Not only the overall implementation of the Anti-
Money Laundering Acts was delayed in a majority of 
countries, also the deadline for the obligatory regis-
tration was several times postponed. For instance, 
Luxembourg pushed back, at the end of August 2019, the 
deadline for companies to say who their real owners are, 
after 53% failed to submit the information that is meant 
to shed more light on opaque corporate entities. More 
than 68,000 companies failed to say who their benefi-
cial owners are. Belgium, where registration had to take 
place before 30 November 2018, postponed the regis-
tration deadline two times because of a poor outcome. 
Similar postponement took place in other countries (such 
as Portugal and the Netherlands).
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3 
IMPLEMENTATION OF THE ACQUIS AND 
ENFORCEMENT AT NATIONAL LEVEL 
47 Even if the offer of goods or services is made on a not-for-profit basis: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:62016CJ0074&from=EN
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
In their overall policy, the European Institutions have 
been supportive of foreign-domiciled incorporations 
and cross-border corporate mobility in Europe. In the 
preceding sections, it was noted that, based on the prin-
ciples of the economic freedoms, the EU and its Member 
States have built a European market for national corpo-
rate legal entities with a relatively weak transnational 
safety net to ensure the genuine character of any cross-
border activity. The assumption is that the registration 
in any Member State is good enough for activities 
across Europe. The basis is mutual trust and confidence 
between Member States. The EU legislator relies on 
the registration requirements in the Member States, 
the latter went through a process of simplification and 
deregulation, with a lowering of incorporation costs and 
especially the minimum capital requirements. 
The only exception of ‘regulation’, which stems 
directly from the company law acquis, is the protection 
for minority shareholders and creditors, and the ‘before 
and after’ principle of workers participation in the SE 
legislation.
The EU acquis provides a patchy and fragmented 
palette with compliance tools and control instruments. 
Some of these instruments might contribute to the tack-
ling of non-genuine service providers making use of 
artificial arrangements and of ‘empty’ corporate legal 
entities. The inherent weakness of these instruments is 
that most preventive and repressive measures stem from 
parts of the acquis that do not belong to the hard core of 
the Single Market. As long as the principles of freedom 
of establishment and the free provision of services are 
not set up in a more conditional manner, defining and 
regulating legitimacy and genuineness, the way is paved 
for abuses. 
In certain areas, nevertheless, national implementa-
tion might lead to more decisiveness and effectiveness. 
In the next sections, an effort is made to briefly sketch 
out the implementation of a few of these efforts and the 
practical functioning of the observed instruments. On 
the basis of our limited research, we neither pretend to 
deliver an exhaustive assessment of the national imple-
mentation of the relevant EU acquis, nor of the practical 
functioning of the different regulatory aspects. However, 
the consulted national experts came up with more than 
proxy evidence and practices in several areas that are 
worthwhile analysing and comparing.
3.2 THE GENUINE UNDERTAKING  
The assessment of the acquis (Chapter 2) reveals 
that there isn’t a consistent definition of undertakings 
neither in the Treaty on the Functioning of European 
Union (TFEU), nor in the relevant competition or company 
law acts at national level. In general terms, the concept 
‘undertaking’ across the EU is understood as any entity 
engaged in an economic activity, irrespective of its legal 
status and the way in which it is financed. Along this 
line of thinking, the CJEU’s general approach focuses on 
the type of activity performed rather than on the institu-
tional form of the involved entity. An economic activity is 
any activity consisting in offering goods or services on a 
given market.47  
This broad approach has the consequence that an 
undertaking is interpreted independently of national 
institutional conceptions. One further conclusion of the 
reasoning could be that an undertaking not engaged 
in real economic activities should be regarded as a 
non-genuine undertaking. This point of view has been 
rejected by the CJEU. The Court has not defined the level 
of activity that should be associated with an established 
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undertaking. Scholars tend to think that it includes any 
activity other than what can be termed ‘purely marginal’, 
but several Member States do not apply any require-
ments related to activities in the country of incorporation 
(Sørensen, 2015). 48  
During our research, the consulted national experts 
confirmed the lack of clarity in this respect; it is a current 
practice to register companies without checking real 
activities. The involved national Departments are not 
preoccupied with the genuine character of registered 
firms, and the Single Points of Contacts, most often 
established in the Ministries for Economics, formulate 
their tasks in terms of the ‘promotion of service provi-
sion’. Even worse, several of the experts that tried to 
figure out where the responsibility lies at national level 
for the assessment of service providers that work in a 
cross-border context, were referring back to the Euro-
pean Commission. The same happened with questions 
related to the functioning of the liaison points or the 
Single Point of Contacts. As a consequence, monitoring 
of the process does not take place.   
Artificial corporate entities, such as letterbox or shell 
companies, are not necessarily non-genuine under-
takings, and there is less known about the size of 
non-genuine undertakings. One of the problems to trace 
and identify corporate legal entities that serve as arti-
ficial arrangements for abusive purposes, such as tax 
evasion, money laundering and abuse or circumven-
tion of social rights, is the fact that there is no unified 
definition of what genuine undertakings are. In a study 
prepared for the European Parliament three types of 
shell companies were identified (Kiendl Krišto, 2018):
• Anonymous shell companies: this type of ‘shell’ com-
pany provides anonymity as a key element, while 
simultaneously guaranteeing control over the shell 
company and its resources. The ultimate beneficial 
owner (UBO) remains hidden behind this company, or 
behind a chain of interconnecting shell companies, 
often in several jurisdictions.
• Letterbox companies: this second type of ‘shell’ 
company, also referred to as a ‘mailbox’ company, 
is generally a company registered in one Member 
State while its substantive economic activity takes 
place in another Member State. These companies are 
sometimes used to circumvent labour laws and social 
contributions in the Member State in which the sub-
stantive economic activity is taking place.
48 According to these scholars, it is debatable whether a company that is incorporated without any activities is protected by the freedom of establishment or consequently, 
Member States are free to deny the incorporation of a company. 
• Special purpose entities (SPEs): a third type of ‘shell’ 
company refers to legal entities whose core business 
consists of group financing or holding activities. For-
eign direct investment with the use of SPEs does not 
represent a genuine investment in the economy of a 
particular country but rather financial flows and the 
channelling of funds via that country.
The current outlook across Europe is that further 
deregulation and simplification of registration is still 
the dominant trend, although tax circumvention and 
money-laundering have gained a lot of attention.
ONE EXAMPLE IN ANOTHER POLICY AREA
In the policy areas of taxation and/or money-
laundering, the legislator has paid more attention 
in recent years to artificial arrangements, 
including legislative proposals to prevent and 
tackle abuses. In recent years, the 4th and the 
5th Directive on money laundering (already 
mentioned in section 2.5) have come into force 
and parts of this policy have become effective. 
The national implementation should lead to a 
stricter monitoring of the reporting of unusual 
transactions by investment firms and investment 
funds and other measures. The national 
transposition was not a smooth affaire, as several 
countries were very late and didn’t respect 
the implementation deadlines. Especially the 
obligatory introduction of a register of Ultimate 
Beneficial Owners that was treated beyond 
had in some countries a slow and difficult start. 
Nevertheless, the Directives introduce in most 
countries new legislation that can have an impact 
on the phenomenon of artificial arrangements. 
For instance, Latvia banned in April 2018, the 
cooperation with shell companies. Banks, 
intermediaries and investment management 
companies are prohibited from establishing 
and maintaining business relationships or to 
executing transactions with shell companies. 
For that purpose, Chapter I of the Law on the 
Prevention of Laundering the Proceeds from 
Criminal Activity (Money Laundering) and of 
Terrorist Financing defines shell companies 
as legal persons characterised by one or several 
of the following indications:
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a) has no affiliation of a legal person to an 
actual economic activity or the operation of 
a legal person forms a minor economic value 
or no economic value at all, and the subject 
of the Law has no documentary information at 
its disposal that would prove the contrary;
b) laws and regulations of the country where 
the legal person is registered do not provide 
for an obligation to prepare and submit 
financial statements for its activities to the 
supervisory institutions of the relevant state, 
including the annual financial statements;
c) the legal person has no place (premises).
Romania published the transposition in its Law 
no. 129/2019 on the prevention and combating of 
money laundering and terrorism financing. The 
country amended and supplemented certain 
normative acts (into force since the 21 July 2019) 
that introduce new notions, as the beneficial 
owner which, in the sense of the normative act, 
is the natural person who finally holds or controls 
the client and/or the natural person on behalf of 
whom is carried out a transaction, an operation 
or an activity. As a consequence, the National 
Trade Register Office shall organise a central 
register where data regarding the beneficial 
owners of the legal persons is registered subject 
to the obligation of incorporation in the trade 
register (except the autonomous administrations, 
national companies and the companies fully 
or majority held by the state). However, in 
general terms and outside the scope of these 
implemented EU Directive on money-laundering it 
is difficult to define non-genuine corporate legal 
entities, as the Company Law does not speak 
about illegal activities.
49 Regulatory arbitrage is defined as a method for companies to take advantage of loopholes in order to avoid unprofitable regulations. For example, a company relocates its 
headquarters to a country with more favourable tax or social security policy to save cost and increase profit. 
50 https://www.ris.bka.gv.at/Dokumente/Bundesnormen/NOR40212265/NOR40212265.pdf
51 https://www.ris.bka.gv.at/Dokumente/Vwgh/JWR_2018150057_20180627L01/JWR_2018150057_20180627L01.pdf
Company law in the strict sense seems hardly to be 
affected by the developments related to fraud and regu-
latory arbitrage.49 In the last decades, the creation of an 
undertaking has been simplified in the Member States. In 
several countries it led to a lowering of the market entrance 
for entrepreneurs. Nowadays it is quite normal to apply 
online for the reservation of a company name, and subse-
quently to register in the trade register office in person - at 
the counter, by mail or in electronic form. Outside the area 
of tax related deliberations, discussions on the ‘genuine’ 
nature of legal entities started relatively late.  
A Eurofound study spoke in in 2017 about ‘sham 
companies’, i.e. legal entities created to disguise the 
real employer. The report states when the only purpose 
of the creation of a company is to benefit from more 
favourable regulations relating to labour and tax (and not 
to develop an activity in a country), questions should be 
asked about the ‘genuine’ nature of the company. The 
comparison of the involved countries shows remark-
able differences in approach (Eurofound 2017). In other 
literature proxy evidence of features of non-genuine 
undertakings can be found (Cremers 2011, Müller 2012, 
Jonsson 2015). 
As far as national company law is concerned, the 
description of an undertaking stays often very brief 
and broad. To give just one example, for the purposes 
of the Companies Act 2006 (section 1161) in the UK, 
an undertaking means either a corporate organisation 
or partnership; or an unincorporated association doing 
trade or business, with or without a view to profit. 
The overall picture is rather patchy, as the following 
non-exhaustive description of the situation in a selection 
of Member States demonstrates. 
In Austria, no unified definition is enshrined in the 
legislation. However, different definitions appear and are 
applied in tax law, in legislation against social fraud and 
in the jurisprudence. 
The fiscal legislation emphasises the evidence of real 
economic activities.50  
The administrative court ruled in 2018 in a case where 
a letterbox company was defined as a firm with no busi-
ness operations that therefore cannot provide services.51 
The Act on tackling social fraud (SBBG, see below) 
defines artificial corporate legal entities or ‘bogus’ compa-
nies (Scheinfirmen) in two ways: a company that has the 
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main purpose to reduce wage contributions, contributions 
to social insurance, supplements under the BUAG (the 
Construction Workers’ Annual Leave and Severance Pay 
Act) or compensation claims of employees, or secondly, to 
register persons for social insurance to receive insurance, 
social or other transfer payments, although these do not 
take up real and gainful employment. The legislation that 
tackles social fraud uses the term for corporate legal enti-
ties without assets (i.e. letterbox companies, often with 
registered offices in empty premises). The sole purpose of 
these firms is registering employees with social security 
institutions, without the intention of paying any taxes or 
social security contributions. The firms appear in ‘subcon-
tracting pyramids’ (extended chains of subcontractors) 
and in extended corporate networks (at national and at 
transnational level). Part of the business model is that 
companies are established, employees are registered, 
and after a certain period, the company declares itself 
bankrupt. The results are systematic social fraud, avoiding 
social security contributions and non-payment of taxes. 
With no capital left, the state cannot claim contributions 
and taxes from these insolvent companies.52  
In 2017 Belgium introduced a law to combat ‘inactive 
companies/ghost companies’, with a new dissolution 
procedure for ‘dormant’ corporate entities. Consequently, 
the district courts in Belgium apply a stricter regime 
since mid-2017 in the detection of fraudulent ‘ghost’ 
companies. According to the Federal Justice Depart-
ment, the law applied to some 140,000 companies (2013 
data). The consultancy firm Graydon, however, estimates 
the presence of about 350,000 ‘ghost’ companies.53  
It was found that companies in Belgium do not file 
accounts on time. According to the Law of 17 May 
2017, the judicial dissolution of a company is possible 
7 months after the closing date of the last financial 
year for which the annual accounts were not filed. In 
addition, not only third parties and the public prose-
cutor are entitled to request the judicial dissolution of 
an inactive company but also the Investigate Services 
of the Commercial courts can initiate a procedure. 
Other reasons to request the dissolution of a company 
are if the company is deregistered from the Crossroads 
Bank for Enterprises, if the company repeatedly fails to 
reply to an invitation to appear before the Investigative 
Services or if directors do not have the basic manage-
ment skills or professional capacities required for the 
performance of the company’s activities. Notwith-




remains limited and seldom is a connection made to 
possible social fraud. With regard to the publication 
of the annual accounts, only the timely publication 
is considered. Thousands of companies publish year 
after year identical annual accounts. Moreover, annual 
accounts of dormant companies can suddenly come to 
life almost miraculously and, by using ‘strawmen’, the 
real owners can stay out of sight. 
Non-genuine companies In Estonia are related to 
practices where direct employment contracts are hidden 
behind civil law contracts or service agreements, with 
the purpose of evading employment-related taxes, 
including social security contributions. This fraudulent 
form of contracting work is facilitated via the creation 
of bogus private limited companies. Contracting with 
a private limited company, rather than establishing a 
labour contract with an employee, allows to bypass all 
regulations on employee remuneration, working time, 
annual leave, and health and safety as the ordinary 
employer-employee relation is hidden behind a ‘commer-
cial’ contract. The Supreme Court of Estonia has ruled 
that such contracts are to be considered as employment 
relationships if one entity performs a working activity 
for another entity in case of subordination to the latter’s 
management and under the latter’s control.54 The ruling 
is similar to rulings in other countries that define a labour 
relationship, taking also into account the remuneration 
and other typical aspects of employment. Calculation of 
the Estonian Tax and Customs Board (EMTA) revealed 
that in 2015, more than 23,000 companies (almost 25% 
of all companies) did not pay labour taxes. However, this 
figure includes inactive companies and those without 
employees and does not represent all fraudulent compa-
nies (Eurofound 2016a).
Finnish law does not include the notion of artificial 
corporate entities or letterbox companies. The regula-
tory effect comes via the regulation of agency work. 
Although the National Bureau of Investigation (KRP) has 
reported cases where ‘inactive’ Finnish companies were 
established in Estonia, with the sole purpose of hiring 
and posting workers, the trade union movement has 
not pushed to amend the legislation, by enacting regu-
lations pinpointing specific on artificial arrangements. 
The unions prefer to tackle the user undertaking/main 
contractor directly. 
The most recent change in Finland entered into force 
as of 1 July 2019. A limited liability company can be 
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founded via internet (e-registration) and act without 
the formerly required share capital (the minimum was 
€2,500). During the introduction, the emphasis laid on 
simplification and easier access. 
Company law in Germany was subject to ongoing 
reform a decade ago, the then existing laws were said 
to be a burden for companies. The debates and reforms, 
focussing strongly on the international competitiveness of 
German corporate law, led to simplifications. With the Act 
on the Modernisation of GmbH Law and the Prevention 
of Abuse Act in 2008, a simplified form of the GmbH was 
created for small start-up businesses: the entrepreneurial 
company with limited liability (Unternehmergesellschaft 
or UG). The UG does not have a minimum share capital 
requirement (€25,000 for a regular GmbH), the law 
provides a standard protocol, requiring little information 
except the purpose of the company, the names of the 
management board members and a list of shareholders. 
The reforms introduced the possibility for companies to 
choose their administrative headquarter independently 
from the registered seat and thus to keep the German 
legal form of a GmbH or AG when doing business abroad. 
Germany also applies a simple legal entity for personal 
SMEs that provide services, the GbR (Gesellschaft bürger-
lichen Rechts). The GbR is anchored in the Civil Code (§ 
705). Whilst in crafts and trades that are protected by the 
Chambers of Commerce or Industry, the Chambers first 
conduct a mandatory audit, a GbR can be established and 
registered within 48 hours without serious audits or finan-
cial assessment. 
Nevertheless, the existence of artificial corporate 
entities like letterbox companies has been acknowl-
edged and addressed by the German government within 
different legal scenarios linked to tax fraud of compa-
nies or individuals by outsourcing assets into another 
constituency.55 Foreign-domiciled service providers and 
their genuine character are not in the primary focus of 
the activities of the authorities. Whilst for instance, 
compliance with the employer’s obligation to inform 
employees of the conditions applicable to the contract 
or their employment relationship (Directive 91/533/EEC) 
is explicitly mentioned as subject to verification, the 
characteristics of the foreign-domiciled posting company 
are not. This is underlined in a publication by the 
national government on the number of specific controls 
designed to verify foreign temporary work agencies with 
employees posted to Germany.56  
55 In 2017 the Act against Fraudulent Tax Evasions (Steuerumgehungsbekämpfungsgesetz) came into force entailing expansive control mechanisms for a better identification of 
tax fraud conducted by domestic individuals or firms with the help of foreign letterbox companies.
56 http://dipbt.bundestag.de/dip21/btd/19/093/1909303.pdf 
 https://www.mueller-gemmeke.de/wp-content/uploads/2019/04/19-04-09_Antwort_KA_Kontrolle_Leiharbeit_BA.pdf  
It says that there are no specific controls aimed at 
foreign-domiciled temporary agencies due to their rela-
tively small size (in 2018: 888) in comparison with all 
temporary agencies active in Germany (in 2018: 20,816). 
The publication reveals furthermore, that statistical 
coverage on temporary work agencies does not differ-
entiate between foreign and domestic companies. Data 
on the agencies provided by the government confirm 
the national focus on controls regarding temporary 
work agencies. In addition to the fact that companies 
employing temporary workers are responsible for their 
registration and hence accountable for wrong or non-reg-
istration online, illicit supply of temporary workers is 
checked by the Employment Agency, by focusing on the 
company in which the employee is temporary employed. 
According to governmental data in 2018, a total 109 
companies lost the permission to provide temporary 
workers and 387 companies were denied the request to 
supply, but no data is available on whether these compa-
nies are domestic, fully foreign domiciled or foreign with 
a German subsidiary. 
Little other empirical data is available, for example 
on the number of companies with limited liability that 
have a seat in Germany (9596 in 2018).  A sector-spe-
cific scholar estimated that 25% of the care workers in 
hospitals are registered abroad. However, no cumulative 
official data is available on the subject.
Non-genuine entities in Italy often take the form 
of bogus workers’ cooperatives. Theses cooperatives 
act as private companies, with one or more managers 
behaving as the employers. The legal status of coop-
eratives provides employers with a ‘shield’ in case of 
inspections or lawsuits. A second feature is fraud that 
is perpetrated by means of letterbox companies that are 
established in other EU Member States in order to save 
on social security costs. Italy also is familiar with fake-
posting, i.e. foreign legal entities, often subsidiaries of 
Italian companies that in reality hire workers who are 
already resident and working in Italy as posted workers. 
The foreign establishments serve as letterbox compa-
nies (mostly in CEE-countries with low social security 
contribution) in order to save on social security costs 
and to evade legal and collective bargaining provisions 
(Cremers, 2011). A third feature of the use of non-gen-
uine legal entities takes place in construction; employers 
try to circumvent the obligatory payment of employer 
contributions to the Construction Workers’ Welfare Fund 
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(Casse Edili) by using letterbox companies established 
abroad. These foreign entities are in general not listed 
in administrative registers and thus detection of irregu-
larity is difficult.
In the Netherlands, registration requirements of 
firms depend on the chosen legal form, which can 
be without legal personality (such as sole proprietor, 
partnerships, limited partnership) or with legal person-
ality (such as private limited companies, public limited 
companies, cooperatives, foundations or associations). 
Large limited companies are required to have a super-
visory duty in the form of a board. After incorporation, 
a firm must file annual accounts with the Chamber of 
Commerce; the Chamber only registers. Requirements 
for creating limited liability companies include at least 
a notarial deed containing articles of association, a 
financial administration and an address. No economic 
substance criteria are required. 
The most popular simplified legal entity is the BV. 
Employers choose this private company form for 
letterbox practices because it grants legal personality, 
the risks of joint and several liability are limited, and 
capital requirements are low or practically non-existent 
(€ 0.01). The capital is divided in shares, which are 
held by shareholders, but cannot be traded freely. The 
firm can build up large debts in a short time and easily 
go bankrupt (through ‘turbo’ liquidation within a day), 
leaving creditors and involved workers unpaid. 
Foreign entities that have an operational branch or 
office in the Netherlands must also register the office at 
the Chamber of Commerce. There are neither checks of a 
potential fraud history nor of the existence of necessary 
assets or the engagement in real activities. 
Like almost all other countries, Spain has no legal 
definition of (non-)genuine undertakings. However, in 
the literature and in the press the country is qualified as 
the ‘paradise for letterbox companies’ in the transport 
sector.57  
In general, the policy plans of the compliance author-
ities use a terminology that goes in two directions. The 
plans describe letterbox companies as entities with no 
activity in the Member State of establishment but with 
activities in other Member States of the EU, moving 
workers to other EU countries with the sole objective of 





60 See for instance: https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/fandd/2019/09/pdf/the-rise-of-phantom-FDI-in-tax-havens-damgaard.pdf  and http://www.europarl.europa.eu/cmsda-
ta/155724/EPRS_STUD_627129_Shell%20companies%20in%20the%20EU.pdf
of the workforce. More specific, the inspection services 
speak in recent publications about entities establishing 
in Member States with labour and social security costs 
that are lower than those of the Member States in which 
the company actually carries out its activities, thereby 
fraudulently reducing or circumventing costs involved in 
hiring workers.58 
The more general term ‘fictitious companies’ is used 
by the inspectorate to describe corporate legal entities 
that are created with the sole purpose of serving as a 
channel for unmerited obtaining of benefits provided by 
Social Security, especially by unemployment, through 
the simulation of the employment relationship. Fictitious 
companies have no real existence and are constituted 
in order to allow people who are falsely declared as 
workers to access benefits, and especially those of 
unemployment.59 
Thus, an undertaking is an entity that offers goods 
or services on a market. But what if there is no real 
activity? How absolute is the requirement of the offering 
of goods or services on a given market? 
The desk research revealed that the terms ‘genuine’ 
or ‘non-genuine’ undertaking does not figure in the EU 
acquis and is only sparsely used in the legislation of 
the Member States. The acquis links the qualification 
‘abusive conduct’, which could serve as the inverse, 
mainly to competition and antitrust law referring to 
abuse of market power. Moreover, the TFEU-Articles 
that deal with ‘abusive conduct’ do not contain explicit 
definitions of what amounts to abusive conduct. This 
is reflected in the national legislation of most Member 
States. 
Only recently, some efforts have been made to esti-
mate the size of so-called ‘shell’ or ‘phantom’ companies 
amongst European Union companies, the main common 
feature of which is the absence of real economic activity 
in the Member State of registration.60  
The presumption is that these companies have no 
or few employees, no or little production, and no or 
little physical presence in the country of registration. 
However, in general there is only proxy evidence of the 
size and the features of these shell companies. The 
data that is necessary to determine whether a company 
is indeed a letterbox or not is generally not present in 
the various publicly available databases that provide 
information on EU companies. The information that the 
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national registries keep is partial, and the commercial 
databases are inconsistent and scarce (LSE, 2016). 
3.3 THE DEFINITION OF FRAUDULENT 
ACTIVITIES
Desk research revealed that there is no definition of 
fraudulent activities provided in the EU acquis related 
to company law, and it is not an abuse of EU law to 
incorporate a letterbox company in the Member State 
with the most attractive company law. However, there 
is reference to possible fraudulent behaviour in the 
Services Directive. As we have seen, Chapter V and VI 
of the Services Directive give some guidelines for the 
cooperation of Member States in case of non-genuine 
actors. 
The European Commission produced a Handbook on 
the implementation of the Services Directive (European 
Commission, 2007) that could serve as a guide for the 
national transposition of these parts of the directive. 
The handbook starts with a list all of ‘unjustified’ restric-
tions and requirements that, according to the Treaty and 
the case law, are not permitted. The handbook quotes 
the CJEU-ruling that a ‘blanket exclusion goes beyond 
what is necessary’ in order to achieve the objective of 
preventing operators from being involved in criminal or 
fraudulent activities and that a less restrictive way of 
monitoring the accounts and activities of the operators 
could be, for example, the gathering of information on 
their representative or their main shareholders. 
Moreover, in view of the sensitivity of information 
on good repute, the handbook refers to Article 33 that 
provides for specific rules for the exchange of informa-
tion concerning criminal sanctions and disciplinary and 
administrative measures, which are directly relevant to 
the provider’s competence or professional reliability as 
well as for decisions concerning insolvency or bank-
ruptcy involving fraud. The exchange of data on good 
repute needs to comply with rules on personal data 
protection and with rights guaranteed to persons found 
guilty or convicted in the Member States concerned. 
Information on criminal sanctions and disciplinary and 
administrative measures directly relevant to the provid-
er’s competence or professional reliability can only be 
communicated if a final court decision has been taken, 
i.e. no possibilities for appeal exist or remain.
Nevertheless, in some cases, requests for informa-
tion will require carrying out factual checks, inspections 
or investigations, for instance, if a Member State into 
which a service provider moves to provide a service 
without being established there, has doubts whether 
that service provider complies with the laws of his 
Member State of establishment. The handbook stresses 
that requests that require carrying out factual checks 
have to be limited to cases where this is necessary for 
supervision; the requests must be clear and precise and 
give reasons for the request. If a competent authority has 
difficulties in meeting a request from another Member 
State, for example because a service provider could not 
be identified or the relevant information could not be 
found, it must quickly inform the competent authority in 
the requesting Member State and try to find a mutually 
satisfactory solution.
Only in cases of urgency, i.e. if there is a substan-
tiated risk of immediate and serious damage to the 
safety of persons or property, the Member State where 
the service is provided can take measures on the basis 
of its own safety-of-services related legislation; in all 
other cases it is necessary to go back to the Member 
State of establishment. The assessment of good repute 
lies in the hands of the Member State of establishment. 
Urgency related measures have to be proportionate and 
to be notified to the Commission and the Member State 
of establishment within the shortest possible time and 
giving reasons for the urgency. The handbook pinpoints 
the provided mechanism aiming to ensure that Member 
States inform all other Member States concerned and 
the Commission within the shortest possible time if they 
become aware of acts of a service provider or specific 
circumstances relating to a service activity which could 
cause serious damage to the health or safety of persons 
or to the environment (the ‘justified’ areas).
The Handbook dedicates a whole chapter to the points 
of single contact; their role is mainly to act as single 
interlocutors for service providers ‘to help them benefit 
from the EU single market’, to provide for the possibility 
to complete procedures at a distance and by electronic 
means and to make information on national require-
ments and procedures easily accessible for service 
providers and service recipients. The priority is given to 
administrative simplification. Member States have to 
ensure that the ‘points of single contact’ are set up and 
functioning at the latest by the end of the implementa-
tion period. 
A key role is given to the competent authorities in 
the Member States that have to cooperate, with coor-
dinating tasks for ‘liaison points’. In cases in which 
difficulties cannot be solved at the level of compe-
tent authorities, liaison points of the Member States 
concerned should be involved in order to find a solu-
tion. This is a very awkward part of the handbook. 
The ‘Liaison points’ – which Member States will have 
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to designate pursuant to Article 28(2) of the Services 
Directive – should have coordinating or supervisory 
responsibilities in the Member State concerned. They 
should only intervene in exceptional circumstances 
when problems occur in the transnational cooperation. 
The question is whether these provisions are a paper 
tiger or seriously implemented and made operational 
in the Member States? Despite investigative efforts by 
several national experts, very limited national assess-
ment of the functioning of the Liaison points can be 
found; most Member States refer to EU documents 
in this area. In some countries, the liaison points and 
the points of single contact are being mixed up, but 
in general the points of single contact activities are 
restricted to free support, used by individuals and 
companies planning to establish an economic activity 
via a form of company registration.
The 2017 Eurofound study used the wording ‘sham 
contracting’ or ‘sham companies’ in its description of 
fraudulent practices. The wording stands for a diver-
sity of fraudulent practices, embedded in different 
institutional contexts, and are perpetrated for different 
purposes, the most important of which are to avoid 
paying, or to save, employment related taxes and social 
security contributions, and to evade employers’ liability 
towards employees. The study reveals that there is not 
much research into sham contracting or sham companies 
as such. Moreover, the authors conclude that EU legis-
lation has not played any role in this respect. This is in 
stark contrasts with, for instance, the item of fraudulent 
use of posting of workers, a key issue for the labour 
inspectorates and trade unions.
Corporate avoidance of social or tax obligations 
can only be successfully applied by employers if they 
can set up subsidiaries in a jurisdiction offering low 
regulatory regimes, lower costs or incentives without 
having material presence there. One of the problems 
is that despite falling under the same beneficial owner 
(employer or corporate group) a subsidiary is treated 
as a legal entity separate from the group ownership. 
When recruitment agencies set up letterbox companies 
in low regulation or cost constituencies, enforcement 
is made complicated by the triangular nature of the 
61 The Guardian uncovered an example in the UK. Directors of a firm based in the Philippines were found to own a multitude of mini recruitment companies which took advantage 
of a VAT Flat Rate Scheme to supply labour to UK firms through a myriad of firms that were technically eligible for VAT and national insurance savings through the small 
business friendly scheme. The firm was based in the Philippines and began liquidating the small companies as soon as investigations started: https://www.theguardian.com/
business/2017/jul/10/tax-scheme-anderson-group  
62 The orientation towards disproportionate national regulation is obvious where the European Commission writes, for instance, that the large majority of measures notified 
via IMI have already been adopted in a Member State. This limits the possibility for the Commission to verify the measures, only leaving infringement action as a last resort. 
https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:52015SC0202&from=EN . See also: https://publications.europa.eu/en/publication-detail/-/publication/7ce-
522da-d80b-11e6-ad7c-01aa75ed71a1/language-en/format-PDF/source-87331889 
 https://publications.europa.eu/en/publication-detail/-/publication/e51f3cd5-bb52-11e5-bfdd-01aa75ed71a1/language-en/format-PDF/source-87326182
employment relationship and the limited cross-border 
enforcement competences. 
Our assessment of the national implementation 
related to fraudulent activities can be very brief. In prac-
tice, there is very limited ex ante verification activity in 
the Member States to explore whether a service provider 
is a genuine undertaking and carries out real activities. 
The national experts have not come across prominent 
case law on ‘non-substantial’ service provision based 
on ex ante verification. Various inspection activities may 
come into play if a company is failing to oblige different 
aspects of tax/labour law and authorities are likely to 
become interested in a firm on suspicion of financial 
crimes. Until the point where there is evidence of this, 
assessing the genuine status of a firm’s activities by an 
authority is unlikely. A commonplace element of using 
artificial arrangements is the easy way of disappearing 
through bankruptcy; ex post enforcement results in an 
impasse. 61 
Moreover, it is striking that most assessments of 
the functioning of the IMI-system are dominated by 
businesses’ expectations and worries about too much 
regulation or data protection.62 
For instance, Germany was criticised for its lack of a 
uniform procedures regarding establishment require-
ments in all sectors and federal states and for the poor 
implementation and use of IMI. The country reacted by 
implementing a uniform online norming procedure for 
all sectors, regarding all aspects of service provision 
and posted workers. In order to assimilate the proce-
dure within the administration across the 16 federal 
states, a software called NormAN was designed and 
implemented. Originally designed for Bavaria, NormAN 
was designed as a navigating tool, to accelerate admin-
istrative processes by clustering. The software is a 
supportive tool for administrative staff in course of veri-
fying if the Service Directive applies and its consequent 
necessary administrative steps. The FAQ’s within the 
distributed manual attached to NormAN are especially 
focussing on the distinction between freedom of estab-
lishment and freedom of services. Furthermore, there 
are checks for most of the sectors and their potentially 
specific requirements. The verification of the factual 
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economic activity in the country of origin is however 
not visibly included in the questionnaire of NormAN. 
The Point of Single Contact is one of the principal users, 
followed by public institutions as well as Chambers of 
Commerce. In addition, NormAN functions as a tool for 
data collection, facilitating the permanent reporting obli-
gations.
The identification of (non-)genuine posting in the 
frame of the transnational provision of services and 
prevention of abuse and circumvention is prescribed in 
the Enforcement Directive. The Directive provides for 
two non-exhaustive lists of elements which Member 
States may use for their assessment for the identifi-
cation of a genuine posting situation (Art 4.2) and for 
the assessment of whether a posted worker carries 
out his work temporarily in a Member State other than 
the one in which he or she normally works (Art 4.3). 
However, the Directive does not deal with the legality 
of the service providing firm as such. Moreover, failure 
to satisfy one or more of the listed elements does 
not preclude a situation from being characterised as 
posting. The elements to determine whether an under-
taking genuinely performs substantial activities has not 
been explicitly transposed in Austria, Germany, Ireland, 
the Netherlands, Sweden and the UK. Most other 
countries have copy-pasted the list of the Directive, 
with small differences related to the duration, the used 
premises and the economic substance of the activities. 
It is too early to assess the practical functioning of 
these elements. 
One last aspect that has to be mentioned is the fact 
that most Member States restrict their policy related 
to posting, based on wrongful or fraudulent distribution 
of A1 documents to the (former) case law of the CJEU. 
That is, if a company has complied with the registration 
requirement prior to posting and the posted workers 
carries the necessary A1-form with him or her when 
controlled, this form has to be accepted and should 
only be questioned in its authenticity based on justi-





3.4 REGISTRATION CRITERIA  
AND/OR OBLIGATIONS
In general, the aim of restricting the use of letterbox 
companies has been addressed only through secondary 
legislation (Sørensen, 2015). As noted, national company 
law in general makes it easy for a company to register 
and to decide where to register its seat. It does not 
matter whether or not the company performs real activi-
ties from this registered address. The few requirements 
that are described by the EU legislator with regard to 
registration are superficial and easy to handle by a 
‘virtual’ office. Member States shall ensure through the 
system of interconnection of registers that the name 
and legal form of the company, the registered office of 
the company and the Member State where it is regis-
tered and the registration number of the company are 
available free of charge. The consulted experts reported 
about existing registration and other requirements; a 
brief selection is given hereunder.
   
In Austria the central commercial registration 
(Firmenbuch) is administrated and organised by the 
courts in the form of an electronic register. Non-respect 
of the obligatory registration can lead to penalties of up 
to 3,600 euro. The principal register contains information 
on all registered Austrian companies, except small SMEs 
(with a business volume below €700.000), which usually 
can be found in the GISA-system (Gewerbeaufsichts-
sytem Austria).63 Article 3 of the Act on the commercial 
registration (Firmenbuchgesetz) lists the items that have 
to be registered: the name, the legal form, the seat, a 
short description of activities, subsidiaries, the company 
statutes, ownership, if temporary, the duration and the 
like. Court rulings that a company is an artificial arrange-
ment have to be registered as well.64 It is reported that 
many registered companies in Austria do not perform 
any economic activity.
The Belgian business register, the Crossroads Bank 
for Enterprises (CBE), is managed by an office in the 
Federal Economic Department. The law requires all 
enterprises to register. The register was created in order 
to simplify administration and covers all basic data 
of companies and business units.65 The CBE assigns 
a unique identification number to each company and 
business unit. This identification number allows author-
ities to exchange information. Consequently, companies 
need to submit their data to the authorities only once. 
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It covers the usual subjects: legal status, start date, 
name and address of head office, legal form, number of 
establishments and the like. The department is author-
ised to automatically remove companies, as referred 
to in Article 2 of the Companies’ Code, which have 
not complied with the obligation to file their annual 
accounts with the National Bank of Belgium for at least 
three consecutive financial years. However, the entities 
continue to exist legally as this is only an administra-
tive removal. Since 1 May 2019, a new Companies Code 
entered into force that prescribes the presence of some 
(intended) economic activity in the Member States of 
incorporation, for a period of at least two years, to be 
reported in a financial plan that is deposited at the 
notary. In case of a rapid bankruptcy (within 3 years), the 
financial plan has to be transferred to the court and the 
founders stay severally liable to all stakeholders.  
During the implementation of the posting rules, 
Denmark developed a registration system suitable for 
foreign service providers, the Register of Foreign Service 
Providers (RUT)).66 It is the government’s official register to 
report a foreign service. Registration in RUT is mandatory 
for foreign service providers (employees and self-em-
ployed) working in Denmark. Information in RUT includes: 
the workplace, the period and the person(s) pursuing work. 
Inadequate information entered in RUT is punishable with 
fines. The requested company’s information is limited: 
general information about the foreign business/company, 
the sector the foreign business/company is active in, the 
period in which the foreign business/company will be 
working in Denmark, and if relevant the type of service.67 
A contractor/user undertaking/client who has entered 
into a contract to supply a service has to notify the Danish 
Working Environment Authority if it has not received docu-
mentation that a RUT-registration has been made. This 
notification should be made no later than three days after 
work has commenced. The contractor risks being fined if 
failing to do so. 
Estonia has the facility of online registration. The 
Company Registration Portal is a tool that enables 
persons and entities to submit documents to the regis-
tration department of the county court. Applications to 
register a new company, amend its registry data, liqui-
date it and delete it from the register can be submitted 
through the portal. Everyone has the right to examine 
66 www.virk.dk/rut




registry card data and related documents. In an accom-
panying e-Business Register, a contractual client can 
visualise all the interrelationships between every enter-
prise.68 
The service enables a company’s background to be 
investigated through valid and invalid relations, which in 
turn indicate earlier ownership relationships. This makes 
it possible to make inquiries concerning the persons 
related to companies. The results of the inquiries are 
displayed as a diagram. The visualising tool originally 
meant to help discover money-laundering schemes is 
nowadays available to every contractual client of the 
e-Business Register. It is possible to investigate an 
enterprise’s background through existing and past links, 
which also bring out previous ownership relations.69   
The registration department of Tartu County Court 
administers the registers that aim to ensure legal 
certainty. An entry in the commercial register is held 
as correct with regard to a third party, unless the third 
party knew or should have known that the entry was not 
correct.70  
In Finland, the Trade Register is administered by the 
National Board of Patents and Registration (NBPR). It is 
a public register that contains information on compa-
nies. As a rule, all businesses have to be entered in the 
register. Businesses also have to notify any changes to 
their register details. It contains contact and identifi-
cation information, for example: the company name, a 
Business ID and company form domicile, address and 
other contact information, principal activity, information 
on termination, interruption of trade, bankruptcy, liquida-
tion or reorganisation proceedings.
The French national register of business and 
companies (registre national du commerce et des 
sociétés  - RNCS) is kept by the National Institute for 
Industrial Property (Institut National de la Propriété 
Industrielle - INPI), which brings together the docu-
ments, qualifying as originals, from the business and 
companies’ registers kept in each registry. The so-called 
Kbis extract represents the true updated ‘identity card’ 
for a company registered in the Trade and Companies 
Register (RCS). The extract certifies the legal existence 
of the company and gives the identity and address of the 
legal entity or natural person registered, its business, 
its management - administrative, financial or control 
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bodies  - as well as the existence or not of insolvency 
proceedings brought against it. The registers contain all 
the information concerning traders and companies.
The German Commercial Register (Handelsregister) 
portal is run by the Ministry of Justice of the federal 
state of North Rhine-Westphalia on behalf of all other 
federal states (Länder). It provides centralised access 
to all federal state registers of companies, coopera-
tives and partnerships and to announcements for the 
register. The smaller GbRs that are easy to establish 
are not covered. Additional information on bankrupt-
cies, accounting/financial reports and capital markets 
can be found on the website of the Company Register. 
In September 2019, the website of the Register warned 
of offers and notifications regarding register entries for 
companies in the company register, in association with 
publications in the Federal Gazette. A blacklist of fake 
consultants has been published.71 
A company registered in another country that plans 
to become active or is planning to open any form of 
subsidiary in Germany is obliged to register with the 
Chamber of Commerce in the respective federal state. If 
a company registered in another Member state of the EU 
plans only to post its workers to Germany, the workers 
have to be registered online via the Minimum Wage 
Notification Portal before posting72. The requirement 
of registration was implemented with the introduc-
tion of the Minimum Wage Act (Mindestlohngesetz). 
There are three different legal bases for the registra-
tion of posted workers: the Minimum Wage Act, the 
Act on the Provision of Temporary Workers (Arbeitneh-
merüberlassungsgesetz), and the Posted Workers Act 
(Arbeitnehmerentsendegesetz). Together, these Acts 
set out a list of sectors in which prior registration of 
posted workers sent to Germany is mandatory (since 
01.01.2017). 
With several reforms Italy has weakened the 
possibility to identify non-genuine activities. Current 
requirements are quite vague, proof that ‘the actual 
71 https://www.bundesanzeiger.de/ebanzwww/i18n/doc//D079.pdf?document=D36&language=de 
 https://www.bundesanzeiger.de/ebanzwww/wexsservlet?page.navid=to_knowledgeable_how-work_date_statistik  
72 The information required in the online registration portal includes to following details:
 - the industry in which the posted workers are to be active (the details are voluntary in the case of a notification being made pursuant to the Minimum Wage Act),
 - the place of activity; in the case of construction services, the building site,
 - the beginning and expected end of the activity, 
 -  the place in Germany where the documents required pursuant to Article 17 of the Minimum Wage Act or Article 19 of the Posted Workers Act (in particular, employment 
contracts, working time records, pay slips, records of wage payments) will be available for inspection,
 - the surname, first name, date of birth, and German address of the relevant contact in Germany (accountable domestic representative),
 - the surname, first name, and address of an individual in Germany who is authorised to accept the service of documents (authorised recipient), 
 -  the surnames, first names, and dates of birth of the workers whose services are used by the employer in Germany, and the lengths of their activities (as an attachment to the 
notification if sent by fax).
73 The Posting of workers Directive (96/71/EC, revised with 2018/957) and the Enforcement Directive (2014/67/EU) are transposed in one legislation WagwEU (Terms of Em-
ployment for Posted Workers in the European Union Act, replacing the Waga), effective as of 18 June 2016. If works are carried out in a sector or workplace that falls under a 
generally binding collective agreement, the ‘hard core’ of labour conditions from that agreement applies.
employer organises the means of production of the 
subcontractor and runs the business risk’ is the only 
requirement. Moreover, the ‘Jobs Act’ removed from 
criminal law the ‘fraudulent labour intermediation’, 
which sought to punish intermediation aimed at 
‘avoiding the application of compulsory law or collective 
bargaining provisions’ (Eurofound 2015). The compe-
tence of labour inspectors to tackle fraudulent hiring of 
workers was thus weakened, resulting in serious prob-
lems of control and enforcement.
In the Netherlands, the business register is owned 
and maintained by the Dutch Chamber of Commerce 
(Kamer van Koophandel), as authorised by the govern-
ment through the Business Register Act. The register 
offers an overview of all (legal) relevant information on 
economic entities in the Netherlands. The most impor-
tant registered data is: the legally registered name and 
other trading names, the seat and addresses, capital, 
branches, contact details and activities (NACE classifi-
cation). However, registration does not form part of the 
process of establishing a company in the Netherlands. 
From a legal point of view, a company can exist without 
being registered. As mentioned above, the Netherlands 
has no generally applicable substance criteria and 
registration does not involve a check ensuring material 
economic presence or genuine service provision from a 
social perspective. 
The transposition of the Posting Directive and the 
Enforcement Directive have led to a number of administra-
tive statutory obligations for companies who are going to 
perform temporary work in the Netherlands.73  One of the 
obligations is the mandatory reply to information requests 
to the Inspectorate SZW (Social Affairs and Employment) 
that enforces the posting rules. Another is the reporting 
in advance by foreign-domiciled service providers about 
where and when, and with which employees, work will 
be carried out. The user undertaking has to check whether 
the report is made and whether it is correct. However, the 
mandatory report is not yet effective; the development of 
a digital system was postponed and verification by the 
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user undertaking was put on hold. In future, the Inspec-
torate, tax and customs offices, Social Insurance Bank and 
Immigration and Naturalisation Service will have access 
to the registry.
Over the years the government has developed some 
fiscal policy against letterbox companies, described as 
resident corporate taxpayers whose activities mainly 
consist of (in)directly receiving (and paying) interest, 
royalties, rent or lease payments from (to) legal entities 
abroad that are part of the same corporate group.74 
In Romania, there are a number of Trade Register 
offices under the authority of the National Trade Register 
Office, in Bucharest and in each of the 41 counties in 
Romania. The National Trade Register Office is a public 
body with legal personality, under the authority of the 
Ministry of Justice. The Office is responsible for keeping, 
organising and managing the central computerised busi-
ness register. The information that is kept deals with the 
obvious data: name, registered office, Trade Register 
number and legal status, subscribed and paid-in capital, 
main activity declared by the company, winding up or 
bankruptcy.
The Companies House is the business register for 
the UK, covering England, Wales, Northern Ireland and 
Scotland. It provides information filed by companies and 
acts as the executive agency/trading fund falling under 
the remit of the Department for Business, Energy and 
Industrial Strategy (BEIS). The main legislation governing 
the operation of the UK register is the Companies Act 
2006. Under that Act, information is delivered, for regis-
tration, to the registrar of companies (‘the Registrar’) by 
a company, or agents acting on its behalf. The Registrar 
accepts the information in good faith. No validation or 
verification is made of the accuracy of the information, 
only the form of the information is checked to ensure it 
is complete. The Companies House has been criticised 
in recent years for operating with limited resources/
enforcement powers (including claims that Compa-
nies House has just six staff members monitoring its 
database), allowing for inaccurate and misleading infor-
mation to be submitted with limited threat of sanction 
74 In recent years, Decrees came into effect aiming at preventing taxpayers with no real presence in the Netherlands from benefitting from the Dutch treaty network. Corporate 
tax payers have to fulfil certain substance criteria aimed at ensuring an economic nexus with (substance in) the Netherlands: 1. At least half of the statutory board members or 
directors with decision making power must reside in the Netherlands; 2. These resident directors have the required knowledge and skills to perform their duties properly. The 
duties of the board of directors include at least the decision-making on transactions which the company pursues and their follow-up; 3. The company has qualified staff to execute 
and register business transactions (either itself or provided by others); 4. The most important board decisions must be taken in the Netherlands; 5. The principal bank accounts 
are maintained in the Netherlands (the bank account is not necessarily maintained at a Dutch bank); 6. Bookkeeping/accounting takes place in the Netherlands; 7. The business 
address and registered office is in the Netherlands; 8. The taxpayer is, as far as he is aware, not considered a tax resident in any other country than the Netherlands; 9. The 
taxpayer runs, in connection with the loans and legal relationships and the interconnected loans or legal relationships that form the basis of the interest, royalties, rent or lease 
payments, genuine economic risks. According to Dutch authorities, there is a real risk when the entity’s equity is at least 1% of the entity’s loan or an amount of at least €2 
million; 10. The taxpayer has sufficient equity, customary with the functions performed, taking into account the assets used and the real risk he runs. 
75 https://www.doingbusiness.org/en/rankings 
 https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/jul/05/how-britain-can-help-you-get-away-with-stealing-millions-a-five-step-guide 
(Transparency International UK 2017). In practice, setting 
up a company costs £12 and takes less than 24 hours. 
According to the World Bank’s annual Doing Business 
report, the UK is an easy place to create a company.75 
An assessment of the quality of the national registration 
systems provided an overview of difficulties encountered 
in the task of collecting data on the number of companies 
that operate in a Member State other than the one in 
which they have been incorporated or have their real seat 
(LSE 2016). The comparative analysis addressed the clas-
sification of obligations entered into before a company is 
registered in a commercial register and outlined (page 15):
Since companies are ‘creatures of national law’, 
Member States have in principle the authority to 
establish under which conditions domestic compa-
nies can be incorporated. About half of the Member 
States, usually those that traditionally followed 
the incorporation theory, provide for substantive 
company law rules that enable the incorporation 
of companies irrespective of the location of the 
company’s headquarters, decision-making centre, or 
business activities, provided the company satisfies 
the minimal requirement of maintaining a postal 
address in the Member State of incorporation. 
The remaining Member States, on the other hand, 
currently require, or at least may require, companies 
formed under their company laws to establish and 
maintain some form of physical presence in that 
Member States, although the situation is some-
times unclear under national law.
Related to the quality of registers, an earlier study 
concluded: ‘the information that the national registries 
keep is partial, and the commercial databases were 
inconsistent and scarce’ (Bech-Bruun, 2013).
These findings were reaffirmed during our research. 
The short overview provided later reveals that the 
criteria that apply in case of creation or registration are 
rather non-committal. Most countries apply the very 
minimum, like a minimum amount of capital, a physical 
address, and a person as legal representative. More-
over, the experts confirmed that there are no ‘substance’ 
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criteria required. A short statement of the activity is 
accepted, without any verification. Next to countries that 
have no explicit obligation to register (like the Nether-
lands), it was reported that also in the countries with an 
obligation to register, there is no control of the genuine 
character of the registered company.  
As a result of desk research, it can be said that the 
mainstream thoughts among competition (and company) 
law scholars make a case for simple and lean require-
ments, with the argument that it will make competition 
even more efficient.
3.5 COMPLIANCE CONTROL AND 
ENFORCEMENT MECHANISMS 
Although registration is poor, the input of consulted 
national experts reveals that there is growing atten-
tion for compliance control and enforcement. However, 
given the absence of straightforward instruments, the 
outlook is rather patchy and fragmented, depending 
on the commitment of different actors and compe-
tent authorities. The question is of course whether the 
genuine application of the core principles of the single 
market and the tackling of practices that may under-
mine the functioning of the internal market must remain 
dependent of instruments stemming from secondary 
legislation and the good will of individuals and their 
accidental activities. Consequently, there is a serious 
risk that rulings, which go in the direction of a more 
critical stand towards the freedom of establishment for 
persons or companies that set up a letterbox company 
with no activities, will remain a paper tiger. Moreover, 
countries that develop a pro-active policy that intervenes 
in the freedom of establishment (like Austria, and in the 
past Belgium) easily come under pressure by the Court 
and/or the Commission. 
  
The Austrian legislator has been very active in the 
legislative period before the now outgoing conservative 
government came into power. Basically, businesses and 
trade activities (of craftsmen, trade, hotels and restaurants, 
master builders) are governed by the Trade Regulation 
(Gewerbeordnung) and controlled by the competent author-
ities included in the regulations.76 This applies to permanent 
establishments and to cross-border service providers. If 
a foreign-domiciled service provider wants to carry out a 
regulated trade temporally and occasionally, notification to 
the competent authority is mandatory before taking up this 
76 https://www.bmdw.gv.at/en/Topics/Enterprise/Trades/Registration-of-a-trade.html?lang=en 
77 https://www.ris.bka.gv.at/GeltendeFassung.wxe?Abfrage=Bundesnormen&Gesetzesnummer=20009245
activity. The competent authority is the Federal Minister of 
Digital and Economic Affairs. The Minister can prohibit the 
activity in certain cases. 
The legislator introduced an Act against Social Fraud 
in 2016 that targets the tackling of corporate entities 
involved in social fraud (Sozialbetrugsbekämpfungs-
gesetz, SBBG). The act provides a risk and conspicuous 
tool to detect bogus companies at an early stage. The 
legal base is § 42b of the general social security legis-
lation.77  
This is combined with an Act tackling Wage and Social 
Dumping (Lohn- und Sozialdumping-Bekämpfungs-
gesetz, LSD-BG) that came into force on 1 January 2017. 
A key provision in this act is the liability of the client/
user undertaking. Pursuant to § 9 LSD-BG remunera-
tion claims for employees from other countries who are 
posted or hired out to work in the Austrian construction 
industry are secured. However, this liability is limited to 
the immediate client, unless obvious evidence of fraud 
was available at the start. The Construction Workers’ 
Annual Leave and Severance Pay Fund is the supervi-
sory body for all employees who are subject to the Act. 
As such, the fund is authorised to conduct inspections 
in the construction industry (at construction sites and in 
payroll offices), and to file complaints with the respon-
sible district administrative authority when violations 
are detected. Moreover, whilst tax fraud is the prime 
interest for the financial authorities, social fraud is also 
an issue for the Regional Health Insurance Funds (Gebi-
etskrankenkassen). If a company looks suspicious, a 
second check is made by the staff of the Funds and if the 
facts indicate that the company is ‘fake’, the manager 
of the company has the possibility to disprove the facts. 
If he cannot disprove the facts, or neither answers nor 
appears, the authorities will decide that the company is 
a fake and put it on a list of the Federal Ministry Republic 
of Austria Finance (see below under Sanctioning).
The Points of Single Contact have no control task of the 
activities of service providers. These points only provide 
information about services, accept applications and 
forward them to the competent authorities and offices.
In Belgium, control and enforcement related to the 
presence and operations of artificial arrangements is 
spread over different authorities. An inspection unit at 
the Federal economic Department controls the registra-
tion and identification of a company, the notaries have a 
task to monitor the registration and the Financial Intelli-
gence Processing Unit (CTIF-CFI), the Federal Police and 
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the commercial courts, follow serious economic crimes.78 
Until 1 May 2019, the identification of an incorrect 
seat wasn’t ground for the annulment of the company. 
However, if an incorrect seat was deliberately stated in 
the articles of association, the court could rule that the 
company, as well as the directors and/or the founders, 
had ‘forgery’, which is civilly and criminally sanctioned. 
In the social domain, different sections of the social 
and labour inspectorate, together with the inspection 
service of the National Social Security Office (NSSO) and 
the labour tribunals, play a prominent role in the fight 
against letterbox companies. The Special Tax Inspec-
torate and the public prosecutor are often involved if 
there is a link with fiscal fraud. The inspectorate reports 
that controlling and investigating letterbox companies 
based on (inter-) national institutional cooperation can 
lead to deterring letterbox companies from being setting 
up, especially by Belgian enterprises, that act as clients 
of the letterbox companies. A key challenge facing the 
assessment of the practice of foreign letterbox companies 
by the labour inspectorate is due to limits in resources. It 
is a labour-intensive job that takes a lot of resources (staff 
and financial) to arrive at a successful outcome, and only 
a small fraction can be inspected. In November 2019, the 
social inspectorate, the police and the public prosecutor, 
established enhanced cooperation agreements with the 
aim to tackle social fraud and fraudulent arrangements 
that can lead to distortion of competition (with so-called 
MOTEM-teams) more effectively. 
Control of the ‘genuine’ character of a service provider 
is not clearly settled. In the framework of the Services 
Directive, the so-called business counters take on the 
task of Point of Single Contact. The links provided redi-
rect users to private organisations and administrative 
sites that promote doing business in Belgium; proce-
dures and legal requirements are difficult to find.79  
A 2017 assessment of the Points of Single Contact 
qualified Belgium as a low performer. The country was 
ranked with Germany, Latvia, Austria and Romania 
among the countries that need most improvements.80 
By contrast, the IMI-system is frequently used as an 
instrument that can assist in control and compliance 
procedures. The chief labour inspectors in each prov-
ince have access to the IMI-system. In 2017, Belgium 
sent 710 requests related to the posting of workers (out 
of a total of 3,178 requests on posting issued by all EU 
Member States). Only Austria made more requests. 
Some 253 requests made by Belgium related to a 
78 For an overview of the different legal services, see: https://e-justice.europa.eu/content_legal_professions-29-be-maximizeMS-en.do?member=1 
79 https://business.belgium.be/en/managing_your_business/full_list_of_procedures/points_of_single_contact 
80 The assessment was not about control or compliance. Assessed were four standard criteria for improving and benchmarking the functioning of the Points of Single Contact: 
quality and availability of information, transactionality of e-procedures, accessibility for cross-border users and usability. https://ec.europa.eu/growth/content/performance-
points-single-contact-%E2%80%93-assessment-against-psc-charter-0_en 
request for more information concerning a posting and 
393 to the use of an old-style form. The labour inspec-
torate is also receiving IMI-requests from abroad related 
to posting (23 requests in 2017). The questions received 
mainly concern the identification of the responsible 
managers or the applicable labour conditions. 
The constant posting from Estonia to Finland, largely 
based on posting by Finnish subsidiaries in Estonia, 
has led to more cooperation between the inspectorates 
of the two countries. An agreement on cooperation 
between Estonia and Finland on posted workers from 
the former country to the latter, led to the exchange and 
control of information on Estonian companies posted to 
Finland. The cooperation has led to fast and successful 
sharing of valuable background information on firms. The 
aim is to contribute to the identification of the presence 
of letterbox company fraud. 
In Finland important control and enforcement activ-
ities are performed by the trade unions. In certain 
sectors, trade unions have chosen to focus on their 
compliance activities, like in France, on the user under-
taking. They prefer to work towards an extension of the 
liability to the user undertaking responsible for using 
letterbox companies in fraudulent cases, also because 
the tackling of letterbox companies is an arduous 
path. More specific, the Construction Trade Union is 
of the opinion that the general, mainly statutory policy 
against undeclared labour has made the use of mailbox 
companies rather risky for the main contractor/user 
undertaking. The compulsory tax number (included in the 
compulsory photo ID) and the main contractor’s obliga-
tions towards the taxation authorities have cleaned the 
construction industry considerably. In 2014, additional 
statutory obligations were set up for the main contrac-
tors in the construction industry. They must announce to 
tax authorities the data per site concerning their subcon-
tractors and the payments made per month. Furthermore, 
the main contractor is obliged to have a catalogue on 
workers present at his site and must communicate this 
catalogue to tax authorities every month. The main 
contractor has the obligation to pay the wages not paid 
by the subcontractor, if declared within seven days from 
the due date. This obligation led to a decrease of the 
recourse to letterbox companies. The social partners in 
construction have acted jointly and produced a guide for 
foreign-domiciled service providers with posted work-
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ers.81  As a result of the elaborated system, together 
with the fact that temporary agency workers must 
pay Finnish taxes from the first day onwards, the main 
contractors normally don’t take the risk of sanctions by 
availing to cheap labour provided by letterbox compa-
nies. If the main contractor is not organised and the 
relevant collective agreement has not been observed, 
blockades declared by the Construction Trade Union is 
an effective instrument. 
In France, the investigation of arrangements with 
dubious foreign legal entities serving as intermediates 
in the provision of services is complex and it is not easy 
to restore workers’ rights. There are no general provi-
sions to act against artificial legal arrangements (such 
as letterbox companies). Tax and social security fraud, or 
other breaches in the social domain, can only be tackled 
on an ad hoc basis.82  
The experience of the labour inspectorate, for 
instance, is that transnational artificial arrangements 
are very difficult to tackle. The use and rotation of 
straw men, the relatively easy dissolution and creation 
of a new entity, the time-consuming control and coop-
eration with authorities in the country of establishment, 
the different concepts and differing competences of the 
authorities involved, hinder an effective operation. The 
main policy of the inspectorate is nowadays to pinpoint 
the user undertaking straightaway. Extending the 
liability to those using letterbox companies follows the 
suggestion in the Enforcement Directive. However, the 
consequence is that the incubators of the (foreign) artifi-
cial arrangement remain invisible and unaffected.
Of particular interest in the French context, and related 
to the focus on the user undertaking, is the Corporate 
Duty of Vigilance Law that is incorporated in the French 
Commercial Code.83 The law applies only to the largest 
French companies, and makes the latter assess and 
address the adverse impacts of their activities on people 
and the planet, by having them publish annual, public 
vigilance plans. This includes impacts linked to their own 
activities, those of companies under their control, and 
those of suppliers and subcontractors, with whom they 
have an established commercial relationship.84 More-
over, the law empowers victims and other concerned 
parties to bring the issue before a judge. It provides 
81 https://www.rakennusteollisuus.fi/globalassets/tyoelama/tyovoima/guide-for-employment-of-foreigners-2013.pdf 
82 For an overview of the different legal services, see: https://e-justice.europa.eu/content_legal_professions-29-fr-en.do?member=1 
83 http://www.respect.international/french-corporate-duty-of-vigilance-law-english-translation/ 
84 The plan shall include the reasonable vigilance measures to allow for risk identification and for the prevention of severe violations of human rights and fundamental freedoms, 
serious bodily injury or environmental damage or health risks resulting directly or indirectly from the operations of the company and of the companies it controls, as well as 
from the operations of subcontractors or suppliers with whom it maintains an established commercial relationship, when such operations derive from this relationship.
85 The plan shall be drafted in association with the company stakeholders involved, and where appropriate, within multiparty initiatives that exist in the subsidiaries or at territo-
rial level; it includes an alert mechanism that collects reporting of existing or actual risks, developed in working partnership with the trade union organizations representatives 
of the company concerned. 
trade unions with an instrument to control the (sub) 
contracting practices of a firm.85 
Compliance control in Germany is in most cases carried 
out by a section of the Custom Services (Finanzkontrolle 
Schwarzarbeit - FKS). The work of FKS is linked to Article 
2a of the Act to Combat Undeclared Work and Unlawful 
Employment (Schwarzarbeitsbekämpfungsgesetz - 
SchwarzArbG), which provides a first legally visible link 
to combatting fraudulent practices in the context of free 
provision of services. FKS has the competence to check 
and investigate regularity. It has full access to the infor-
mation provided in the online portal to verify the legality 
of a posting. However, data recorded in the online portal 
has a strong focus on the activity performed in Germany 
and offers little or no information on the ‘genuine’ char-
acter of the foreign-domiciled company posting the 
workers. It is also problematic that the FKS only acts as 
penalizing institution with regard to taxed and social secu-
rity contributions due to be paid to the state. It is not the 
compliance authority that assist workers implementing 
their rights or wages. On the contrary, detection of fraud-
ulent activities might also lead to investigations against 
the posted workers and not the general contractor, user 
undertaking or posting firm. Given the existing number of 
investigators, language barriers, and the limited access to 
certain work-sites (like private households or small busi-
nesses), FKS often works with nationwide coordinated 
controls that target a specific (high-risk) sector. These 
controls provide an opportunity to approach the probability 
of fake posting or letterbox companies in the envisaged 
sector. For instance, in August and September 2019, 
enhanced controls took place in the transport, hospitality 
and construction sectors. 
There is no other form of labour inspectorate entitled 
to undertake controls. Cooperation with other authorities 
is moving ahead slowly. In a recent assessment of the 
control and enforcement of the statutory minimum wage, 
recommendation to reform the FKS was made, so as to 
strengthen the cooperation or even merge the investi-
gation services (Bosch et al. 2019). The federal system 
leads to a fragmentation of control mechanisms, next to 
the fact that intertwined policy areas are often tackled 
by different competent authorities. Investigations are 
normally subject of control authorities in the respec-
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tive federal state. This complicates successful control, 
because if a company registered in one federal state 
breaks the law in another federal state, it is neverthe-
less to be punished in the federal state of registration. 
Long bureaucratic procedures complicate the search, 
and a company can easily disappear and pop up under a 
different name in another federal state. 
The State Revenue Service in Latvia has elaborated 
a scheme that should lead to an adequate risk-assess-
ment. It conducts analysis using specific criteria and 
specialised computer software to detect letterbox 
companies, combat fraud and deter undeclared work 
and practices of tax evasion. These fraudulent practices 
occur where a main company or contractor providing 
real services (e.g. catering, security guards, cleaning) 
does not declare all its employees. Instead, employees 
are declared through letterbox companies (fraudulent 
subcontractors) which ‘hire out’ its personnel to the main 
company. The letterbox company submits declarations 
and calculates taxes but does not pay the estimated 
taxes, resulting in large tax debts. In order to avoid 
paying tax debts, the letterbox company disappears, 
starts up again with no debts, and continues to trade 
as a new company. The employees are recruited into 
the new letterbox company. The computerised system 
(ESKORT) evaluates the likelihood of the company 
being fraudulent. Examples of criteria used in the 
system to measure the risk include: the average salary 
of the company in comparison to average salaries for 
the sector; the number of employees in the company 
in comparison to the number of employees declared by 
the company; the proportion of a company’s employees 
that work part-time; the declared salary by employees 
in comparison to the salaries declared by the company; 
illegal employees in the company detected by the Labour 
Inspectorate; the number of employees in the company 
not being in line with what could be expected based on 
the turnover; complaints received about undeclared work 
(particularly concerning ‘envelope wages’). High-risk 
companies identified through the risk analysis process 
are then analysed in further depth. A subcontractor 
supply chain is visualised using VAT returns data. The 
State Revenue Service has one common database for 
all relevant information. It is therefore possible during 
risk analysis to combine information about wages and 
employees with VAT information and other information 
available.
86 The Tax Authority has an Economic Enforcement Office which can report infringements, such as a failure to deposit annual accounts to the Chamber of Commerce (on time), on 
the basis of which the Public Prosecution Service can impose a fine or bring the case to court. 
87 The transport sector works with a specialised Inspectorate, see: https://english.ilent.nl/about-the-ilt 
In the Netherlands the competence to deal with 
artificial legal corporate entities and similar bogus 
arrangements related to the provisions of services, lays 
in the hands of several ministries. During the investiga-
tion, the consulted expert was referred from one desk 
to another several times. The main government ministry 
responsible for tackling letterbox companies used for 
regulatory avoidance in the social area is the Ministry 
of Social Affairs and Employment and its labour inspec-
torate. The Ministry for Economic Affairs and Climate 
Policy is responsible for the Services Directive, this 
ministry also shares some tasks in the area of the corpo-
rate governance and financial reporting with the Ministry 
of Justice and the Finance Ministry. The latter retains 
the primary responsibility for the Dutch company law. 
Circumvention of tax falls under the Finance Ministry 
and specifically its tax office.86  
Monitoring of whether a Dutch-registered company 
posting workers to or providing services in another EU 
country is genuine with real economic activities in the 
Netherlands is entirely missing in the findings. Minis-
tries did not reply to specified questions about the 
Netherlands as a sending country. It is quite probable 
that this type of compliance control is absent.
It is possible to delete companies from the Companies 
Register. For instance, if a company has been found ‘to 
act in violation with the public order’, the Public Prose-
cution Service can request a judgement to dissolve the 
legal entity or prohibit it from operating.
The Point of Single Contact, foreseen in the Services 
Directive, is located at the Authority for Consumers and 
Markets and the Netherlands Enterprise Agency, which 
fall under the Ministry of Economic Affairs and Climate 
Policy. It has ‘neither control nor compliance function’, 
but assists businesses by, for instance, answering ques-
tions and facilitating their entrance.
The most active governmental body in the social 
domain is the labour inspectorate (hereafter I-SZW). It 
is responsible for the monitoring, control and enforce-
ment of the obligations laid down in the revised Posting 
of Workers Directive and in the Enforcement Directive.87 
The national liaison office foreseen in Article 4(1) of 
the Posting Directive and also of the IMI Regulation, 
falls under the Analysis, Programming and Signalling 
Directorate of the I-SZW, with adjacent Directorates 
dealing with monitoring compliance and investigations. 
A separate team deals with bogus arrangements that 
are covered by a special law (the Bill tackling artificial 
arrangements). I-SZW conducted 157 investigations in 
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four years (bogus arrangements excluding fake employ-
ment relationships for purposes other than saving labour 
costs). Violations were found in 61 cases, with imposed 
fines amounting to millions of euros. In total, 1,464 viola-
tions were identified relating to 133 different employers. 
In seven cases the Inspectorate’s Investigation Direc-
torate transferred the files to the Public Prosecution 
Service for further criminal investigation. 
The social partners, and especially the trade unions, 
play an important role in tackling artificial arrangements. 
Trade union FNV works with an Enforcement & Compli-
ance unit that investigates non-compliance with collective 
agreed pay and related breaches. One of the problems 
that this unit has signalled is the lack of structural collab-
oration tackling bogus arrangements with inquiries about 
wages. Besides tax details (when there are indications 
that an employer is using bogus arrangements) towards 
the tax authorities are regularly denied. An effective 
approach to ending bogus arrangements would require a 
more systemic change in practice regarding inspections 
in the Netherlands, involving systematic and institutional 
collaborations between different departments (tax, social 
and economic fraud departments).
   
During inspections and investigations in Romania, 
compliance and control offices, such as the labour 
inspectorate, are often confronted with letterbox 
companies. If artificial arrangements pop up, the inspec-
torate tries to tackle those situations by identifying and 
locating the real employer. One characteristic is that 
in such cases, the identification of and communication 
with the employer is often illusive. In order to tackle this, 
some legal obligations for the beneficiary of service/user 
undertaking have been introduced, with the argument 
that service provision with posting is temporary but the 
beneficiary remains on the national territory.
Spain has developed a Strategic Plan of the Labour 
and Social Security Inspection for the period 2018-2020, 
with joint actions of the inspection services tackling 
letterbox companies.88 The Strategic Plan that was 
formulated in April 2018 by the Ministry of Employment 
and Social Security assesses the activities of the two 
inspection services in the last decade. Directly involved 
in the activities are the General Treasury of the Social 
Security (Tesorería General de la Seguridad Social, 
TGSS), the Public Employment Office (Servicio Público de 
Empleo Estatal, SEPE), the National Institute for Social 




INSS) and the Maritime Social Institute (Instituto Social 
de la Marina, ISM). The regulatory circumvention with 
fictitious companies that are created for this purpose is 
an important detected form of social fraud. In the past 
period (2012-2017) 107,909 inspections were carried out 
on fictitious companies. Overall, 13,828 infractions and 
breaches were found, leading to requests of the General 
Treasury of the Social Security to deregister 82,149 ficti-
tious situations. One of the conclusions is that there is a 
need to intensify joint actions with other Public Admin-
istrations, such as the Transportation Inspectorate, in 
areas in which the Administrations involved can work 
together in the detection and correction of different 
forms of fraud. The Strategic Plan formulates 12 key 
objectives, dealing with workers’ rights and non-com-
pliance of firms, in the fight against undeclared labour 
and unfair competition.89 Part of Objective 11 is tack-
ling of fraud associated to letterbox companies and the 
recruitment of mobile workers. The enhanced activity 
has three dimensions: improvement of the procedures 
that can detect non-compliance, more coordination in 
the regions and a special training program for inspection 
services. In November 2018, the Spanish government 
presented a National Transport Inspection Plan for 2019 
that announced enhanced inspection of ‘fake’ entities. 
The enhanced action was supplimented with new indi-
cators of increased fraud figures and the use of letterbox 
companies in the transport sector.90 
The UK key regulators are the Companies House, Her 
Majesty’s Revenue and Customs (HMRC), the Fraud Inves-
tigation Service, the National Crime Agency, the Serious 
Fraud Office and the UK Insolvency Service. As said 
earlier, the Companies House is seriously understaffed 
and has limited capacity to monitor compliance. HRMC 
plays a key role in monitoring all companies with respect 
to collecting tax monies owed, including letterbox/shell 
companies. The Fraud Investigation Services, the National 
Crime Agency and the Serious Fraud Office primarily 
address money laundering arising from tax offences and 
breaches of the money laundering regulations by busi-
nesses supervised by HMRC, across all UK jurisdictions. 
The UK Insolvency Service is an executive Government 
agency sponsored by the Department for Business, Energy 
& Industrial Strategy that tackles wrongdoing and helps 
secure returns to creditors. Of potential relevance to 
letterbox/shell companies, the insolvency service admin-
isters bankruptcies and debt relief orders, investigates 
the affairs of companies in liquidation; works to disqualify 
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unfit directors in all corporate failures; deals with bank-
ruptcy and debt relief restrictions orders/undertakings; 
and investigates/prosecutes breaches of company and 
insolvency legislation and other criminal offences. The 
Insolvency Service faces a financial challenge with 
respect to investigating letterbox/shell companies as the 
agency in part relies on funds from the seizure of insolvent 
company assets. There is thus a disincentive to investi-
gate shell/letterbox companies which are not suspected 
to hold valuable assets. 
More specifically active in the area of labour law 
violations is the Gangmasters and Labour Abuse 
Authority (GLAA), a non-departmental public body 
governed by an independent Board. GLAA’s role is to 
protect vulnerable/exploited workers via intelligence 
received from inspections, the public, industry and other 
government departments. In cases where letterbox 
companies are found to be abusing worker rights, the 
GLAA can open up investigations of relevance to tackling 
fraudulent letterbox companies. Of similar relevance is 
the Employment Agency Standards (EAS) Inspectorate, 
which protects the rights of agency workers by ensuring 
that employment agencies and businesses treat their 
workers fairly (EAS is part of the Department for Busi-
ness, Energy & Industrial Strategy - BEIS).  
3.6 SANCTIONING
In general terms, effective and dissuasive enforce-
ment is lacking in the EU acquis. In the examined parts 
of the acquis, as transposed in national legislation, 
only few sanction mechanisms targeting deregistration, 
withdrawal or winding up could be found. In some coun-
tries, efforts are made to tackle fraudulent activities 
that are arranged with the use of artificial legal entities 
through penal proceedings. As written before, an abso-
lute denial to access a market requires a court decision. 
Deregistration is a regular phenomenon, but seldom 
the consequence of social fraud or related breaches. 
Social fraud is in most countries a matter of civil law, 
not of criminal law, and the winding up of a corporate 
entity or the prohibition to act in the market is very rare. 
In other parts of the acquis, for instance the control of 
genuine provision of financial products or the protection 
of consumers, inspection mandates to tackle fraud and 
the applicable fining policy are much stronger. 
In other policy areas significant fines and/or disclosure 
91 https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/797675/Non-compliance_and_enforcement_of_the_National_Minimum_
Wage_WEB.pdf 
92 https://service.bmf.gv.at/service/allg/lsu/ , accessed 30 September 2019. 
93 https://www.jusline.at/gesetz/gewo/paragraf/87 
of offenders are applied. Examples in some adjacent 
areas make clear that sanctioning has not necessarily to 
be restricted to financial penalties that result from civil or 
criminal proceedings. For instance, the AMF (the authority 
that monitors the financial markets in France) has estab-
lished a blacklist given the large number of non-compliant 
offerings of financial products and the risks of fraud in 
the area of high-risk speculative trading products. This 
listing is both dissuasive for the companies concerned 
and at the same time has the benefit of alerting citizens. 
It is reported in the AMF annual reports that, as soon as 
investment offerings were added to the AMF’s black-
list, such offerings shrank in number. After the adoption 
of the Sapin II law in December 2016, control has been 
enhanced and in May 2018 the blacklist contained 445 
illegal websites and internet addresses not authorised - 
for want of approval - to offer financial products in France. 
Another example in this context is the regular publication 
of a naming and shaming list in the UK, companies that 
do not respect the statutory minimum wage, can also be 
mentioned. In 2017/18, more than 600 employers who 
were found to have underpaid their workers the minimum 
wage were named in a list published by the Business 
Department. This is the largest number in any single year 
since the scheme began in 2014.91 
One of the most prominent dissuasive examples was 
enacted by the Austrian government in 2016. The Act 
against social Fraud (SBBG) in Austria includes the 
introduction of a blacklist of artificial corporate enti-
ties. Article 8.10 of the Act instructs the Federal Finance 
Ministry to publish on the Internet a list of legally 
established fictitious companies with data (identity, 
commercial register number and business address of the 
fictitious company). Detection of a letterbox company 
leads to withdrawal of the trade licence and to deletion 
from the commercial registration. In October 2019 the 
list mentioned 327 legally confirmed fake enterprises.92 
Publications relating to natural persons are to be 
deleted after five years from publication. 
The Act tackling Wage and Social Dumping (LSD-BG, 
explained beyond) allows the legislator to withdraw the 
trade licence in severe cases of wage dumping. Certain 
delicts (such as social fraud, severe infringements of the 
business legislation or a lack of reliability) can lead to 
withdrawal of licenses.93  
According to another law, a company loses its busi-
ness license if evidence of real activities is absent in a 
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period of three (sometimes five) years and the respon-
sible firm leader is no longer residing in Austria. These 
rules also apply to foreign-domiciled service providers.94  
A client/user undertaking that (sub) contracts a ficti-
tious company after the legal determination of the 
artificial character is liable for the payment of wages 
and social security contributions of the workers involved 
in the contract. Sanctioning of breaches related to 
evasion of mandatory social security contributions are 
covered by criminal law; penalties include imprisonment 
(ranging from 6 months to 5 years).
Although the legal provisions are available, deregis-
tration or withdrawal occurs rarely. The discretion of the 
authority is small and it is not always possible to receive 
information needed from other authorities. Besides, in 
94 https://www.wko.at/service/wirtschaftsrecht-gewerberecht/Endigung_der_Gewerbeberechtigung.html 
95 https://www.rik.ee/en/e-business-register 
96 https://ariregister.rik.ee/arikeelud , accessed 30 September 2019 
cross-border cases the cooperation with Member States 
is key and it is very difficult to enforce penalties in a 
cross-border context.
In Belgium, the annulment of a company is possible 
based on several grounds listed in the Company Code. 
One of the reasons is ‘subject matters that contradict 
the public policy or public order.’ On 15 July 2013, the 
government adopted a package of emergency meas-
ures combating fraud that partly amended the law of 16 
January 2003 creating the Crossroads Bank for Enter-
prises. A provision was adopted enabling the company 
register to withdraw a company that, among others, did 
not submit its annual accounts in the last 3 years (see 
table). 
Table: Official withdrawal 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018
Société anonyme 25285 721 294 278 589 296
Société coopérative à responsabilité illimitée 84 13 4 3 4 4
Société coopérative à responsabilité limitée 1730 124 79 61 84 103
Société en commandite par action 58 7 6 2 6 9
Société en commandite simple 54 8 2 4 1
Société en nom collectif 93 7 1 1 2 2
Société privée à responsabilité limitée 71005 3937 1821 1782 2274 1873
Total 98309 4817 2205 2129 2963 2288
Source: Federal Economic Department (Algemene Directie Economische Inspectie / L’inspection économique)
The Estonian e-Business Register, a service based 
on the database of the registry departments of county 
courts and displaying the real-time data of all legal 
persons registered in Estonia, provides an online list 
that helps the verification of business and entrepreneur-
ship prohibitions of Estonian persons.95 According to an 
article of the Commercial Code (§ 69), information on 
prohibitions on business has been disclosed since 22 
December 2008. The current list (in Estonian) includes 
827 business bans and 13 other cases of prohibition.96 
Since the introduction of the statutory national 
minimum wage in Germany in 2017, its application was 
extended beyond the sectors mentioned in the Posting 
Directive to all sectors. The provision of Main Contrac-
tor’s Liability (Generalunternehmenshaftung) established 
in §14 of the German Posting Act provides a tool to link 
all foreign-domiciled companies directly to German law 
and empowers control authorities like the customs to 
impose fines and legal consequences on German terri-
tory. Therefore, if customs authorities verify a work site 
with posted workers, any fraudulent activity linked to 
the work performed in Germany that can be identified 
based on the relevant legislation, will theoretically lead 
to action undertaken by the customs authority against 
the German main contractor, as this company is liable for 
all subcontractors and its employees, whether resident 
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or posted. Section 363 and Section §266a of the Crim-
inal Code refer to ‘Non-payment and misuse of wages 
and salaries’ as a fraudulent act identifying liability to 
imprisonment not exceeding 5 years or fines as possible 
consequences. These legal consequences cannot be 
imposed on foreign letterbox companies without trans-
national cooperation, but it can have consequences for 
a user undertaking residing in Germany. So far, statis-
tical FKS-data on the application of chain liability as an 
instrument to combat fraudulent practices in the frame 
of the provision of services, are not available. 
Another part of the fining policy that is applied 
concerns the registration of violations. If the FKS iden-
tifies a company that violates the law and the fine 
summoned is more than 200 Euro, this fine will be 
recorded in the Central Business Register (Gewerbez-
entralregister). In theory the Register can be accessed 
by public authorities, by the Points of Single Contact 
and by other bodies that have the competence to work 
with the NormAn tool for data collection. But there is 
neither a direct link between the Register and NormAn, 
nor with the Point of Single Contact, although this could 
provide an information source of the previous standing 
of a company. Trade unionists and labour market experts 
opine that intense media coverage and public uproar 
on poor working conditions of posted workers resulting 
in political pressure to restructure a sector function as 
effective instruments in the fight against abuses with 
letterbox companies. 
Late 2018, the Finance Minister, expressed concerns 
regarding the use of letterbox companies and announced 
a new act aiming at combatting their use as a mean to 
obscure companies’ obligations to pay minimum wage, 
social contribution and taxes in certain sectors such as 
the construction or security sector. The draft law that 
was presented in March 2019 referred specifically to 
letterbox companies, but the term letterbox companies 
used in this law does not refer to companies outside of 
German territory (it focuses on bogus-self-employment 
and fake invoices without any real economic activity).97 
As of 1 July 2012, every company or legal entity that 
provides workers in the Netherlands (irrespective 
of where it is based, thus including foreign-domiciled 
entities) must register the activity with the Chamber of 
Commerce (Article 7a of the collective agreement for 
temporary agency work), even if it has no Dutch branch 
97 The consulted experts explained that a positive aspect of the new act could be that there is reference to means enhancing cross-border cooperation such are the Directive 
2014/67/EU on the Enforcement of the Posted Workers directive. The draft clarifies that the existing Administrative Procedure Act (Verwaltungsverfahrensgesetz, VwVfG, 
last promulgated in 2003) already entails a section on cross border cooperation with institutions within the EU. The sections 8a to 8e focus specifically on the terms, costs, 
forms and applicability of cross border cooperation. In addition, the proposed law clarifies that Germany will opt out of the possibility provided in §6(3) of Directive 2014/67/
EU. In addition, as mentioned in the new law, the Act on Combatting Illicit Employment (Schwarzarbeitsbekämpfungsgesetz, SchwarzArbG) entails a Section 6, 6a and 6b on 
cross-border cooperation and identifies the terms and conditions for cross-border transmission of data. 
98 https://www.onrc.ro/index.php/en/statistics , accessed 30 September 2019 
or office. In the event of a violation of the registration 
requirement, the Labour Inspectorate can fine both the 
agency and the user undertaking up to €12,000 per 
worker. Repeated violations can result in higher fines of 
€24,000 and €36,000 per worker.
The Inspectorate does not conduct regular assess-
ments on the bona fide nature of the service provider, 
but assesses possible bogus arrangements on the basis 
of indications provided to them by social partners or 
authorities, such as the unions or the Tax Office. If indi-
cations are sufficient to suspect a bogus arrangement, 
the Inspectorate checks whether a service provider 
posting an employee in the Netherlands is a genuinely 
foreign-domiciled service provider (and thus falls under 
the scope of the Posting Directive) or if it is actually a 
Dutch service provider using a bogus corporate entity 
(i.e. a foreign letterbox). Violations can lead to proceed-
ings and administrative fines. Moreover, the Inspectorate 
can impose sanctions to employers for violating several 
laws and regulations, such as the Acts on the statutory 
minimum wage and minimum holiday allowances, on 
minimum working hours or temporary work.  
The Inspectorate has no competence to fine offences 
related to the lack of respect of collective labour agree-
ments. The sanctioning of non-adherence of collective 
agreed pay and working conditions is a matter of civil 
law. It can only be instigated by civil actors that may 
request the inspectorate to support investigations 
(as settled in a tripartite social pact from April 2013). 
Upon request, the inspectorate conducts independent 
investigations under General Administrative Law in 
which employers are obliged to. A report with findings 
containing facts and circumstances of the case is sent to 
the submitting social partner, which can decide whether 
or not to start civil proceedings to enforce compliance 
with the collective agreement (Cremers 2017). Between 
2014 and 2018, I-SZW carried out 94 investigations on 
request, relating mainly to pay, allowances and job clas-
sification.
Once registered, the National Trade Register Office 
in Romania can introduce action in court for dereg-
istering of a company. The National Trade Register 
provides data on dissolutions and deletions of firms, in 
the 1st half of 2019 16,626 and 67,807 entities under 
General Administrative Law. In the same period 47,304 
new private limited companies were incorporated.98 
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However, reasons for deregistration are not recorded 
and according to the consulted experts these were not a 
consequence of the application of anti-abuse measures. 
In the UK civil fraud is generally pursued by victims 
in civil courts (e.g. to recover assets, and to realise 
compensation). Criminal fraud refers to actions that are 
deemed a criminal offence, and these are prosecuted 
by prosecuting authorities (if these are not prepared to 
bring proceedings then individuals/entities can bring a 
private prosecution to the criminal courts; Magistrates’ 
Court or Crown Court). For serious abuses by letterbox 
company e.g. if workers have been abused, cases 
are likely to benefit from the enforcement powers of 
enforcement agencies (e.g. the Gangmasters Licencing 
99 https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/list-of-people-banned-from-running-an-employment-agency-or-business/employment-agency-standards-inspecto-
rates-eas-people-prohibited-from-running-an-employment-agency-or-business
and Labour Abuse Authority; insolvency services etc.) 
who can undertake investigations that uncover a multi-
tude of evidence of relevance to the criminal court. The 
two systems can work together, i.e. a civil claim can 
be followed by a criminal claim (or vice versa), and the 
two claims can also take place simultaneously. Section 
3(a) of the Employment Agencies Act 1973 provides 
the Employment Agency Standards Inspectorate (EAS) 
with the possibility to apply to an employment tribunal 
for banning someone from running, or being involved 
in running, an employment agency or business; thus 
banning individuals from acting as directors and/or 
refusal of market entry. The government issues a list of 
people banned from running an employment agency or 
business due to misconduct or unsuitability.99 
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THE CORPORATE LEGAL ENTITY ACTING  
AS A CROSS-BORDER SERVICE PROVIDER
4.1 A SYNTHESIS OF DESK RESEARCH AND 
ANALYSIS 
This report investigates several aspects of the EU 
acquis that are relevant in the assessment of the 
‘genuine’ character of corporate legal entities that act 
as cross-border service providers. The EU legislator 
(Council and Parliament), the European Commission and 
the Court of Justice of the European Union always stress 
that the foundation of a corporate entity has to take 
place in accordance to the relevant national company 
law provisions, whilst Article 49 of the Treaty on the 
Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) ensures this 
freedom of establishment EU-wide. The creation, the 
registration and the verification of the ‘real’ existence of 
corporate legal entities are a matter of national compe-
tence, enshrined in national company law. However, 
once established, Article 56 of the Treaty establishes the 
right to provide services within the EU for these corpo-
rate legal entities.
One of the basic problems that have been raised in 
recent years in the area of cross-border labour mobility 
and the recruitment of workers, is to which extent it is 
possible to identify non-genuine service providers and 
the use of artificial corporate arrangements. Research 
so far has revealed that there is a clear intersection 
between different policy areas (company law and related 
corporate law issues and the EU-rules on the free provi-
sion of services on the one hand, different areas of 
social policy on the other hand). The analysis in this 
study looked at several relevant aspects in these areas 
from a horizontal perspective. In the policy area sections, 
the summaries have already outlined some conclusions. 
In this final section, an overall perspective is sketched 
out in view of the results of some basic national inves-
tigations that focused on the transposition of measures 
and provisions that can be found in the EU acquis.
4.2 APPLICATION OF THE NOTION OF THE 
GENUINE UNDERTAKING
Overall, EU rules formulated in the area of company 
law do not provide a definition of the genuine under-
taking. The EU established a package of company law 
initiatives, with the starting point of simplifying and 
deregulating entry to the ‘business environment’. The 
basis is mutual trust and confidence between Member 
States and the assumption that the registration in any 
Member State is good enough for activities across 
Europe. The few requirements that are formulated are 
aspects like the type and name of the corporate entity, 
the objectives, the amount of subscribed authorised 
capital and some statutory data concerning rules and 
procedures of governing bodies. The statutes have to 
provide information on the registered office and the 
identity of natural or legal persons that signed for the 
creation of the company. The requirements that are 
described by the EU legislator, with regard to registra-
tion, are superficial and easy to handle by a ‘virtual’ 
office or by an ‘incubator’ that organises the establish-
ment of the legal entity, arranges a company registered 
office address and takes care of registration duties. 
Although the Services Directive talks about achieving 
‘a genuine internal market for services’, the core articles 
of the Directive do not specify strict requirements, which 
could rule the genuine character of corporate entities 
that acts as service providers. The freedom of establish-
ment and free movement of services may benefit (only) 
companies constituted in accordance with the laws of a 
Member State and having their registered office, central 
administration or principal place of business within the 
Community. The concept of service ‘provider’ should 
cover any natural person who is a national of a Member 
State or any legal person engaged in a service activity in 
a Member State. According to Article 4.4 an ‘establish-
ment’ means the actual pursuit of an economic activity, 
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as referred to in Article 43 of the Treaty, by the provider 
for an indefinite period and through a stable infrastruc-
ture from where the business of providing services is 
actually carried out.
The Regulations for the coordination of social secu-
rity (883/2004 and 2009/987) provide certain criteria for 
the assessment of the genuine character of an under-
taking that posts workers. Decision No A2, formulated 
by the Administrative Commission for the Coordination 
of Social Security Systems, prescribes that a number 
of elements have to be considered in order to establish 
whether there is substance in activities. More directly 
related to the posting undertaking is the condition of 
an existence of ties between the undertaking that acts 
as the service provider and the Member State in which 
it is established. The possibility of posting should be 
confined solely to undertakings normally carrying on 
their business in the territory of the Member State 
whose legislation remains applicable to the posted 
worker, assuming that the undertakings perform 
substantial activities in the territory of the Member 
State in which they are established. Thus, the assump-
tion is that the posting undertaking/service provider is a 
genuine company, registered and normally carrying out 
substantial activities in the country of registration. There 
is no further definition of genuine service providers.
The Posting of Workers Directive 96/71/EC did not 
provide an operational instrument related to the genuine 
character of the corporate entity that acts as the service 
provider. Host countries had to rely entirely on informa-
tion of the home country or the country of the registered 
office. The Enforcement Directive 2014/67/EU does not 
change this reference to the country of registration as 
it says that the condition that the employer is genu-
inely established in the Member State from which the 
posting takes place, need to be examined by the compe-
tent authority of the host Member State and, where 
necessary, in close cooperation with the Member State 
of establishment. Related to the genuine character of 
posting situations and the tackling of abuses in subcon-
tracting situations, the Revision Directive (EU) 2018/957 
refers to the Enforcement Directive. 
This research on national reporting related to the 
assessment and monitoring of the genuine character of 
companies indicates that the current practice is to register 
companies without checking real activities, and most 
Member States do not apply any requirements related 
to activities in the country of incorporation. Although tax 
circumvention and money-laundering have gained a lot of 
attention, the dominant trend is still a policy of deregula-
tion and simplification of registration. National company 
law in the strict sense seems hardly to be affected by 
the developments related to fraud and regulatory arbi-
trage. The terms ‘genuine’ or ‘non-genuine’ undertaking 
does not figure in the EU acquis and is only sparsely 
used in the legislation of the Member States. The infor-
mation of national registries, necessary to determine 
whether a company is a genuine undertaking, is incom-
plete and superficial, and the commercial databases are 
inconsistent, scarce and easy to manipulate. As far as 
national instruments used to tackle fraudulent practices 
with corporate legal entities in the context of cross-border 
services, these neither stem from regulations enshrined 
in company law nor from the (implemented) safety-of-ser-
vices related legislation. Limited efforts are made to 
tackle these practices based on secondary legislation in 
adjacent policy areas (labour inspectorate, social security 
offices and others). The compliance offices in these areas 
lack the competence to act effectively and thoroughly 
against non-genuine entities. 
4.3 THE ABSENCE OF A DEFINITION OF 
FRAUDULENT ACTIVITIES
Although the European company law acquis mentions 
the possible occurrence of unlawful practices, the 
different Directives neither define the phenomenon, nor 
describe what makes (activities of) these entities (un)
lawful. The desk research revealed that there is no defi-
nition of fraudulent activities provided in the EU acquis 
related to company law, and it is not an abuse of EU 
law to incorporate a letterbox company in the Member 
State with the most attractive company law. There is 
no reference to any arrangement that might end up in 
(social) fraud. Moreover, the EU-policy in general and the 
ECJ-rulings in particular, to provide low-cost corporate 
law are leading to regulatory competition between EU 
Member States. Deregulation of corporate law affects 
the decision of firms as to where to incorporate, without 
any direct link to real activities, and the widespread use 
of an industry of special incorporation agents to facili-
tate legal mobility across countries has been the result. 
The policy area of company law lacks concrete reference 
to (the necessity to tackle) abuses and fraud. 
Although there is reference to possible fraudulent 
behaviour in the Services Directive, it makes no reference 
to possible social fraud, for instance abusive cross-border 
recruitment practices by artificial arrangements that serve 
as service providers. As demonstrated, Chapter V and VI of 
the Services Directive give some guidelines for the coop-
eration of Member States in case of non-genuine actors. 
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The European Commission is most co ncerned with ‘unjus-
tified’ restrictions and requirements that, according to the 
Treaty and the case law, are not permitted. Additional 
attention is paid to limiting compliance and enforcement 
to ‘overriding reasons relating to the public interest’ as 
recognised in the case law of the Court of Justice. There 
is a certain opening-up in the list of overriding reasons, 
with social policy objectives, such as the protection of 
workers, including their social security, combating fraud 
and the prevention of unfair competition figuring in this 
list. However, the Directive gives no guidance how to 
make this operational. Therefore, effective implementa-
tion is hard to find. 
A key role is given to the competent authorities in 
the Member States that have to cooperate, with coor-
dinating tasks for ‘liaison points’. Despite investigative 
efforts by several national experts, very limited national 
assessment of the functioning of the liaison points 
can be found; most Member States refer back to the 
European Commission services in this area. In some 
countries, the liaison points and the points of single 
contact are being mixed up, but in general the points of 
single contact activities are restricted to free support, 
used by individuals and companies planning to establish 
an economic activity via a form of company registration.
The IMI-system was installed as an instrument for a 
smooth functioning of the Single Market; the scope of the 
instrument was the Services Directive and the Directive on 
the recognition of professional qualifications. This scope 
has been extended to several adjacent policy areas. The 
assessment of the instrument as a contribution to tackle 
the fraudulent use of the freedom to provide services is 
still in its infancy and alerts in this area are rare. Assess-
ments of the functioning of the IMI-system are dominated 
by businesses’ expectations and worries about too much 
regulation or data protection. Most attention has been 
paid to the proportionality of national regulations required 
under the Services Directive.
In practice, there is very limited ex ante verification 
activity in the Member States to explore whether a 
service provider is a genuine undertaking and carries 
out real activities. The national experts have not come 
across prominent case law on ‘non-substantial’ service 
provision based on ex ante verification. Various inspec-
tion activities may come into play if a company is failing 
to oblige different aspects of tax/labour law.  Also 
authorities generally only become interested in a firm 
upon suspicion of financial crimes. Until the point where 
there is evidence of this, assessing the genuine status of 
a firm’s activities by an authority is unlikely.
The Regulations for coordination of social security 
led to long disputes about regularity and legitimacy. 
The solution was sought in the description of non-ex-
haustive criteria that can be applied to the assessment 
of substantial activities. However, this listing does not 
state that lack of respect of these criteria qualifies 
the activity (or the service provider that performs the 
activity) as unlawful.
The Enforcement Directive (2014/67/EU) was formu-
lated in line with the previous CFEU jurisdiction. 
Moreover, in Article 4.2 the Directive copied the guide-
lines that stem from the social security Regulations. 
It provides the national competent authorities with 
‘substance rules’, consisting of a non-exhaustive list 
of indicative factual elements to be used in an overall 
assessment in order to determine whether an under-
taking genuinely performs substantial activities, other 
than purely internal management and/or administra-
tive activities. These criteria apply first and foremost 
to the factual posting activity of the worker, and to a 
lesser extent to the activity of the service provider in the 
country of registration. The Directive does not deal with 
the legality of the service provider as such. The revision 
of the PWD adds the liability of the user undertaking, 
without further specifications of the fraudulent character 
of the entities concerned. Overall, the posting rules give 
little guidance on how to deal with artificial corporate 
entities that are used in the provision of services.   
4.4 ANY RELEVANT REGISTRATION CRITERIA 
AND/OR OBLIGATIONS
In general, the EU acquis in the company policy area 
aims to create a business-friendly legal environment, by 
reducing the ‘administrative burden’. This is the case in 
the ‘old’ series of company law directives, except for the 
SE-Regulation that gives some detailed prescriptions. In 
the case of an SE, there has to be a ‘real and continuous 
link’ with a Member State and the registered office, 
and the head office of an SE should be located in the 
same Member State. Worries about the administrative 
burden are also important characteristics of the tabled 
company mobility package, which was finalised in 2019. 
Although there has been no support for a central Euro-
pean registration, certain rules have been harmonised. 
For instance, the registration of a company shall, through 
the system of interconnection of registers, make avail-
able, without delay, the information on the opening and 
termination of any winding-up or insolvency proceedings 
of the company and on the striking-off of the company 
from the register, if this entails legal consequences in 
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the Member State of the register of the company. Where 
a company has been dissolved or otherwise struck off 
the register, its branches are likewise struck off the 
register without undue delay. 
National company law in general makes it easy for 
companies to register and to decide where to register 
its seat. It does not matter whether or not the company 
performs real activities from this registered address. The 
few requirements that are described by the EU legislator 
with regard to registration are superficial and easy to 
handle by a ‘virtual’ office. As a result of desk research, 
we conclude that the mainstream thoughts among 
competition (and company) law scholars make a case 
for simple and lean requirements, with the argument 
that it will make competition even more efficient. Regis-
tration at the Chamber of Commerce, the usual practice 
in many countries, offers no guarantee. The Chambers 
have no monitoring tasks and play no substantial role 
in compliance and enforcement practices. At its best, 
there is verification of the accuracy of the information 
and a check for the sake of completeness. Nevertheless, 
the recent policy changes in the field of fiscal fraud and 
money laundering have led to some interesting potential 
instruments. Unfortunately, these are not (yet) applied in 
the social policy field. For instance, the Estonian visual-
ising tool, a part of the country’s e-Business Register 
originally meant to help discover money-laundering 
schemes, opens possibilities to investigate an enter-
prise’s background through existing and past links, which 
also bring out previous ownership relations.
The key priority in the Service Directive is simpli-
fication of procedures and formalities, including 
authorisation, certification and market entrance. The 
registration of service providers remains a national affair 
in the country of registration. However, it is possible for 
a host country to impose requirements as regards to 
the provision of a service activity, where they are justi-
fied for reasons of public policy. Besides, chapter V of 
the Directive formulates several binding measures to 
watch over the quality of the services and to protect the 
recipient of the services. Chapter VI binds the Member 
States to introduce competent bodies, mechanisms and 
activities that are depending on this registered infor-
mation. It must be made available in good time before 
conclusion of a contract or, where there is no written 
contract, before the service is provided. Providers shall 
supply contact details, in particular a postal address, 
fax number or e-mail address and telephone number to 
which all recipients, including those residents in another 
Member State, can send a complaint or a request for 
information. Additionally, they have to supply their legal 
address if this is not their usual address for correspond-
ence. Most of these obligations can be relevant for 
the assessment of the ‘genuine’ character of the legal 
entity that provides the service activity, although this is 
not explicitly mentioned in the Directive. Based on the 
research, we have serious doubts about the implemen-
tation of these two chapters of the Service Directive. 
The findings at national level show that ex ante checks 
ensuring material economic presence or genuine service 
provision from a social perspective are in most cases 
missing. 
In the field of the EU-coordination of social secu-
rity, disputes about the obligatory character of 
requirements (and their compatibility with the economic 
freedoms) have led to decisions on the substance of 
activities formulated by the Administrative Commission 
for the Coordination of Social Security Systems that was 
installed by the European Commission. Substance has 
become the fundamental benchmark for the application 
of the legislation of the Member State of residence or 
the legislation of the Member State in which the regis-
tered office or place of business of the service provider 
is situated. This distinction is decisive for the determina-
tion of the social security legislation that applies to the 
posted worker. Host countries have certain rights, but 
the main assessment of certain criteria (place of regis-
tration, number of staff, law applicable to contracts, 
and the turnover in the country of registration) lies in 
the hands of the country of registration. The so-called 
Gebhard test stays the main reference. National meas-
ures restricting EU freedoms must fulfil four conditions: 
they must be applied in a non-discriminatory manner; 
they must be justified by imperative requirements in the 
general interest; they must be suitable for securing the 
attainment of the objective which they pursue; and they 
must not go beyond what is necessary in order to attain 
it. The transmission of an A1-form is seen as the confir-
mation of legality in this area. 
The posting rules formulate guidelines for the identi-
fication of a posting provider in line with the substance 
criteria that stem from the social security regulations. 
Interestingly, the revised PWD adds a chain liability to 
the applicable measures with certain obligations for the 
user undertaking, mainly the obligation to inform about 
working conditions and labour legislation in force down 
a cross-border recruitment chain. Obviously, an assess-
ment of the implementation of recent changes of the 
posting rules could not take place in the frame of this 
research.
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4.5 COMPLIANCE CONTROL  
AND ENFORCEMENT MECHANISMS  
IN A CROSS-BORDER CONTEXT
The EU company law acquis provides neither control 
nor enforcement measures. The aim to facilitate the 
use of online registration tools and to dismantle obsta-
cles involving setting up companies, registering their 
branches or filing documents, especially in cross border 
operations, dominates the EU policy. Otherwise, the EU 
legislator completely relies on the registration stand-
ards in the Member States. The control on most of the 
requirements is handed over to the Member States 
without any guidance. 
Chapter VI of the Services Directive speaks about the 
necessity to have ‘liaison points’ in the Member States 
that can deliver mutual assistance and put in place 
measures for effective cooperation. Their cooperation 
and mutual assistance, including exchange of informa-
tion regarding the good repute of providers, is bound 
by obligations. In case they do not fulfil this obligation, 
this has to be communicated to the Commission. The 
Services Directive has a dispute settlement procedure, 
meant to protect the client. It is also prescribed that 
Member States shall, at the request of a competent 
authority in another Member State, supply information 
(in practice with the IMI-system as the main instrument) 
in conformity with their national law, on disciplinary or 
administrative actions or criminal sanctions and deci-
sions concerning insolvency or bankruptcy involving 
fraud taken by their competent authorities in respect of 
the provider, which are directly relevant to the provider’s 
competence or professional reliability. 
The application of the coordination of social security 
is in the hands of the Member States, with competent 
authorities that generally have restricted compliance 
traditions. The Administrative Commission for the Coor-
dination of Social Security Systems installed by the 
European Commission has dealt with certain concerns 
on combating fraud and on guaranteeing that contri-
butions are paid to the right Member State and that 
benefits are not unduly granted or fraudulently obtained. 
Member States shall install a point of contact for fraud 
and error to whom either risks of fraud and abuse, or 
systematic difficulties which cause delays and error, can 
be reported. Nevertheless, the ultimate competence to 
check whether a service provider and the provision of 
services with posted workers are genuine lies in the 
hands of the national authorities in the country of regis-
tration.
The Posting rules leave it up to the Member States to 
designate the competent authority that has to perform 
the appropriate provisions, measures and control 
mechanisms necessary for better and more uniform 
implementation, application and enforcement in practice 
of the PWD; including measures to prevent and sanction 
any abuse and circumvention of the applicable rules. 
The control and enforcement in the area of posting have 
led to long and intense debates, resulting in the conclu-
sion of the Enforcement Directive and a revision of the 
PWD. The Enforcement Directive prescribes the mutual 
assistance and cooperation, including the investigation 
of any non-compliance or abuse of applicable rules. The 
competence between the relevant authorities of the host 
country and the country of registration of the service 
provider are strictly divided and limited to the national 
borders. The transfer of information and answers to 
requests is channelled through the IMI-system. It is 
too early to evaluate the practical functioning of these 
prescriptions. The revised PWD, Directive (EU) 2018/957, 
stresses the enhanced coordination between the 
Member States’ competent authorities and/or bodies 
and cooperation at Union level on combating fraud 
relating to the posting of workers. This should be effec-
tuated by a reinforcement of the transnational dimension 
of inspections, inquiries and exchanges of information 
between the competent authorities or bodies of the 
Member States concerned. Competent authorities or 
bodies should have the necessary means for alerting on 
such situations and exchanging information aiming to 
prevent and combat fraud and abuses. The host country 
is responsible for the monitoring, control and enforce-
ment of the obligations laid down in the revised PWD 
and in the Enforcement Directive.
Although registration is poor, the input of consulted 
national experts reveals that there is growing atten-
tion of compliance control and enforcement based on 
secondary legislation, mainly stemming from adja-
cent social legislation (social security, mandatory 
working conditions, and fiscal policy). However, given 
the absence of straightforward instruments stemming 
from the core parts of the internal market, the outlook 
is rather patchy and dispersed on a case-by-case basis, 
depending on the commitment of different actors and 
competent authorities. Moreover, a pro-active policy 
that intervenes in the freedom of establishment (like in 
Austria) easily comes under pressure by the Court or the 
Commission’s infringement policy. 
Interestingly, stakeholders like the trade unions, but 
also the legislator in some countries, rely more and more 
on policy that targets the user undertaking. Given the 
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fact that artificial arrangements are difficult to tackle 
(they pop up and disappear very quickly and endlessly, 
the investigations are time-consuming and the potential 
fining has no EU-wide effect) these actors prefer to work 
towards an extension of the liability to user undertakings 
responsible for using letterbox companies in fraudulent 
cases. This also is expressed in more severe sanctions 
for the user undertaking.  
4.6 SANCTIONING OF BREACHES 
Overall, the EU acquis does not provide for effective 
or dissuasive sanctions against the abuse of artificial 
corporate entities in a cross-border context. One Direc-
tive (EU/2017/1132) in the series of company law, 
contains the notion of nullity in cases of non-compliance 
with legal formalities. However, this sanction does not 
refer to situations of social fraud or non-genuine cross-
border activity, but to requirements related to merger 
and/or division processes. In all other situations, the 
acquis refers to national sanctioning dimensions. The 
SE-Regulation is (again) an exception, if an SE does not 
comply with the requirement that the registered office 
and the head office are located in the same Member 
State, it has to be liquidated. Moreover, the possibility 
for an SE to transfer its registered office from one 
Member State to another is subject to anti-abuse provi-
sions and anti-treaty shopping rules, executed according 
to national antitreaty shopping rules. But references to 
the SE-Regulation are absent. Only in recent years, expe-
riences with cross-border activities of artificial corporate 
arrangements in other domains (taxation, social secu-
rity, labour standards) have led to debates and the first 
cautious steps to work towards more adequate penal 
approaches.
There are no direct sanction mechanisms or guidelines 
formulated in the Services Directive in the event that 
the principles of the Directive are breached. National 
sanctions and other judicial actions referred to in the 
Directive shall only be communicated if a final decision 
has been taken (by a court). Information on disciplinary, 
administrative or criminal sanctions can be used in cases 
where it is necessary to establish the good repute of an 
individual or a legal person. The Services Directive refers 
only to sanctioning in relation to proportionality. The 
Directive formulates the elimination of disproportionate 
authorisation schemes, requirements, checks, inspec-
tions, fees and penalties as one of its key intentions. 
The consulted experts found no reference to the notion 
100  http://www.efbww.org/default.asp?Index=1012&Language=EN 
of good repute. The possibility to request information 
is so far devoid of substance, it certainly could have a 
stronger signalling function. For instance, we have seen 
in the use of IMI (in § 2.2.6) that the bulk of requests 
concerning the service provider with posted workers 
was sent to Slovenia. In the spring of 2019, the Euro-
pean Federation of Building and Woodworkers launched 
a complaint against Slovenia with the argument that 
the country was using the posting of workers as a kind 
of gateway of cheap labour for Europe with numerous 
workers from Bosnia and Herzegovina, Serbia, Mace-
donia and Albania. The recruited workforce amounted 
far beyond the national working population.100 
In the area of social security, there is little effective 
remedy in a host country against artificial legal enti-
ties that function as service providers in a cross-border 
context. Although the withdrawal of a provided A1-form 
could be a strong sanctioning instrument in a host 
country, this competence is still a matter of the issuing 
country. Equally, in line with the case law of the CJEU, 
there is limited remedy against service providers with 
no established economic activity and little to no inde-
pendent economic value in the country of registration. 
The CJEU has ruled that a host state may not refuse 
recognition of the legal capacity of a company incorpo-
rated under the law of another Member State, even if 
that company does not pursue any economic activity in 
the latter state. 
Member States shall ensure that there are effective 
mechanisms for posted workers to lodge complaints 
against their employers directly, as well as the right to 
institute judicial or administrative proceedings. More-
over, Member States may take additional measures on 
a non-discriminatory and proportionate basis in order to 
ensure that in subcontracting chains the contractor of 
which the employer (service provider) is a direct subcon-
tractor can, in addition to or in place of the employer, 
be held liable by the posted worker. Member States 
may take alternative enforcement measures, which 
enable, in a direct subcontracting relationship, effec-
tive and proportionate sanctions against the contractor, 
to tackle fraud and abuse in situations where workers 
have difficulties in obtaining their rights. The revised 
PWD prescribes that Member States shall lay down 
the rules on penalties applicable to infringements of 
national provisions adopted pursuant to the Directive 
and shall take all measures necessary to ensure that 
they are implemented. The penalties provided for shall 
be effective, proportionate and dissuasive. Moreover, 
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the revision explicitly says that, where, following an 
overall assessment, it is established that an undertaking 
is improperly or fraudulently creating the impression that 
the situation of a worker falls within the scope of the 
PWD, that Member State shall ensure that the worker 
benefits from relevant law and practice. There are no 
further guidelines related to sanctioning. Like in the 
social security acquis and in line with the case law of the 
CJEU, there is no direct remedy against abusive service 
providers with no established economic activity and 
little to no independent economic value in the country 
of registration, such as the withdrawal from the national 
market of the host country. The posting rules conform 
likewise to CJEU rulings stating that a host state may 
not refuse recognition of the legal capacity of a company 
incorporated under the law of another Member State, 
even if it does not pursue any economic activity in the 
latter state.  
In the examined parts of the acquis, as transposed 
in national legislation, only few sanction mechanisms 
targeting deregistration, withdrawal or winding up could 
be found. In some countries, efforts are made to tackle 
101 At the moment of writing, the CJEU has ruled on ‘too severe’ sanctioning in an Austrian case. The Court dealt with fines imposed in over 200 cases that clearly violated 
the Austrian Act tackling Wage and Social Dumping. In November 2018 the Court had already ruled that Article 56 TFEU must be interpreted as precluding legislation of 
a Member State, such as that at issue in the main proceedings, under which the competent authorities can order a commissioning party established in that Member State 
to suspend payments to his contractor established in another Member State, or even to pay a security in an amount equivalent to the price still owed for the works in order 
to guarantee payment of the fine which might be imposed on that contractor in the event of a proven infringement of the labour law of the first Member State.  
See: http://curia.europa.eu/juris/celex.jsf?celex=62018CJ0064&lang1=en&type=TXT&ancre= . And: http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?text=&do-
cid=210068&pageIndex=0&doclang=EN&mode=req&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=1520110 
fraudulent activities that are arranged with the use of 
artificial legal entities through penal proceedings. As 
written before, an absolute denial to access a market 
requires a court decision. Deregistration is a regular 
phenomenon, but seldom the consequence of social 
fraud or related breaches. Social fraud is in most coun-
tries a matter of civil law, not of criminal law, and the 
winding up of a corporate entity or the prohibition to 
act on the market is rare. However, examples in some 
adjacent areas make clear that sanctioning has not 
necessarily to be restricted to financial penalties that 
result from civil or criminal proceedings. For instance, 
the AMF (the authority that monitors the financial 
markets in France) has established a blacklist given the 
large number of non-compliant offerings of financial 
products and the risks of fraud in the area of high-risk 
speculative trading products. Also the Act against social 
Fraud (SBBG) in Austria includes the introduction of a 
blacklist of artificial corporate entities. Combined with 
the Act tackling Wage and Social Dumping (LSD-BG) the 
legislator applies in severe cases of wage dumping not 




CLOSING REMARKS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
In the research report Exploring the fraudulent 
contracting of work in the European Union, Eurofound 
summarised the function of letterbox companies (page 
17, Eurofound 2016b):  
Most of the national reports (Austria, Belgium, Czech 
Republic, Denmark, France, Germany, Hungary, 
Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, 
Romania, Slovenia and Sweden) indicate similar 
fraudulent use of the posting of workers. Typically, in 
such instances, a company that is permanently estab-
lished in a Member State and carries out its activities 
there, subcontracts some of its activities to another 
company (often completely owned by the former). 
Although the latter company is formally established in 
another Member State, it is completely inactive there 
- a so-called ‘letter box company’ (…) The employees 
are formally hired by the subcontractor and registered 
as habitually working in the Member State where the 
subcontractor is legally established and where the law 
or collective agreements provide for lower minimum 
wages and social contributions - or other less protec-
tive or less expensive employment conditions than 
those stipulated in the Member State where the 
contractor is established. In reality, these employees 
have never worked before for the subcontractor in 
its Member State of origin; they have been hired 
expressly and solely to work in the other Member 
State where the contractor carries out its activity. (…) 
The rules of the latter state should in fact be wholly 
applied if these employees were properly registered 
as working in the host Member State for the user 
company.
The deregulation of company law fuelled the growth 
of artificial legal corporate entities. Such letterbox 
companies serve as intermediaries, with no or only 
symbolic activities in the country of registration, 
facilitate outsourcing, cross-border recruitment, and 
avoidance of regulation under the flag of the free provi-
sion of services. The European Commission seems to be 
aware of these consequences in its Practical Guide on 
Posting (European Commission 2019): 
Where it is established that an undertaking is improp-
erly or fraudulently creating the impression that the 
situation of a worker falls within the scope of the 
Posting of Workers Directives, the Member State where 
the work is carried out must ensure that the worker 
benefits from the relevant national law and prac-
tice and is in any case not subject to less favourable 
conditions than those applicable to posted workers. 
The consequence of these practices is that workers are 
deprived from rights-based free movement of workers. 
The question is whether this can be tackled in an effec-
tive way via provisions of secondary law. Even though 
the Services Directive formulates the aim to achieve ‘a 
genuine internal market for services’, the core articles 
of this Directive neither specify strict requirements that 
rule the genuine character of the legal corporate entities 
acting as service providers nor provides the Member 
States with instruments to check regularity. In general, 
Member States refrain from refusing market entry to 
national or cross-border service providers for the reason 
of ‘no good repute’ or disqualifying directors; and also 
creating a registry in that respect. The lack of effective 
verification and monitoring induces opportunities for 
regulatory avoidance by exploiting weak regulation and 
inconsistencies between and within jurisdictions.  
The deregulated entrance to businesses and cross-
border provision of services as regulated by the 
Services Directive interact with patchy competences 
and fragmented national enforcement practices. This 
can easily be at the detriment of clients, creditors, 
suppliers and workers. Significantly, the experts, which 
provided fieldwork and tried to get information on 
national compliance mechanisms and the transposi-
tion of provisions stemming from EU-law, were often 
referred from one national desk to another, or even 
back to the European Commission.
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Also despite enhanced collaboration in projects and 
campaigns, most enforcement authorities retain their 
specific remit laid down in the relatively limited legal 
basis of their competences that are further restricted 
by their territorial limitations.  Whereas an effective 
approach to ending artificial arrangements requires 
more systematic and institutional cooperation between 
different departments (tax, social and economic) and 
other stakeholders, such as the social partners and/or 
their sectoral compliance offices. National liaison offices 
should coordinate this approach. There is thus a need to 
bring real life to their functioning. The business models 
that orchestrate the use of questionable corporate 
legal entities, assisted by an industry, which provides 
the façade necessary to keep everything ‘perfectly’ 
legal, require a horizontal and structural compliance 
and enforcement policy, based on cooperation between 
authorities and social partners. 
A variety of legislative acts and regulations at national 
and EU-level interact in the subject matter of this 
research. The results demonstrate the need to work out 
an agenda for the reaffirmation of the lex loci laboris 
principles in the EU acquis that regulates the free move-
ment of workers and the freedom to provide services. 
In the past, the ETUC has pleaded for the introduction 
of a social progress-clause that should be used for the 
assessment of the regulatory frame for the EU Single 
Market that touches upon the position of workers. The 
allocation of such benchmark could help to prevent 
further thoughtless introduction of deregulation and 
simplification. Given the intertwined and mixed legal 
framework, it is not easy to formulate simple recommen-
dations. However, there are certain policy areas at stake 
that should be tackled.
a. Transparency and disclosure in the area of 
company law. 
More information is needed, before the registration of 
a firm, about the factual operation and the substance of 
its activities. Moreover, public registers should show the 
real and beneficiary owner of every legal entity. Compe-
tent authorities in the policy area of service provision 
must have the competence to put a firm ‘on hold’ if this 
information is lacking or in case of serious doubts (not 
only based on criminal law, but also on administrative 
procedures). It is necessary to leave behind the dogma, 
in corporate and company law, of simplification of the 
entrance to the ‘business environment’, supported by 
politicians and scholars. Assessment at the gate from 
the perspective of social justice does not lead to a 
contamination of the discipline, but might contribute to 
a big clean up.   
b. Enhanced liability in chains of (cross-border) 
service provision.
The competence of authorities that control the genuine 
character of these operations ends at the territorial 
borders, whilst the operation as such refers to the 
EU-freedoms. This is inconsistent. The argument of 
protection of the market does not stand, given the fact 
that there are no other effective national remedies 
against abuses of the freedom of establishment and 
the free provision of services. Artificial arrangements 
in another constituency are, on the one hand, not easy 
to uncover, whereas on the other hand bankruptcy is 
an easy means to escape; it is therefore necessary to 
expand the liability of the user undertaking/client firm in 
such chains (both in the national and in the cross-border 
context). 
c. Regulation of service providers that are active 
EU-wide.
The relevant chapters of the Service Directive need 
revision. Control of activities in Member States of 
registration must be mandatory. The regulation of cross-
border service provision should include social safety nets 
against abuses, for instance by introducing a statutory 
declaration of ‘good repute’, based on a common frame 
of reference, for mobile service providers that invoke the 
freedom to provide services. 
d. Coherence of entities in order to protect work-
ers and their representation.
This is largely intertwined with the other recommen-
dations. However, it adds another mechanism that is 
relevant. The introduction of chains of involved entities 
through national and transnational holdings and subsid-
iaries makes abuse very easy. To treat activities with 
subsidiaries as a coherent ensemble (as discussed in the 
tax field) is a good point of reference. 
e. Social fraud should be qualified as a major 
offense with an EU-wide effect of sanctions.
Therefore, a fining policy should be worked out in the 
hard core of the Single Market acquis, with effective, 
proportionate and dissuasive sanctions against abuses 
and non-genuine operations. This includes withdrawal 
from the market, blacklisting and other strong penalties. 
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